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This dissertation analyzes one strand of post-independence anti-caste activism, that of 
transnational dalit activism. As an interdisciplinary work of anthropology and history, it 
draws from multi-site archival and ethnographic research. Each chapter focuses on a 
particular moment or aspect of transnational dalit activism and its translation of caste-
based discrimination into an internationally recognized wrong. Through an exploration of 
the affective and political bonds activists have developed with communities outside of 
India, and the simultaneous use and critique of human rights in dalit activism, this 
dissertation demonstrates how the global field has become critical to the 
conceptualization and articulation of social justice. Engagements in the global field also 
set this activism apart from the dominant anti-caste movement of modern India – that of 
B.R. Ambedkar’s movement for dalit rights. Specifically, in terms of its political strategy, 
identity politics, and conceptualization of caste, transnational dalit activism departs from 
Ambedkar’s movement. First, in terms of political strategy, this activism uses human 
rights discourse to communicate the problems and aspirations of dalits. It seeks support 
from institutions beyond the nation-state, and it internationalizes caste-based 
discrimination, ostensibly to connect with social justice movements outside of India and 
to generate international pressure on the Indian state to act in the interests of dalits. 
Second, regarding identity politics, this activism emphasizes a similarity in political 
identity with other groups, which is in contrast to Ambedkar’s use of a minority identity 
politics that emphasized dalit difference to claim rights. Activists construct dalit identity 
through analogies with groups outside of India that are perceived as sharing comparable 
histories of oppression and structural positions in their home societies.  Dalit identity is 
constructed through the citation of other groups and through the projection of 
membership in a virtual global community of comparably oppressed people. Third, 
activists have reinterpreted the very notion of “caste,” challenging most academic, 
popular, and state conceptualizations of the phenomenon. In transnational campaigns, 
“caste” is recast as a global phenomenon; it is not unique to Hinduism or India, but 
rather, is a generalizable category, a form of descent-based discrimination that is found 






 On November 25, 1949, in a speech anticipating the enactment of the Indian 
Constitution, B.R. Ambedkar pointed to a disjunction between political status and social 
reality that he feared would mark life in post-independent India:  
On 26
th
 of January 1950, we are going to enter into a life of contradictions. In 
politics we have equality and in social and economic life we have inequalities. In 
politics we will be recognizing the principles of one man one vote and one vote 
one value.  In our social and economic life, we shall, by reason of our social and 
economic structure, continue to deny the principle of one man, one vote. How 




“Political democracy,” he argued, could only thrive if joined with “social democracy.” 
Over sixty years after the ratification of the Constitution, the “contradiction” Ambedkar 
foresaw continues to affect the lives of many of India’s dalits.  Despite the prohibition of 
caste discrimination, the guarantees of civil rights, and positive obligations laid out for 
the state, dalits – the group perhaps most dramatically affected by the workings of caste – 
remain subject to systemic violence and discrimination. Government statistics show that 
dalits have the highest illiteracy rates and lowest life spans in India. They are among the 
poorest in the country, constituting over fifty percent of those living under the official 
poverty line, even though they are only seventeen percent of the country’s population. 
Human development indicators are worse for dalit women than the dalit community at 
large, and dalit women on average live a staggering fourteen years less than the general 
population. Activists interested in the annihilation of these disparities have had to 
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contend with the contradiction Ambedkar foresaw, namely the persistence of caste 
inequality in a nation-state context where both formal equality and “compensatory” 
discrimination, such as a reservation of seats in higher education and government jobs for 




This dissertation analyzes one strand of post-independence activism that targets 
the removal of caste inequality, that of transnational dalit activism.  In contrast to 
Ambedkar – for whom engagements with a larger global field did not fundamentally 
inform his politics and whose thinking on problems of caste remained within the context 
of the nation – later dalit activists imagined solidarity and alliances with groups across 
the world.
3
 For these activists, the global field became critical to the conceptualization 
and articulation of their politics of social justice. While Jotirao Phule’s imagining of 
solidarity with groups oceans away in the mid-nineteenth century reveals a deeper history 
to anti-caste activists’ interest in models of social change from afar, transnational 
activism has its most significant impact on the dalit movement after Indian independence.  
Over the last six decades, dalit activists have built connections with groups across the 
world, including, for example, with the Roma in central Europe, the Burakumin in Japan, 
African Americans in the United States, and landless workers in Brazil.  Groups such as 
the Dalit Panthers, the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights, the National 
Federation of Dalit Women, and Navsarjan Trust express a clear internationalist vision 
for the empowerment and liberation of all oppressed communities.  These connections, 
                                                 
2
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Equalities: Law and the Backward Classes in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984).   
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political visions, and solidarities are the focus of this dissertation; I draw out the 
transnational dimensions of this activism and illuminate the ways in which they reach 
beyond and transect the Indian state.  
Activists’ turn outward and abroad for solidarity and support seems linked to an 
increasing frustration with the “contradictions” Ambedkar foresaw between Indian 
political and social structure.  After independence, the state in India was to be the engine 
of social change and progress. By the 1970s, a sense of the state’s failure to live up to its 
own vision precipitated a move away from a solely statist approach to social change and 
a turn outward for models of protest and partners in the pursuit of social justice.  The 
economic reforms of the early 1990s seemed to have created a further disillusionment 
with the state and its promise to act in the interests of social justice. At the same time, 
however, India, as it sought more power on an international stage, seemed more invested 
in its international reputation as a thriving democracy and economic power. Transnational 
activism and the use of human rights then had the potential of using a politics of shame to 
pressure the Indian state into acting in the interests of dalits.
4
   
This dissertation explores two primary issues in transnational dalit activism: the 
affective and political bonds dalits have developed with other marginalized communities 
and social justice movements, and the simultaneous use and critique of human rights in 
dalit activism.  Through this exploration, I reveal a set of parallel and intertwined 
processes – how local, caste-specific experiences are made to resonate globally and how 
the global discourse of human rights is reworked and rearticulated by dalit activists.  I 
distinguish transnational dalit activism from other strands of post-independence anti-caste 
movements on the basis of three characteristics:  this activism seeks support from groups 
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and institutions beyond the nation-state. It internationalizes the issue of caste-based 
discrimination ostensibly to both disrupt the isolation of dalits in India and to generate 
international pressure for the Indian state to act in the interest of dalits.  Second, 
transnational dalit activism uses the language of human rights to articulate its protests and 
demands. It embraces a universalist discourse and analyzes the problems of caste 
discrimination and violence as global problems and as human rights violations. Lastly, 
this activism imagines and/or actualizes solidarity with other groups and social justice 
movements. This solidarity both aids in courting global support for dalits in India and 
shapes the representation of the anti-caste movement within India.
5
   
I demonstrate that transnational dalit activism uses a political logic and form of 
argumentation that departs from Ambedkar’s movement for dalit rights. Specifically, the 
internationalization of caste discrimination reworks previous conceptualizations of dalit 
identity and of caste. The dominant logic of Ambedkar’s anti-caste movement was one 
grounded in a minority identity politics that emphasized dalit difference – a difference in 
political identity from the majority of Indians.  Transnational dalit activism, in contrast, 
emphasizes a similarity in identity with other groups. These groups are deemed to be in 
comparable social positions to dalits in India, but critically, are outside of the Indian 
state. They are framed as having distinct histories of exploitation and marginalization, 
and yet dalit transnationalism sees parallels with the plight of these distant communities. 
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the concepts and vocabulary of internationally recognized human rights. Critically, Mandalism stays 
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What dalits are felt to share is an analogically similar history of oppression and 
marginalized structural position in society, in other words, a shared difference. A positive 
political identity of “minority” may be maintained within the context of the nation-state, 
but this is supplemented in human rights campaigns with appeals based in membership in 
a virtual global community of comparably oppressed people. While still an identity 
politics, in lieu of an argument based on dalit difference, activists use analogies and 
comparisons with other groups outside India – suggesting that dalits are just like African 
Americans under Jim Crow, Black South Africans under Apartheid, or Jews under the 
Nazis. Many of the groups referred to in these analogies have had successful social 
justice movements that have captured world attention. These analogies and comparisons 
have been mobilized for many ends, assuming political and pedagogical significance; 
they announce to the world that dalits are just like these other groups who galvanized 
international movements, and they also project a future for a successful dalit movement 
in India. Transnational activism thus communicates dalit identity and human rights 
claims through the “citation” of these other communities; the analysis of the politics of 
these “citations” forms a central focus of this dissertation.
6
  
 Through the internationalization of dalit issues, activists have also reinterpreted 
the very notion of “caste” itself, a transformation that challenges most academic, popular, 
and official statist understandings of caste. In international and transnational campaigns 
of dalit activists, “caste” is recast as a global phenomenon; it is a form of social 
stratification and inherited inequality that is found in societies across the world, 
including, for example, Japan, Yemen, Nigeria, and Senegal. This conceptualization of 
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caste emphasizes similarities with other forms of inequality and discrimination, and it 
suggests a mode of comprehending caste in India that focuses on these similarities, rather 
than on the differences between the social forms in question. A conceptualization of caste 
marked by its difference, its specificity to India or Hinduism, would preclude its 
globalization; as long as caste is exceptional, it remains unique to India and cannot be 
considered a particular form of a more general phenomenon. In human rights activists’ 
articulation of caste, caste was not unique to Hinduism or India; rather, “caste” was a 
heuristic category that enabled the understanding of a variety of local forms of inherited 
inequality. 
  
Background: Terms and Categories 
First coined by Jotirao Phule in the nineteenth century, the term ‘dalit’ has served 
as a central organizing identity for the anti-caste movements of post-independence India. 
The term comes from the Sanskrit root dal, meaning to break or crack and is often 
glossed in English as the oppressed, downtrodden, or crushed. Ambedkar first used the 
term in 1928 to describe one who had experienced degradation and deprivation, but 
‘dalit’ did not gain popularity as an identity until the 1960s.
 7
 During this period, the 
dynamic literary culture of Maharashtra gave ‘dalit’ the dominant meaning it has today: 
the designation of the groups officially identified by the Indian state as the “Scheduled 
Castes” and often glossed in English as “outcastes” or “untouchables,” and an identity of 
one subjected to the most extreme forms of caste oppression who also contests the 
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 Anupama Rao, The Caste Question: Dalits and the Politics of Modern India (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2009), 15.  
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justifications of that oppression.
 8
  The significance of ‘dalit’ lies not only in its 
contestation of the other terms – most notably harijan – used for those from Schedule 
Caste communities, but also, as Anupama Rao writes, in its “politics of naming,” in how 
it generates  “new relationships between words and bodies, between new ways of being 
and ways of seeing and speaking within the social field.”
9
  In her discussion of the term 
‘dalit’ and the surrounding politics of naming, Rao argues that ‘dalit’ is both “analytic 
and prescriptive: it defines the historical structures and practices of dispossession that 
experientially mark someone as Dalit and simultaneously identifies the Dalit as someone 
seeking to escape those same structures.”
10
  A ‘dalit’ identity thus recalls a history of 
oppression and humiliation, while also asserting opposition to the social order responsible 
for producing that oppression. An identity with political content, ‘dalit’ signals 
membership in a collective movement against exclusion, exploitation, and degradation 
and announces an assertion of rights and a refusal to tolerate inequality. Following Rao, I 
also use the term ‘dalit’ even when it is anachronistic.  
 The term “caste” is believed to have derived from the Portuguese use of the word 
‘casta,’ meaning pure or chaste, to describe Indian social organization. “Caste” is not a 
term found in any South Asian language, but is conventionally used to refer to two local 
concepts of social relations: varna and jati. 
11
  The varna system refers to the four-fold, 
occupation-based division of society laid out in Hindu texts written in the first few 
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include avarna, meaning without varna or caste, and panchama, or fifth varna. 
9
 Rao, Caste Question, 16.   
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the Indian society.” See Padmanabh Samarendra, “Census in Colonial India and the Birth of Caste,” 
Economic and Political Weekly XLVI, no 33 (August 13, 2011): 51-58.   
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centuries of the Common Era, such as the Dharamasatras. In this model, society is 
divided into four varnas – the Brahmin, or priests and scholars; the Kshytria, or kings and 
soldiers; the Vaishya, or merchants; and the Shudra, or laborers – each with differential 
rights, privileges, and obligations.  Dalits are not formally included in this scheme, but, as 
evidenced by designations such as avarna (without varna) or panchama (fifth varna), can 
be considered included within it through their very exclusion.
12
 Jati refers to the 
endogamous groups most relevant for the everyday operations and manifestations of 
social life. There are thousands of jatis within India and hundreds of Scheduled Caste 
jatis.  This dissertation does not take up issues of varna or jati, but rather focuses on 
“caste” – as a sociological, anthropological, and political category used to make sense of 
the social order in India – and “dalit” – as an epistemological position and category of 
being explicitly in opposition to inequality based on varna, jati, or caste.  I focus on 
“caste” because that is the category activists use to translate the structures generating 
discrimination and violence towards dalits and on “dalit” because that is the organizing 
identity behind this movement for rights.    
 The subjects of my research are activists.  By activists, I mean individuals, 
groups, or organizations who are engaged in the pursuit of social justice.  This 
engagement seeks not just the amelioration of suffering within the confines of the status 
quo, but rather strives for structural change to produce radical shifts in the organization of 
power and resources in society. Throughout this dissertation I describe the work of these 
activists as “international” or “transnational” activism.  “International” refers to 
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connections among nation-states or connections across borders that reference the nation-
state system. I use “transnational” to refer to relationships among people and movements 
that traverse nation-state boundaries such that the latter become porous or even “border-
less.” These relationships draw attention to alliances around identity or global issues and 
emphasize connections and cooperation among people. “Transnational” as a category of 
relations has drawn significant scholarly attention over the last couple of decades, and my 
own understanding of the term is derived from feminist studies. Feminist scholarship, 
such as the work of Chandra Talpande Mohanty, Inderpal Grewal, and Ella Shoat, uses 
‘transnational’ to draw attention to processes of colonialism, imperialism, and global 
capitalism in structuring the forces that oppress men and women across the world.
13
 
While focusing on the intersection and simultaneity of race, class, gender, nationality, 
ethnicity and sexuality in the lives of individuals, it also draws attention to the 
possibilities of organizing and protest across nation-state borders.  My use of 
‘transnational’ also borrows from historian Jean H. Quataert’s description of the term. In 
her analysis of human rights as a form of “globalization from below,” she argues that 
“transnational” is more than a “descriptive term.”
14
  “Transnational,” she maintains,   
is a dynamic analytical tool that simultaneously keeps in focus local contexts and 
international settings.  It is a perspective that moves seamlessly from local 
through national and regional to international arenas and back again, all the while 
addressing the transnational responses to local situations, on the one hand, and 
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crediting the grassroots pressures on regional and international decision-making 




 I thus use “transnational” not only to describe one strand of anti-caste activism, but also 
to highlight a critical orientation: the activism that I analyze links the local with the 
global, drawing attention to processes of exclusion and marginalization and striving to 
connect people with different histories and in different spaces with the possibility of a 
shared politics.  For this reason, I use the term “transnational” to refer to connections 
before India was a nation-state, albeit anachronistically.  
  
B.R. Ambedkar 
 This dissertation begins and ends with a chapter on Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar 
(1891-1956). Indeed, an analysis of Ambedkar’s political work and philosophy seems an 
essential part of a study of dalit activism. Ambedkar not only dedicated his life to the 
empowerment of the dalits, but he also committed himself to the restructuring of Indian 
society; and for this, he used the experiences of the historically most dispossessed 
community in India to generate universalist values of equality, liberty, and fraternity.  His 
life and legacy continue to exert enormous force, both symbolic and concrete, on anti-
caste movements. In addition, the shift in argument and logic that occurs with 
transnational dalit activism can only be fully grasped by first recounting Ambedkar’s 
contributions to the movement to annihilate caste.  
Ambedkar was born in 1891 into the dalit Mahar community and rose to become 
one of the most educated Indians of his time. After receiving a scholarship from the 
Gaekwar of Baroda, Ambedkar travelled to the United States in 1913 to study at 
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Columbia University. He studied anthropology and economics and ultimately earned a 
doctorate for his thesis The Evolution of Provincial Finance in British India.  In 1916, he 
began a doctoral thesis at the London School of Economics and also became a barrister 
after passing the bar exam at Gray’s Inn.  Ambedkar’s education is often remembered as 
symbolic of his disruptions of the caste order: dalits had long suffered from the denial of 
education and under the ideal moral life of the varna system, the pursuit of knowledge 
would be limited to Brahmins. 
Ambedkar began his career as spokesperson for dalits in arbitrations with the 
colonial government in 1919 when, having returned to India, he was consulted by the 
Southborough Committee about upcoming electoral reforms. Ambedkar spent much of 
the next four decades advocating for the rights of dalits. Among his most notable 
campaigns was his Mahad satyagraha in 1927 for dalit access to the Chavdar water tank 
and his movement for dalit rights to enter the Kalram Temple in 1930. To signal a 
dramatic defiance of the caste order, Ambedkar and his followers burned a copy of the 
Manusmriti, an ancient Hindu legal code, in the 1927 satyagraha. In the early 1930s, 
Ambedkar encountered one of the most significant political battles of his career in a 
dispute with M.K. Gandhi over separate electorates for the Depressed Classes. Ambedkar 
was forced to concede to Gandhi after he had initiated a “fast-unto-death” to protest 
separate electorates, but the event resulted in an enduring distrust of both Gandhi and the 
Congress Party.  
With Indian independence, Ambedkar became Minister of Law and Chair of the 
Drafting Commission of the Constitution. For this reason, dalits today honor him with the 
appellation of India’s modern Manu. In 1948, Nehru appointed Ambedkar to preside over 
12 
 
the drafting of a new Hindu Code, a process that had been initiated in 1941. When 
Ambedkar’s version of the Code was rejected without protest from Nehru in September 
1951, Ambedkar resigned from Nehru’s cabinet.  After announcing his rejection of 
Hinduism and plan to convert into another belief system in 1935, Ambedkar formally 
converted to Buddhism in a public ceremony on October 14, 1956, a date which was 
considered to be the anniversary of Mauryan Emperor Ashoka’s conversion to Buddhism 
in 262 BCE. He died less than two months later in December 1956. 
 
Methodology 
As an interdisciplinary work of anthropology and history and of contemporary 
history, this dissertation draws from several fields of inquiry and also from several 
sources. Research for this project required multi-site archival and ethnographic research. 
After conducting research at the Maharashtra State Archives, the National Archives of 
India, the British Library’s India Office Records, and the National Campaign for Dalit 
Human Rights (NCDHR), the National Federation of Dalit Women (NFDW), and 
Navsarjan organizational archives, I have created a collection of sources in Hindi, 
Gujarati, and English that speak to the history of dalit transnationalism. There was not 
one primary or established archive from which I gathered material. Rather, I created an 
“archive” that spoke to the topic of this dissertation.  I also studied national-level dalit 
organizations such as the NCDHR and the NFDW and conducted ethnographic research 
with Navsarjan Trust, a grassroots human rights organization in the state of Gujarat. I 
interviewed dalit activists in Ahmedabad, Bangalore, Mumbai, and New Delhi in Hindi, 
Gujarati, or English.  
13 
 
I use these interviews as “data” insofar as they communicate a representation of 
the activism in question. Sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology have cautioned 
against a methodological strategy of interpreting interviews as direct channels to the 
interviewee’s thoughts and behavior. Anthropologist Charles Briggs suggests that it is the 
“objectivist ideology that underlies interview techniques…that leads us to believe we are 
capturing features of our subjects’ behavior and belief.”
16
  Instead, he argues that 
interviews should be analyzed as “communicative events” in which both interviewer and 
interviewee are “co-participant[s] in the construction of a discourse.”
17
 Recalling Briggs’ 
caution about the nature of interviews, I read the interviews from my research as 
extensions of activist campaigning itself. The activists I met knew that I was a doctoral 
student from an American university researching dalit activism.  My position as someone 
who would write about dalits to a foreign audience influenced almost all of my 
conversations with activists.  My questions were quite frequently viewed as interview 
questions whose answers could and probably would be disseminated to foreign publics.  
Activists spoke to me about their campaigns, I believe, knowing that their representations 
would be circulated to a wider, even global audience. The intersubjective environment 
created by the interview was one in which I was likely viewed as someone who would 
increase the visibility of dalit issues and dalit activism. I analyze these interviews as I do 
the textual or visual representations of activist campaigns. I do not assume that activists’ 
responses to my questions are unmediated descriptions of their feelings, beliefs, or 
actions; rather, I try to contextualize their responses as part of a larger campaign for the 
visibility of dalit issues and try to analyze the logic of the visibility that activists seek.  
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Dalits and the Nation in Dalit Studies 
 Eleanor Zelliot’s and Gail Omvedt’s pioneering studies of Ambedkar and his 
movement for dalit rights anticipated key themes in the emerging field of dalit studies. 
Zelliot and Omvedt focused on Ambedkar’s rearticulation of the political and cultural 
identity of India’s untouchables; both scholars argue that resignifying identity was a key 
means for the empowerment of dalits in the late colonial period.
18
  In the 1990s, a spate 
of writings on dalits and the dalit movement renewed interest in the history, perspectives, 
and social justice movements of dalits in India. Identity was again a central focus of this 
scholarship, but in distinction from Zelliot and Omvedt’s work, this field of dalit studies 
emphasized dalit difference and the political significance of this assertion of difference. 
The establishment of autonomous dalit women’s organizations seems to have influenced 
this direction in the scholarship. The emergence of organized dalit feminist activism 
initiated an interest in conceptualizing the kind of identity politics at work in the dalit 
movement and led to scholarly debates about the emancipatory potential of dalit 
feminists’ assertion of their “difference.”
19
 This notion of “difference,” however, was 
primarily analyzed within the nation-state context; “dalit difference” offered a critique of 
leftist social justice movements, but the implications of “dalit difference” for 
transnational activism were not considered.  
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Histories of dalit communities have similarly neglected the global context.  
Historical studies such as Vijay Prashad’s and Ramnarayan S. Rawat have provided 
extremely important accounts of the role of colonial and national processes in 
reproducing ‘untouchability,’ specifically through assumptions about the association 
between caste and occupation.
20
 These studies, however, remain histories of the nation as 
much as they are histories of dalit communities.  In a similar vein, Dilip Menon provides 
a compelling argument of the analysis of caste and untouchability in studies of modern 
Indian history.
21
  Noting a pattern of lower caste assertion followed by communal 
violence, he contends that caste is central to understanding communalism in India, 
suggesting that “communalism in India may well be the return of the repressed histories 
of caste.”
22
  In this reading, histories of caste become important for their contribution to 
studies of communalism and again, of the nation. In her ground-breaking study, 
Anupama Rao, however, excavates a history of “caste radicalism” that is essential to 
understanding political modernity in India and, more generally, to the history of 
democracy.
23
 The significance of dalit history here resonates beyond the nation-state into 
a global context; Rao demonstrates how dalit struggles speak to the histories of ideas 
such as equality, rights and democracy.  While I am indebted to the scholarship on dalits 
and the dalit movement, my approach to the study of dalit activism tries to avoid 
subsuming its narrative into the greater narrative of the nation. I try to remain attentive to 
activists’ perceptions of their national and global contexts and to the implications of this 
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activism in a global context.  In this way, I hope this dissertation can also illuminate 
possibilities for internationalizing South Asian history and for mapping the history of the 
region through transnational connections.  
  
Chapter Overview 
 Each chapter of my dissertation focuses on a particular moment or aspect of dalit 
activism and its translation of caste-based discrimination into an internationally 
recognized wrong. Chapter 1, “Ambedkar’s Buddhism: A Theology for Modernity,” 
provides a historical and intellectual context for post-independence dalit movements. I 
begin with an exposition of Ambedkar’s thought and work because (1) he offers a 
political foundation for dalit assertions of rights within the Indian state and (2) he remains 
a key symbol for transnational dalit activism, despite its departure from his political 
philosophy. Ambedkar is not only paid deference in transnational anti-caste activism, but 
he appears as an authorizing figure, the figure in whose name activism is pursued. In this 
chapter, after detailing Ambedkar’s commitment to legislative and constitutional 
measures for the eradication of caste inequality, I analyze his reformulation of Buddhism. 
I argue that Ambedkar’s turn to Buddhism precipitates a shift away from minority 
politics as the means of dalit empowerment. Through his revision of Buddhism, 
Ambedkar offered a new historical awareness and ethical paradigm for the liberation of 
dalits and the entire Indian nation. Conversion to Buddhism was to inculcate a new 
cultural identity and ethics to supplement the laws and policies of the new Indian state.  
Ambedkar, however, continued to imagine the liberation of dalits within the nation-state 
framework. He deemed Buddhism an ‘indigenous’ universalism and in this way, the new 
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identity and ethics he imparted to dalits was fundamentally “Indian,” and dalit issues 
remained framed within a specific history of oppression. While Ambedkar did engage in 
an international field, the international context did not substantially affect his 
prescriptions for dalits or the Indian nation.  Subsequent chapters of this dissertation 
explore how engagement with a global context changed the argument for dalit rights.  
Chapter 2, “National Minority, Global Majority: Episodes in Dalit 
Transnationalism,” narrates the trend towards transnationalism and the turn away from 
activism limited to the national context.  It recounts five episodes of transnational dalit 
activism, beginning with Ambedkar’s correspondence with W.E.B. DuBois. This 
correspondence was as an early effort, but one that ultimately did not come to fruition, to 
internationalize dalit issues. The four subsequent episodes analyze the activism of the 
Dalit Panthers, diasporic dalit groups, international human rights organizations and 
networks, and Navsarjan Trust. I describe my approach to this history as episodic because 
it recounts discrete histories, rather than linearly tracing a historical development, and 
discerns recurrences and congruities over different historical moments; the narrative that 
emerges from these different pieces then aids an understanding of dalit activism. The 
three primary developments that recur in these different moments of transnational 
activism are (1) a claim of similarity in social position and in politics with another 
community; (2) the expansion of “dalit” as an identity not limited to those subjected to 
caste oppression; and (3) a rearticulation of caste as a global phenomena, as a form of 
inherited inequality not unique to India, but rather that occurs in societies across the 
world.  Chapter 3, “Generalizing Caste: Histories of Caste as Inherited Inequality” picks 
up on the latter theme and provides a deeper history to the conceptualization of caste in 
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transnational activism.  Starting with a speech by radical Republican senator Charles 
Sumner in 1869, I trace a history of the term “caste” in which it referred to a system of 
social stratification and inherited inequality.  In this history, “caste” was not 
geographically restricted to the Indian subcontinent nor was its development solely linked 
to the effects of Hinduism in Indian society.  While India may have provided the best or 
original example of caste and its processes, “caste” in this history is defined in terms of 
relational criteria and social features that were not limited to a geographic place.  This 
notion diverges from official, scholarly, and even Ambedkar’s conceptualizations of 
caste, but as this chapter demonstrates, this notion also enables the internationalization of 
dalit grievances and transnational activism.  
 Chapters 4, 5, and 6 analyze three examples of this internationalization through a 
discussion of national-level dalit organizations and their transnational activism. Chapter 
4, “ The NCDHR’s Black Paper: Countering State Neglect with Dalit Human Rights,” 
discusses the formation of the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights and its 
inaugural human rights campaign in 1998. I argue that NCDHR’s appeal to human rights 
expresses both frustration with the Indian state for its failure to fulfill the promises of the 
Constitution and concern that the economic reforms of the early 1990s were further 
eroding the state’s responsibility to act in the interest of social justice. The NCDHR also 
challenges some of the premises of human rights, putting forth a conceptualization of 
universal rights that critiques the scope of acceptable liberty in liberal theory; challenges 
the state-centered approach implicit in both the theory and practice of human rights; 
highlights the need for positive obligations from the state; and underscores the violence 
of neglect.  This chapter then illustrates the contradictions of dalit human rights activism 
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as it reaches beyond the state to enact changes within the state. First, the NCDHR, 
representing a marginalized community in a postcolonial country, conceives of liberal 
human rights as part of a complex of ideas that have enabled global inequality. Ironically, 
the NCDHR’s reconstitution of human rights revises the international discourse so that it 
more closely resembles Ambedkar’s political philosophy.  Second, while the NCDHR’s 
revision of human rights maps onto Ambedkar’s liberation theory, its conceptualization 
of dalit identity and caste critically departs from Ambedkar’s.  
Chapter 5, “Dalit Activism at WCAR, 2001,” analyzes the mobilization of the 
NCDHR’s concept of identity and caste in its campaign at the United Nations World 
Conference Against Racism held in Durban, South Africa in 2001. Activists argued that 
caste-discrimination constituted a form of inherited inequality, specifically a form of 
discrimination based on descent; this then rendered caste discrimination analogous to 
discrimination based on race. I analyze the debate that ensued among scholars, activists, 
and politicians over the NCDHR’s conceptualization of caste and draw attention to the 
Indian state’s efforts to block all discussion of caste at WCAR. This chapter then 
highlights a tension in transnational activism: while the NCDHR seeks an international 
system of human rights that embodies the understanding of rights found in the 
Constitution of India, it is the Indian state that puts up the most resistance to the 
internationalization of caste discrimination.   
 Chapter 6, “NFDW and Transnational Dalit Feminist Activism,” disaggregates 
dalit activism and highlights the tensions that erupt around a failure to address all forms 
of inequality within the movement.  This chapter offers the perspective of dalit feminists, 
a group that have felt marginalized within both anti-caste and women’s movements.  It 
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focuses on the National Federation of Dalit Women and traces key moments in the 
development of its international advocacy.  I analyze the how dalit feminists contend with 
their marginalization within both anti-caste and women’s movements and argue that 
transnational alliances and solidarity with other communities of marginalized women – 
from an allegiance of camaraderie with Angela Davis to an alliance against sexual 
exploitation between former devadasis and former comfort women – have enabled dalit 
feminists to transcend the ideological contradictions of these social movements.  My 
understanding of the alliances around sexual exploitation draws from Margaret Keck’s 
and Kathryn Sikkink’s analysis of transnational advocacy networks. Keck and Sikkink 
define these networks as “those actors working internationally on an issue, who are 
bound together by shared values, a common discourse and dense exchange of information 
and services.”
 24
 I use their model of advocacy networks to analyze how dalit feminists 
translate the caste-based practice of the dedication of dalit girls into the devadasi system 
and how they build “a common discourse” about human rights violations against women.   
Chapter 7, “Ambedkar on the Women’s Question,” returns to Ambedkar’s 
political philosophy, but offers a critical reading of his views on and prescriptions for 
dalit women. I expose the gender biases in Ambedkar’s thought and highlight the 
strategic use of patriarchal codes of respectability in his movement for dalit rights and 
empowerment. Ambedkar’s views on women and gender, I argue, compromise his 
universalism,  and this legacy of sexism has produced a tension in post-independence 
anti-caste movements that has yet to be resolved. By calling attention to Ambedkar’s 
sexism, this chapter suggests that an exclusionary impulse existed in the foundation of 
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modern anti-caste movements, and that the legacy of this can be discerned in 
contemporary dalit activism, especially around issues related to gender.  
By bookending this dissertation with discussions of Ambedkar, I hope to impart 
the relevance of his legacy for contemporary activists and highlight the contradictions 
and tensions that emerge from the idealization of Ambedkar. Chapter 1 demonstrates that 
Ambedkar’s movement for dalit rights was premised on a particular notion of identity, 
one built around dalit difference in political identity. Chapter 7 highlights how Ambedkar 
also insisted on an identity for dalits that conformed to the predominant notions of 
respectability at the time; those outside the norms for respectability were excluded from 
Ambedkar’s movement.  As Chapters 2-6 demonstrate, transnational dalit activism 
departs from both of these aspects of Ambedkar’s identity politics. Transnational dalit 
activism stresses similarity in political interest and identity with groups outside of India – 
groups that are deemed to be in comparable structural positions to dalits. It also empties 
dalit identity of its national specificity and constructs this identity through a projection of 
dalits’ membership in a virtual global community of struggling peoples. Despite this 
departure from the logic of Ambedkar’s movement, Ambedkar remains the key emblem 
of transnational dalit activism. In another irony, activists completely discount the 
exclusionary impulses present in Ambedkar’s liberation philosophy, even as these 
ideological tensions continue to strain the universalist ideology of contemporary anti-
caste activism.  By anchoring my analysis of transnational dalit activism in discussions of 
Ambedkar, each chapter adds to the unpacking and elucidation of the contradictions that 





Ambedkar’s Buddhism: A Theology for Modernity 
 
In a speech broadcasted on All-India Radio in 1954, B.R. Ambedkar declared that 
his social ideology was neither inspired by a European intellectual tradition nor did it 
have a secular logic. Rather, he claimed that it had an indigenous origin and was 
fundamentally based in religion:    
my Social Philosophy may be said to be enshrined in three words: Liberty, 
Equality, and Fraternity.  Let no one, however, say that I have borrowed my 
philosophy from the French Revolution. I have not. My philosophy has roots in 





While Buddhist philosophy has been cited as an Indian intellectual tradition comparable 
to views emerging from the European Enlightenment – as a body of thought that is 
equivalent in content but genealogically distinct from Enlightenment philosophy – in the 
passage above, Ambedkar is not arguing for a similarity between Enlightenment and 
Buddhist philosophies.
 26
  Rather, he seems to juxtapose them to highlight their 
difference. Ambedkar uses one of the key slogans of the French Revolution and the 
national motto of France – “Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity” – only to claim that for 
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him, those values are not derived from European political theory but rather from the 
religious teachings of the Buddha.  His usage of a phrase so closely associated with the 
triumphs of the Enlightenment, its political revolutions and doctrines of humanism and 
rights, indicates a complicated engagement with European discourses of liberation.  
 From the 1920s onwards, Ambedkar pursued the liberation of dalits through an 
ingenious use of “political science” – the logics and frameworks of liberalism, 
constitutionalism, and democracy.  He argued that dalits constituted a distinct and 
separate community within India and used the political logic of difference to protect 
against dalit exclusion.  As Anupama Rao has demonstrated, Ambedkar relied on the 
liberal category of “minority” to argue for the promotion of dalit interest.  In Rao’s 
words, this strategy was “characterized by the exacerbation of difference in order to 
obviate it.”
27
 As a “minority,” dalits appeared as a community in sharp distinction and 
irreconcilably separate from caste Hindus. A ‘minority identity,’ a category itself derived 
from European “political science,” was a central part of Ambedkar’s struggle for a 
political resolution to the inequality, exclusion, and disenfranchisement of dalits within 
Hindu society and under the colonial institutional and electoral system.
 28
  
In the statement quoted above, however, Ambedkar announced a departure from 
European “political science” and placed the liberatory promise of the creed “Liberty, 
Equality, and Fraternity” within the realm of religion rather than political theory.  While 
Ambedkar never abandoned political channels to dalit empowerment, his conversion to 
Buddhism marked a change in the form of community he imagined for the liberation of 
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dalits in India.  In this chapter, I argue that after Indian independence and his adoption of 
Buddhism, Ambedkar rejected the logic of minority politics and approached the pursuit 
of dalit liberation through the formation of a new community.  Dalit empowerment and 
national fraternity, as I will show, was then pursued not through the assertion of 
difference and a minority identity, but rather through the creation of a new moral 
community – that of Buddhism – for all of India. This form of community was cultural 
by design and was part and parcel of a new historical awareness that Ambedkar projected 
for dalits and the new nation. In this chapter, I first discuss Ambedkar’s use of “minority 
identity” as a political category that amplified difference in identity in order to counter 
historical and manifest inequality.  I then turn to his critiques of liberal political theories, 
his interpretation of Indian history, and his conversion to Buddhism to demonstrate his 
departure from minority identity politics.  
 
Ambedkar Studies 
Over the last two decades, Ambedkar's life and work has been the source of 
renewed interest among scholars of South Asia. While Eleanor Zelliot and Gail Omvedt 
began publishing on Ambedkar in the 1970s, his contributions as a nationalist leader, 
social reformer, and theorist of caste remained somewhat neglected in the historical and 
anthropological scholarship on India. In their pioneering studies of Ambedkar and his 
anti-caste movement, Zelliot and Omvedt focus on his effort to reconstitute dalit identity 
and his commitment to the political and democratic process.
29
  Both scholars underscore 
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the primacy of the social and religious in Ambedkar’s struggle against caste. They 
emphasize Ambedkar’s focus on the “superstructure” in bringing about social change by 




Ambedkar’s political leadership has been the focus of several recent biographical 
and historical studies.  Valerian Rodrigues emphasizes the uniqueness of Ambedkar’s 
insistence that that the movement for dalit rights be led by dalits.
31
 Ambedkar distrusted 
the reformist designs of Congress leaders, and insisted upon dalit agency in the 
destruction of caste and the reorganization of Indian society.  Rodrigues also notes that 
Ambedkar repeatedly strove to join dalits in coalitions with other oppressed groups. His 
attempts at mobilizing mass followings through his political parties – the Independent 
Labour Party, 1936 and the Republican Party, 1956 – have been analyzed as part of his 
effort to join dalits, peasants, and non-Brahmins in a political movement. Christophe 
Jaffrelot notes that a consistent tension between forging an identity of difference for 
dalits and joining dalits with other oppressed groups can be found throughout 
Ambedkar’s political activities. Jaffrelot interprets the formation of the Scheduled Caste 
Federation just six years after the Independent Labour Party as a result of Ambedkar’s 
fear of “diluting the identity of his movement” and indicative of the “a key dilemma of 
his approach: must Untouchables conceive of themselves as an entirely separate 
group?”
32
 While Jaffrelot analyzes Ambedkar’s conversion and reworking of Buddhism 
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as a “strategy of emancipation,” he neglects to see it as providing resolution to this “key 
dilemma,” to the tensions in a strategy based on dalit difference, an interpretation that I 
will offer later in this chapter.   
Literary theorist Gauri Viswanathan’s reads Ambedkar’s conversion as inherently 
political, as both a critique and a strategic maneuver with demographic significance. She 
discusses Ambedkar’s dissatisfaction with the modern secular state as an antidote to caste 
oppression and reads his conversion to Buddhism as effectively revealing “the wide gap 
between the secular commitment to the removal of civil disabilities and the secular state’s 
persistent functioning within a majoritarian ethic.”
33
  Viswanathan provides a compelling 
analysis of Ambedkar’s Buddhism as a “form of political and cultural criticism” and 
“dissent against the identities constructed by the state.”
34
 While she accurately points out 
Ambedkar’s frustration with the state’s functioning with a “majoritarian ethic,” her 
reading of conversion as a denouncement of secularism as a “universalist world view 
stalling the processes of enfranchisement” does not resonate with my reading of 
Ambedkar’s thought. Throughout his activist career, Ambedkar stayed committed to the 
democratic process and to secularism as a governmental ideology. Conversion, it seems, 
was meant to supplement the governmental laws and institutions of independent India to 
facilitate the establishment of liberty, equality, and fraternity.   
Anupama Rao argues that Ambedkar’s conversion exemplifies the importance of 
both the political and religious arenas as sites of liberation. Conversion also put forth a 
distinct identity for dalits that unambiguously cast off the denigration of dalits as 
“degraded Hindus.” Another contribution of Rao’s monograph on anti-caste radicalism is 
                                                 
33
 Gauri Viswanathan, Outside the Fold: Conversion, Modernity, and Belief (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1998), 214. 
34
 Gauri Viswanathan, Outside the Fold, 213.   
27 
 
her discussions of Ambedkar’s innovations in transforming the liberal category of 
equality as caste equality. In this way, she reveals Ambedkar’s work as pivotal to the 
history Indian democracy and political modernity more generally.  
While Rao analyzes Ambedkar’s creative translations and innovations of liberal 
political theory, historian Ananya Vajpeyi explores Ambedkar’s nationalist politics in 
terms of his reconceptualization of duhkha, a concept she categorizes as part of an “Indic 
tradition.”
35
 Duhkha is conventionally translated as sorrow or suffering and within 
Buddhist and Hindu practice, this suffering is commonly interpreted as individual 
suffering brought on by the work of karma. Vajpeyi suggests that in his exposition of 
Buddhism, Ambedkar redefines duhkha as social suffering arising from caste and deems 
it collective suffering.  In my reading, Ambedkar does not limit duhkha to the work of 
caste; rather, he espouses a more generalizable understanding in which duhkha is the 
product of various forms of man-made inequality and exploitation. Vajpeyi does, 
however, accurately note that Ambedkar presents a reading of Buddhism that focuses on 
the social aspects of its doctrines rather than the transcendental and metaphysical. While 
many scholars have related this to Ambedkar’s particular emancipatory project for dalits, 
Vajpeyi sees this as evidence of his being “estranged” from Indic traditions.
36
 She claims 
that Ambedkar’s interpretation “renders Buddhism unrecognizable as itself” and indicates 
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Ambedkar’s “distance from a certain civilizational orientation.”
37
  The “civilizational” 
traditions Vajpeyi refers to are based on Sanskritic texts and Brahmanical Hinduism. By 
suggesting that Ambedkar – the only dalit out of the five thinkers she analyzes - is 
alienated from Indic traditions, Vajpeyi reinforces an upper-caste and elitist bias and 
invalidates Ambedkar’s (and other lower caste) critiques of these traditions as oppressive 
ideologies.
 38
   
While recent scholarship has elucidated Ambedkar’s social philosophy, political 
strategies, and contributions to political theory and social justice, Vajpeyi’s recent work 
shows the persistence of the marginalization and, at times, denigration of Ambedkar and 
his liberation movement by certain schools of South Asian history.
39
  Ambedkar has long 
been accused of disloyalty to the nation, an accusation that is often wielded at 
contemporary dalit activists as well. While Vajpeyi identifies Ambedkar as a nationalist 
leader, her interpretation of his revision of Buddhism suggests an alienation from the 
cultural fabric of the nation and ends up excluding him from the pantheon of 
foundational, nationalist leaders.  Ambedkar thus appears as an outsider, estranged from 
the values and traditions that constitute Indic civilization.  The works of Zelliot, Omvedt, 
Rodrigues, Jaffrelot, Viswanathan, Rao, and others, however, have excavated 
Ambedkar’s contributions and have analyzed the significance of these for both India and 
political modernity in general. They have drawn attention to the oft neglected visions of 
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social justice and the Indian nation that Ambedkar strived to actualize and have helped 
stimulate a renewed scholarly interest in his work and philosophy.   
In this chapter, I approach Ambedkar’s social and political philosophy with an 
eye towards contemporary dalit activism. In particular, I hope my exposition will offer a 
historical and intellectual context for modern dalit movements, and will also detail the 
political insights inherited by dalit activists after Ambedkar.  I analyze Ambedkar’s 
rearticulation and resignification of Indic tradition and focus on the forms of community 
Ambedkar imagined for the liberation of dalits and the entire nation after Indian 
independence.  
 
Jotirao Phule and E.V. Ramaswamy, a Predecessor and Contemporary 
 When Ambedkar began advocating for the rights of dalits in 1919, he joined an 
anti-caste movement that had for decades appealed to the colonial government on behalf 
of the oppressed castes.
 40
  Within Ambedkar’s Mahar community in western India, 
activists such as Gopal Baba Valangkar (?-1900) and Shivram Janba Kamble (1875-
1942) grounded their arguments for greater opportunities within the colonial structure in 
historical claims of pre-Aryan, indigenous, or Kshatriya lineage.
41
 For both of these 
activists as well as for Ambedkar, the leadership and intellectual project of Jotirao 
Govindrao Phule (1827-1890) was seminal in the development of their activism.  Phule, 
born into a shudra community, placed the historical reconstruction of lower-caste identity 
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at the center of his activist project and thus also aspired for the reconfiguration of 
community identity as a means of social change. Phule put forth a speculative history in 
which Brahmins were foreign conquerors who subdued the indigenous population 
through “that weird system of mythology, the ordination of caste and the code of cruel 
and inhuman laws.”
42
  This indigenous population was deemed the ancestors of Shudra 
and Dalit communities. Phule maintained the identification of Brahmins with Aryans 
found in Orientalist historiography, but resignified the elements of the Orientalist 
construction of Indian history. Aryan Brahmins appeared as brute and uncivilized people 
in Phule’s history and the indigenous people as prosperous and advanced.  He thus 
inverted the dominant theory of the Aryan conquest and put forth a history in which the 
dominant tropes were of struggle, violence, and clashes of power. His narrative of the 
conquest of the indigenous people included ten phases, which he claimed were 
mythologized as the ten incarnations of Vishnu.  In this way, Phule redefined Hindu 
mythology and read it as a chronicle of the Aryan/Brahmin assault on India. In her study 
of Phule, Rosalind O’Hanlon writes that for non-Brahmins, “the discovery of his real 
identity, and of the hidden history of his ancestors” from Phule’s history “was intended to 
bring about an upheaval in emotions as well as in his reasoned understanding of his social 
environment.”
43
 Phule’s intellectual and activist project called for the unity of shudras 
and dalits to dismantle Brahmanical power and the caste system.  He espoused a 
universal theism that proclaimed equality among all castes and between both sexes. 
Ambedkar professed inspiration from Phule and although his histories rejected the claim 
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of pre-Aryan and Kshatriya status, he too employed the tropes of struggle and conflict in 
his reconstruction of the Indian past and developed a new religion to reorient the 
identities of the lower castes.  
In addition to the activism in western India, anti-caste movements were also 
gaining momentum in South India during the colonial period. The most notable of these 
was the Self-Respect Movement, led by Ambedkar’s contemporary, E.V. Ramaswamy or 
Periyar (1879-1973), and like the non-Brahman movement in Maharashtra, it stressed a 
non-Aryan and indigenous origin of the lower castes.
44
  Periyar’s work combined 
socialism, distrust of Congress, Tamil nationalism, and opposition to caste. Periyar had 
joined the Indian National Congress in 1919, but left in 1925, frustrated and disappointed 
by Congress’ recalcitrance on issues of social reform. In 1926, he founded the Self-
Respect League, which espoused opposition to the caste order and skepticism of all 
religions , in particular, the power of  Brahmin priesthood. It also extolled rationalism 
and made women’s equality and rights a centerpiece of his movement. Periyar travelled 
to Malaysia, several countries in Europe, and the Soviet Union between 1929 and 1932; 
and the latter left a significant impact on his economic thinking.  In 1944, he reorganized 
the Justice Party, renaming it Dravida Kazhagam, with the explicit goal of Dravidian self-
determination.  In her assessment of the Periyar, Gail Omvedt argues that although 
Periyar tirelessly struggled for the abolition of untouchability and the caste order, the 
Self-Respect and Dravidian Movement failed to attract a mass dalit following.
45
 Internal 
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fractures limited the movement’s appeal. As Omvedt writes, “The South thus witnessed a 
powerful non-brahman movement and a strong opposition to ‘Hinduism’ but more than 




 While Phule and Periyar remain key figures in the history of anti-caste 
movements and continue to inspire contemporary activism, Ambedkar emerges as the 
first dalit leader to have appeal across India.  An “all-India” leader, Ambedkar is still 
upheld as a model and guide for dalit liberation. His political thought and lived struggles 
have influenced the trajectory of modern anti-caste movements and he remains a 
powerful symbol for dalit activism.  The compilation of the writings and speeches 
published by the Government of Maharashtra has also disseminated his work to a wide 
public, furthering the circulation of his political thought among activists all over India. 
As defender and advocate of dalits, communities found in villages, towns, and cities 
across India, Ambedkar is also one of the few nationalist leaders who has, as Ramchandra 
Guha writes, “truly pan-Indian appeal.”
47
 His status as both a nationalist and anti-caste 
leader thus contributes to his continued importance to activists today. 
 
Dalit Difference as Political Strategy for the Annihilation of Caste 
Ambedkar’s pursuit of a political solution the problem of caste inequality came to 
the fore in the 1930s. Throughout the 1920s, Ambedkar had campaigned for dalit rights 
to access water reserves and temples.  He argued that these practices constituted civic 
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rights and used legal arguments that stressed the “public” nature of these facilities.
48
 In 
1924, he established the Bahishkrit Hitakarini Sabha (Society for the Wellbeing of the 
Excluded) with its motto of “Educate, Agitate, Organize.” The organization was key to 
Ambedkar’s movement for the empowerment of dalits. In 1926, Ambedkar was 
nominated to the Legislative Council for the Bombay Presidency, adding to his political 
authority to represent dalits. 
In the 1930s, the assertion of dalit difference – of a radical difference in political 
identity from caste Hindus – became Ambedkar’s predominant strategy for dalit 
empowerment.  This strategy framed dalits as a minority community and as Anupama 
Rao writes, cast them as “subjects of suffering defined by permanent antagonism to the 
caste Hindu order.”
49
 This strategy rendered dalits a community politically equivalent to 
Muslims and consequently, deserving of comparable electoral protections. At the Second 
Roundtable Conference, in which both M.K. Gandhi and Ambedkar sat on the Minorities 
Committee, Ambedkar advocated for the institution of separate electorates for the 
Depressed Classes. In August 1932, the colonial government responded with the 
Communal Award, which gave the Depressed Classes the right to separate electorates. 
Gandhi protested that separate electorates would destroy Hindu unity and announced a 
“fast-unto-death” if the measure was not repealed.
50
 Ambedkar, forced to yield under 
threat of Gandhi’s death, conceded to the Poona Pact, a diluted version of the reform 
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offered by the Communal Award. Instead of instituting separate electorates, the Poona 
Pact promised reserved seats in the general electorate.
51
   
Three years after the Poona Pact, in a move that declared his rejection of 
Hinduism and troubled Congress and Hindu Mahasabha leadership, Ambedkar 
announced his plan to convert to another religion. Over the next two decades, Ambedkar 
consulted with leaders of various religions, including Islam, Sikhism, and Christianity, 
before converting to Buddhism in 1956. In 1936, Ambedkar established his first political 
party, Independent Labour Party. He formed the Scheduled Caste Federation in 1942 and 
his third political party, the Republican Party, shortly before his death in 1956.  While 
these political parties were not very successful electorally, they do indicate Ambedkar’s 
continued pursuit of the political empowerment of dalits and of political resolutions to the 
problems of caste inequality even after the disappointment of the Poona Pact.  
As evidenced by the argument for separate electorates, minority identity for the 
dalits of India was thus central to Ambedkar’s strategy for the political resolution to caste 
inequality. In their introduction to a volume focused on the reassessment of identity 
politics, Linda Martin Alcoff and Satya P. Mohanty argue that the term “minority” – in 
addition to referencing numerical weakness – “signifies a struggle, a position that is 
under contestation…that does not enjoy equality of status, of power, or of respect” and 
indicates “the nonhegemonic, the nondominant, the position that has to be explained 
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  “Minority” thus indicates not only a quantitative difference, but 
as Anupama Rao notes, a qualitative difference from the majority. Accordingly, B.R. 
Ambedkar’s assertion of a minority identity for dalits served as a political strategy to 
shore up dalit electoral power, indexed structural relations between Hindus and dalits,  
and promoted a notion of community based on difference from caste Hindu society.  
Colonial assessments of Indian society had rendered religious identity equivalent 
to political identity and religious community equivalent to political interest. Muslims in 
India thus constituted the main minority community in India.  By espousing minority 
status for dalits, Ambedkar broke their association with the Hindu community and 
rendered them structurally equivalent to Muslims.  Most prominently evoked at the 
Second Roundtable Conference, minority status was used to argue for separate electorates 
– which Muslims had been granted in 1909 – so that dalits could gain power and emerge 
as a distinct political entity.  Ambedkar claimed that the history of suffering inflicted by 
the caste Hindu order provided the basis of dalits’ minority status. Rather than “degraded 
Hindus,” dalits were, as Rao demonstrates, “defined by social marginality, civic 
exclusion, and material deprivation.”
 53
  Ambedkar stressed “the primacy of the political 
to oppose preexisting organic definitions of community” and argued that dalits shared a 
“political interest.”  
  
The Political as Insufficient for the Annihilation of Caste 
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Although Ambedkar utilized the logic and categories of liberal political theory, he 
also remained critical of it. Politics, it seems, provided a path to dalit empowerment, but 
Ambedkar seemed to doubt its efficacy in restructuring society. In the speech referenced 
in the beginning of this chapter, Ambedkar contended that law could not generate liberty 
and equality nor could it provide a guarantee against their violations.
54
 He explained that 
law could be broken or circumvented, but that fraternity – which law alone cannot 
generate – was the “only real safeguard against the denial of liberty or equality.” 
Throughout his career as a spokesperson for dalits and as a nationalist leader, 
Ambedkar’s overriding critique of Hindu society was that it was unable to produce 
fraternity, and consequently, equality and liberty. Caste divisions, he maintained, 
precluded community and as long as Hindu society observed caste, dalits would not be 
able to enjoy a life of dignity, a life that could only be fully experienced through bonds of 
fraternity.  For Ambedkar, “fraternity” – which was “another name for religion” – was 
not guaranteed by political community; rather, it could only be the product of cultural or 
religious community.
55
  Unlike Buddhist philosophy, he suggested, European 
Enlightenment political theory did not foster communal solidarity. 
Even before turning to Buddhism, however, Ambedkar was critical of the 
categories and understandings of liberty and equality in classical political theory.  In 
States and Minorities: What are their rights and how to secure them in the Constitution 
of Free India, Ambedkar challenged the “scope and function” of traditional constitutional 
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  The text was published in 1947 after the All-India Scheduled Caste Federation 
had asked Ambedkar to provide an account of how the Scheduled Caste communities 
would be protected in the future constitution of an independent India. Ambedkar 
suggested a constitution for the “United States of India,” and in his notes, he conceded 
that “Students of Constitutional law will at once raise a protest” that his “proposal goes 
beyond the scope of the usual Fundamental Rights.”
57
 He maintained, however, that the 
state needed governmental mechanisms for the protection and advancement of vulnerable 
groups, even if these mechanisms deviated from classical European liberal 
constitutionalism.  If “democracy is to live up to its principle of one man, one value,” 
India 
 
needed to learn from the European example, where liberal constitutionalism had 
yielded gross economic inequalities.
58
   Ambedkar cautioned that formal political equality 
and universal enfranchisement were not capable of catalyzing the social and economic 
changes necessary to make manifest the “one man, one value” ideal of democracy.  For 
Ambedkar, the problem of caste – a problem with roots in religion – was the main 
obstacle to democracy in India. True democracy, he said in a speech in 1956, required 
bonds of “sympathy” and “social endosmosis,” and this could not be generated by 
political institutions and formal equality alone.
59
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Ambedkar’s political reasoning thus indicates his critique of the liberal 
foundations of European political theory as not sufficiently emancipatory.
60
  Furthermore, 
post-independence politics – especially around the Hindu Code Bill – showed Ambedkar 
how the modern democratic, secular state could operate in collusion with a 
discriminatory, religious ideology.
 
 Conversion to Buddhism was meant as an antidote to 
the state’s and society’s castist, Hindu orientation by supplementing the rights and 
freedoms afforded by the political system with new ethics. For dalits, conversion offered 
a cultural alternative to caste and political identities. It was conceived as part of a 
complex of ideas and practices which would remake caste identities, alter understandings 
of the past, and inspire new projections of the future.  
 
A New Past for a Future Without Caste 
While many of Ambedkar’s earlier anthropological writings on caste suggested a 
narrative of Indian history, it was not until the 1940s and 1950s that he fully engaged in 
history writing.  These histories – The Untouchables: Who Where They and Why They 
Became Untouchables, Who are the Shudras?: How They became the Fourth Varna in 
Indo-Aryan Society, and Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Ancient India – narrate 
stories of conflict and struggle.  Buddhism emerges in Ambedkar’s histories as one of the 
most significant ideological movements that shaped Indian civilization and the religion 
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practiced by most Indians during India’s “Golden Age.”
61
 Allegiance to Buddhist beliefs 
was also implicated in the establishment of untouchability.   In The Untouchables, 
published in 1948, Ambedkar dispelled dominant theories of the genesis of 
untouchability – including religious myth, colonial race theory, and occupational theories 
of caste – and put forth an alternative history of the origin of the practice. This history, I 
argue, was part of Ambedkar’s search for an alternative to a political identity based on 
difference and offered a template for reconceptualizing dalit and Indian identity. 
Ambedkar’s genealogy of untouchability begins with an anthropological 
assessment of the needs of “Primitive Society” as it transitions from a nomadic mode of 
living to a settled one reliant on agriculture.  Ambedkar speculates that in “primitive” 
times, tribes were in constant warfare. A defeated tribe which lost many of its members 
resulted in a “floating population of Broken tribesmen roaming in all directions.”
62
 These 
Broken Men were vulnerable to attack and in need of shelter and protection. Tribes that 
had settled faced another problem: these groups needed watchmen to protect them from 
raiding, nomadic tribes. Ambedkar contends that in the negotiations between settled 
communities and the Broken Men, Broken Men were offered shelter outside of the 
demarcated area of the settled community in exchange for their protection of the 
community.  Ambedkar cites examples of Broken Men communities in Ireland and Wales 
to demonstrate that this type of spatial organization of communities was “a universal 
phenomenon.”
63
  While other societies eventually incorporated the Broken Men into their 
communities this did not happen in India because, as Ambedkar contends, “the notion of 
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Untouchability supervened” and eventually, the Broken Men of India became 
Untouchables.   
 As Broken Men, the people living outside of the village were neither denied 
interaction with the other villagers nor were they despised or seen as defiling. The 
animosity towards Broken Men developed during Brahmanism’s rise to power after the 
fall of Buddhism. Ambedkar explains that while most people during this era had been 
Buddhist, many returned to Brahmanism when it came into power. The Broken Men “did 
not care to return to Brahmanism,” and were thus objects of contempt. Ambedkar adds 
that in the Brahmanic revolution against the Buddhist kings, the cow was strategically 
deified and beef-eating was transformed from “a purely secular affair” to “a matter of 
religion.” The defiant maintenance of Buddhist beliefs and the continuation of beef-
eating made the Broken Men guilty of “sacrilege” and created untouchability, which 
along with the system of caste was then institutionalized by Smriti literature.  Using 
Hindu texts and writings from Chinese travelers, Ambedkar dates the origin of 
untouchability – which was “born out of the struggle for supremacy between Buddhism 
and Brahmanism” – to the 4
th
 century AD.  
 If, as Ambedkar writes, untouchability is an “outgrowth of social psychology,” its 
solution would have to include a change in perceptions and consciousness.
64
 Ambedkar’s 
history of untouchability enables this change by producing a new awareness of the past.  
Genealogical accounts, such as that offered in The Untouchables, highlight historical 
contingency and expose the potential of variation in what had previously been considered 
historically constant.  These kinds of accounts, as philosopher Bernard Williams argues, 
have a “disobliging or disrespectful tone,” posing a subversive threat to the notion of the 
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present as naturalized by more than historical chance.
65
  Ambedkar’s genealogy exposes 
how untouchability, the authority of Brahmins, and deification of the cow were products 
of specific political events.  
In Ambedkar’s historical narrative, Buddhism emerged in ancient India as a 
critique of Brahmanism and the form of social structure it had established. He argues in 
Revolution and Counter Revolution in Ancient India that Aryan/Hindu culture was in a 
state of decay when the Buddha preached his gospel. “The Aryan community of this 
time,” he writes, “was steeped in the worst kind of debauchery: social, religious, and 
spiritual” and cites “gambling,” “drinking,” and “sexual immorality” – activities all 
deemed unrespectable in late colonial/early independent India – as endemic to Aryan 
culture.
66
 Ambedkar portrays society under Brahmanism as deteriorating, with many 
suffering from the exploitation and inequality legitimized by Brahmanic values.  
Buddhism challenged the very foundation of Brahmanic thought and as 
Ambedkar writes, opposed the “inequality, authority and division of society that 
Brahmanism had introduced in India.”
 67
 It precipitated a revolution in both political 
authority and social ideology and salvaged Indian civilization from decadence and 
immorality.  As Ambedkar writes, Buddhism “attempted to found a society on the basis 
of reason and morality and was a major revolution, both social and ideological against the 
degeneration of Aryan society.”  The spread of Buddhism across India and the 
subsequent royal patronage of the religion generated a period of civilizational glory, 
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where equality, community, liberty, and rationality were guiding values. In this historical 
narrative, the murder of the last Maurya Emperor Brihadratha Maurya by his Brahmin 
Commander-in-Chief Pushya Mitra, however, reversed Buddhist reforms and allowed for 
the return of Brahmanic dominance.  
With this history, Ambedkar not only broke the identification of India the Hindu 
conceptualization implicit in dominant Indian nationalism, but he also uncovered a 
history in which the pinnacles of civilization occurred under Buddhism.  In this way, he 
posited an alternative ‘golden age’ for the nation from that of the dominant nationalist 
imaginary.  Ambedkar showed that hierarchy and inequality were not indigenous to India, 
but were politically expedient values and enforced as the organizing principles of the 
social structure in the Counter-Revolution.  Ambedkar’s narrative thus discredits 
Hinduism – which had become the cultural content of the dominant anticolonial and 
nationalist projects – both historically and morally as a foundation for the identity of 
Indians. As literary theorist Gauri Viswanathan demonstrates, “Ambedkar struggled to 
release Unity from the stranglehold of Hinduism and relocate national identity.”
68
  He 
found the cultural content of this identity in Buddhism and its history of radical reform, 
equality, liberty, and fraternity in India.   Ambedkar argued that the Buddhist Revolution 
was “as significant as the French Revolution.”
69
 At another point, six years before this 
speech, Ambedkar stated that the revolution instigated by the Buddha’s doctrine of 
equality was actually much more significant that the French Revolution: “India has been 
a land of revolution in comparison to which the French Revolution would only be a 
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‘Bagatella’ and nothing more.”
70
 With this account, he offered Indians a model of 
revolution, radical change, and emancipatory knowledge that not only developed in India, 
but that he deemed to be a more efficacious path to emancipation and social justice than 
that offered by Enlightenment notions political modernity. The “Buddha,” Ambedkar 
argues, “was the first person to preach the message of liberty, equality, fraternity in the 
history of the world.”
71
  In Ambedkar’s historical narrative, India, under Buddhism, 
emerges as a birthplace of humanistic universalism and also, human rights. 
The pedagogical aspects of Ambedkar’s histories – the aspects of instructional 
value to dalit communities – emerge through his use of counterfactual and modal claims. 
Counterfactual claims convey the opposite of a historical statement and modal claims 
impart a sense of historical possibility. James Bulhof contends that counterfactual and 
modal claims are utilized in historical narratives to isolate causes and highlight the 
significance of events.
72
 These types of claims seem essential to genealogical accounts 
because they illustrate the contingency of events and implicitly state how outcomes could 
have been different.  As Bulhof writes, “behind every assertion of causes…is the 
suggestion that something else could have been done, that it was in fact possible for the 
situation to have been different; then we see what that possibility implies.”
73
  
Counterfactual and modal claims join two events together in a sequence and enable the 
representation of a cause.  They may be explicitly stated or simply implied and are 
utilized to illustrate possibility. These claims can convey a history alternative to that 
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conventionally narrated.  This fictional history, the unwritten history of events that could 
have occurred or would have occurred if certain key factors had turned out differently, 
contributes to the meanings derived from the written narrative 
Ambedkar’s historical reconstruction of ancient India is replete with both explicit 
and implicit counterfactual and modal claims. These claims impart a story of what could 
have occurred for the groups that became the untouchables if certain key events had 
turned out differently.  These claims also project ideas of what should occur in the 
present. In Ambedkar’s delineation of the significance of the murder of Brihadratha 
Maurya by Pushyamitra is the implicit counterfactual claim that if the murder had not 
occurred, the Brahmin revolution against the Buddhist kings would not have succeeded.  
Despite the impossibility of testing the veracity of the claim, it does convey the sense that 
if Brihadratha Maurya had survived, Buddhist kings would have continued to rule.  The 
social reforms enacted by the Buddha would be have been maintained, and the Brahmins 
would have been unable to legally institutionalize caste.  This alternative history 
produces an imagining of what could have been if the Brahmin revolution had not 
succeeded: an India without caste and untouchability.  This then is also the aspiration for 
the future that Ambedkar strives to inculcate in dalits as well as the Indian nation. 
 
A Buddhist Modernity 
With these histories of ancient India, conversion to Buddhism becomes an action 
based on the modal historical claim that the ancestors of today’s dalits – in fact most 
Indians – were formerly Buddhist. Conversion is thus rendered a “return” to the religion 
of India’s golden age and a reclamation of an ancestral religion.  The Buddhism that was 
45 
 
envisioned for this return was one which reversed key tenets so that it embodied 
Ambedkar’s project of social justice.  As M.S. Gore writes, “What emerged was a version 
of the Buddha’s teachings which was consistent with a modern liberal philosophy, met 
criteria for a religion with a social mission and answered the needs of India’s depressed 
millions.”
74
   
Ambedkar expounded on his interpretation of Buddhism in The Buddha and his 
Dhamma, a text posthumously published in 1957.  In this text, Ambedkar revised 
conventional interpretations of Buddhism and elaborated a humanistic universalism 
within the category of religion.  One of Ambedkar’s key interventions in Buddhist 
philosophy was his rejection of the “Four Noble Truths” and the doctrine of karma.   
Ambedkar contended that these tenets were Brahmanic perversions intended to dilute the 
Buddha’s emancipatory message.  He termed the “Four Noble Truths” the “Four Aryan 
Truths,” and argued that a worldview that sees sorrow in everything and does not 
conceptualize liberation from this sorrow “den[ies] hope to man.”
 75
  He claimed that this 
worldview, in addition to conventional interpretations of karma and rebirth, conspired to 
block human agency to better one’s situation and ameliorate suffering. While a 
Brahmanic social structure was premised on the individual’s resignation to their station in 
life and the suffering it may bring, the Buddha, Ambedkar wrote, was “interested in 
knowing how to do away with suffering.”
76
  In this rendering of Buddhist philosophy, the 
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sources of suffering are not the actions committed during a former birth, but rather, 
worldly inequality.
77
 He maintained that, “Man’s misery is the result of man’s inequity to 




Ambedkar interpreted Buddhism as having replaced the figure of God with 
“Morality.”
79
 The aim of religion was to impart this morality to society and to illuminate 
the nature of right relations between individuals.  The humanistic universalism Ambedkar 
prescribed for the “moral community” of independent India was found in his reworking 
of the Buddha’s dhamma, his teachings on righteousness.
80
 This universalism is 
alternative to that offered by Enlightenment notions of political modernity and countered 
majoritarian notions of the nation-state. The central concepts of this alternative are prajna 
(understanding) and karuna (love).  Ambedkar wrote that moral action shouldn’t be 
directed towards appeasing a god and thus did not require “prayers, pilgrimages, rituals, 
ceremonies, or sacrifices.”
81
 In addition, the impetus to moral action was not to be found 
in the laws of a God nor was it rooted in a “natural law,” the rules of nature.  Rather, as 
Ambedkar conceived it, morality was pursued out of earthy expediency. He wrote that “it 
is for his own good that man has to love man” and righteousness “arises” from this, “the 
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direct necessity for man to love man.”
82
  In fact, many of the traditional attributes of 
religion, such as belief in God, the soul, or the efficacy of sacrifice, were not part of the 
criteria of morality. The Buddha and his Dhamma repudiated belief in the supernatural, 
belief based on speculation, and belief in the infallibility of sacred text.  Unlike the 
prescriptions of Brahmanism, Ambedkar’s Buddhism opened learning to both sexes and 
all strata of society and mandated that a Bhikku, or mendicant/monk would be “made,” 
not born.
83
 Critically, Ambedkar emphasized that the Buddha offered principles not rules 
for action; a principle, he explained, offered the framework for reasoning within a 
particular context, but demands understanding and “leave[s] you freedom to act.”
84
   
Ambedkar’s elucidation of the Buddha’s dhamma then illuminated his own utopian 
vision: a disenchanted world where merit was earned and was open to all, reason 
triumphed, and only reason led to true understanding and right action.  
 Although the model of right action and belief that Ambedkar put forth intersects 
with many aspects of modernity, it also challenged a key liberal right in Enlightenment 
notions of political modernity, namely the right to accrue private property.
85
 Ambedkar 
stated that Buddhism begins its exposition on human relations with the social fact of 
exploitation.  He translated dukkha, a central concept in Buddhist philosophy often 
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glossed as suffering, as poverty.
86
  Ambedkar writes of poverty as that which “gives rise 
to sorrow” and hunger as the “worst of diseases.”
87
 In his reformulation of Buddhism, 
limitations on private property do not follow from an ascetic ideal, but rather are 
mandated to curb exploitation:  
The Blessed Lord did not elevate poverty by calling it a blessed state of life…Nor 
did he tell the poor that they may remain content for they will inherit the 
earth…On the contrary, he said riches were welcome.  What he insisted upon is 




 Vinaya are the principles that govern the Buddhist community.  Ambedkar emphasized 
that the acquisition of wealth would have to be in accordance with the ethics of 
Buddhism, ethics which centered on love and understanding and which were occluded by 
greed and selfishness.  He maintained that men and women should not be alienated from 
their labor and wealth should be acquired through a direct connection to one’s labor: 
“legitimately” and “justly” acquired wealth was “earned by great industry, amassed by 
strength of arm and gained my sweat (of the brow).”
89
 
Ambedkar recognized “the close affinity” between “the doctrine of the Buddha 
and the doctrine preached by Karl Marx.”
 90
 For him, however, the ethics of love and 
understanding, constituted a fundamental difference between the two.  He claimed that 
communism was “based on force.” Buddhism, in contrast, achieved its goals through 
“persuasion, by moral teaching, by love”; Ambedkar insisted that “the Buddha would not 
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allow violence and the Communists do.”
91
  In his view, the world could only be 
transformed through a change in people’s perspective and ideology.  For this reason, he 
recommended that the exploited and poor “not be allured by Communist successes,” and 
stated that he was “quite confident that if we all become one tenth as enlightened as the 
Buddha was, we can bring about the same result [as the Communists] by methods of 
love, of justice, and good will.”
92
  Ambedkar’s reformulation of Buddhism was thus 
intended not just for dalits or the Indian nation, but all of the world.  The internationalism 
of Ambedkar’s Buddhism is evident in the universality of its ethics.  Moreover, in a 
speech on BBC in 1956, Ambedkar added that it was Buddhism’s focus on worldly ethics 
as opposed to the transcendental or metaphysical that made it an ideology for social 
change and a blueprint for a global revolution: “Once it is realized that Buddhism is a 
social gospel, the revival of it would be an everlasting event for the world will realize 
why Buddhism makes such a great appeal to everyone.
93
 
The humanistic universalism that Ambedkar proposed could not have been strictly 
materialist or secular; by necessity, this universalism had to be in the form of religion.  
Ambedkar maintained that human beings needed more than the satisfaction of their 
materials needs; they needed hope and the human mind needed to be “cultured.”
94
  In his 
view, only religion provided this. Religion proliferated social values and made ethical 
principles universal and was therefore “absolutely essential for the development of 
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  Furthermore, Ambedkar had long called attention to the futility of political 
rights in a social context that denied them; for him, rights could only become meaningful 
if they emerged from the desires of society.  Ambedkar’s Buddhism provided a template 
for social relations and offered a basis for the broad, horizontal community necessary for 
his ideal of democracy. Gauri Viswanathan astutely points out that Ambedkar envisioned 
the incorporation of the “ethics of Buddhism….[into] the democratic principles of the 
modern state”; the net effect of this integration would be the rearticulation of rights “not 
in terms of political franchise alone but primarily moral claims.”
96
 Ambedkar claimed 
that social relations required a moral guide and could not be changed by politics or 
economics alone. He provided this guide in the religion he devised from the teachings of 
the Buddha.   
 
******** 
Religious studies scholar Christopher S. Queen suggests that Ambedkar’s 
advocacy for dalits and reworking of Buddhism can be productively compared with the 
use of liberation theory in the Civil Rights movement in the U.S. and in social 
movements throughout the Americas.
 97
 Indeed Ambedkar does seem to resuscitate 
Buddhism to provide a “liberation theology” for dalits, if not all Indians. His 
understanding of Buddhism contains a template for social relations that counter the harms 
of both traditional society and political modernity. His excavation of Buddhism also 
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offers an alternative genealogy of humanism and of rights to equality, liberty, and 
fraternity that future generations of dalits can claim as their own. This alternative was 
made available for dalit contestations with the Indian state and dominant castes and 
became an element in the historical and political imagination of dalit activists and 
intellectuals today.  In this chapter I have shown how Ambedkar himself departed from 
the political logic of identity difference and embraced a cultural identity that could be 
shared by all Indians. Here, a nascent internationalism can also be discerned.  Ultimately, 
Ambedkar’s thinking on dalit issues remained within the nation-state framework, but he 





National Minority, Global Majority: Episodes in Dalit Transnationalism  
 
“We must understand that the caste nature of the term dalit is breaking down.” – Dalit 
Panther Manifesto, 1973 
 
In an essay titled “The Problem of Isolation,” B.R. Ambedkar lamented the 
absence of allies for the dalit movement.
98
 He argued that the structure of Hindu society 
precluded allies and made those with similar interests oppose cooperation with dalits.  
Even labor movements and communist parties, he argued, had not generated the 
solidarity needed for the dalit movement to succeed. “This want of solidarity,” he 
reasoned, was because of the system of “graded inequality,” a system in which “the 
Brahmin is above everybody, the Shudra is below the Brahmin and above the 
Untouchable.” Ambedkar argued that this system guaranteed the political isolation of 
dalits in India and the perpetuation of caste inequality. “If the Hindu social order was 
based on inequality,” he wrote, “it would have been over-thrown long ago.  But it is 
based on graded inequality so the Shudra while he is anxious to pull down the Brahmin, 
he is not prepared to see the Untouchable raised to his level.”
99
 Ambedkar decried the 
result of this structure: “there is nobody to join the Untouchables in his struggle. He is 
completely isolated. Not only is he isolated, he is opposed by the very classes who ought 
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  The solidarity Ambedkar found lacking was political solidarity. This kind of 
solidarity countered isolation, especially isolation in struggle. It was not rooted in identity 
and while it anticipated similar interest, it also could not be reduced to a partnership 
based on expedience. Regardless of the veracity of Ambedkar’s claim that political 
solidarity could not be found for dalits in India, generations of dalit activists have created 
linkages to groups outside of India, in an effort to counter the isolation of dalits in India. 
They have developed and imagined a political solidarity that discerned a similarity in 
struggle with disparate groups. In this chapter, I historicize and analyze five episodes of 
this kind of transnational solidarity. I argue that a transnational approach to building 
allies and countering isolation has also corresponded with a shift away from the identity-
based minority politics that characterized the movement for dalit rights since the late 
colonial period.  
The structure of this chapter largely replicates the account of the 
internationalization of caste discrimination offered by several of the activists I 
interviewed in my research.  As activists spoke of their human rights work, they also 
offered a history of twentieth-century transnational activism. This history begins with an 
exchange between B.R. Ambedkar and W.E.B. Dubois, then moves to the activism of the 
Dalit Panthers, before arriving at the activism of the dalit diaspora and that of human 
rights activists in India. The narrative I present in this chapter is based on research 
conducted after taking cues from this account. As an anthropological and historical 
method, an episodic approach both attends to activists’ own understandings of the context 
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of their work while also excavating an overlooked historical narrative. This approach 
does not linearly trace continuities, but rather discerns certain congruities in different 
historical moments that together shed new light on contemporary activism.  The histories 
I present track three primary congruities over five different episodes: First, a discernment 
of similarity in structural position or similarity in struggle conditions the projection of 
transnational political solidarity. Second, this projection has on occasion rearticulated 
‘dalit’ as an identity not specific to those subjected to caste oppression. Lastly, as dalit 
activists’ attempt to counter their isolation in India, they also reframe caste as a global 
phenomenon and caste discrimination as a global problem.   
 
Episode 1: Ambedkar and Dubois 
 When I asked about the beginnings of transnational dalit activism during my 
research, several activists referenced B.R. Ambedkar’s correspondence with W.E.B. 
Dubois. They said that Ambedkar had written Dubois about the possibility of submitting 
a petition to the United Nations on caste discrimination and the plight of dalits in India.  
Despite having done extensive secondary reading on Ambedkar and having conducted 
archival research of Ambedkar’s private papers, I had not been aware of the exchange 
between Ambedkar and Dubois until these interviews. To my knowledge, this 
correspondence has not yet been published in the volumes of Ambedkar’s writings and 
speeches issued by the Government of Maharashtra or in Ambedkar’s other published 
works, despite its apparent significance to many dalit activists.
101
  Upon returning to the 
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U.S., I was able to track down this correspondence, not in any of the available collections 
of Ambedkar’s writings, but rather, in The Papers of W.E.B. Dubois, a compilation of 
eighty-nine reels of Dubois’ correspondence.
102
  
 The correspondence activists spoke of was initiated by Ambedkar in July 1946. 
Ambedkar began his letter to Dubois by noting Dubois’ esteemed standing among all 
who are “working in the cause of securing liberty to the oppressed people.” He stated that 
he had been “a student of the Negro problem” and had followed Dubois’ writings. He 
then claimed an analogy between the situation of dalits in India and African Americans in 
the U.S. “There is so much similarity between the position of the Untouchables in India 
and of the position of the Negroes in America,” Ambedkar suggested, “that the study of 
the latter is not only natural but necessary.” Ambedkar wrote that he was “very much 
interested to read that the Negroes of America have filed a petition to the U.N.O.,” and 
requested copies of the statement, disclosing that the “Untouchables of India are also 
thinking of following suit.” In his response to Ambedkar, dated July 31, 1946, Du Bois 
included the statement submitted by the National Negro Congress and reported that the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) was considering 
submitting a “more comprehensive statement,” which he would send once it was 
completed.  Dubois acknowledged that he was familiar with Ambedkar and his work and 
also indicated solidarity with his cause: “I…of course have every sympathy with the 
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Untouchables of India,” he wrote, adding that he would be “glad to be of any service…if 
possible in the future.”
103
     
The petition referred to in the letters – “A Petition to the United Nations on 
Behalf of 13 Million Oppressed Negro Citizens of the United States of America” – was 
drafted in Detroit, Michigan at the Tenth Anniversary Convention of the National Negro 
Congress and was presented to United Nations officials on June 3, 1946.
104
 The statement 
emphasized the repeated attempts that had been made to move the United States’ 
government for redress and noted that such efforts would continue since “the main 
responsibility lies with the rulers of America.” It explained that the failure of these efforts 
compelled Africans Americans in the U.S. to  
call upon the United Nations, as we have every legal and moral right to do, to 
mobilize the influence of all organized mankind toward fulfillment, here in the 
United States, of the stated purpose of the United Nations to promote and 
encourage ‘respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.’  
 
The petition included a statement of “facts,” which detailed the violence, poverty, 
disenfranchisement, and “inequality of opportunity” experienced by African Americans 
and also reprinted letters written to Trygve Lie, then Secretary General of the United 
Nations, and Harry S. Truman, then President of the United States.  
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The activists I spoke with had only read or heard references to the exchange 
between Ambedkar and Dubois.
105
  While I am not sure if other contemporary activists 
had read the exchange at the time when I was conducting my research, Ambedkar’s letter 
does intimate two political logics that characterize the transnational anti-caste activism 
that emerged thirty years later: the internationalism and human rights activism of the 
1970s onwards find parallels in Ambedkar’s plan to appeal to the United Nations and in 
his identification of a similarity in predicament with African Americans. Although 
Ambedkar did not submit a petition about the situation of dalits to the United Nations, the 
letter clearly shows his interest in putting the issue before an international governing 
entity.  Literary scholar and political commentator S.D. Kapoor suggests that Ambedkar 
“probably had no time to pursue the matter” since the British government announced the 
imminence of their departure just a few months after writing to Dubois.
106
  More 
importantly, with India still a British colony, Ambedkar could not have filed the kind of 
petition that the National Negro Congress had. A petition on behalf of India’s dalits 
claiming “second-class citizenship” – as the National Negro Congress had claimed – 
could not have carried much force at a time when all Indians were subjects of the British 
crown and not extended full “democratic rights and liberty.”
107
 In addition, the imminent 
independence of India held possibilities for political restructuring and with this, social 
transformations. Ambedkar’s interest in taking the issue of caste discrimination to an 
international governing entity at this point, however, is significant, especially since he did 
not submit such a petition even after the failure of his draft of the Hindu Code Bill.  
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Rather than pursue redress through the United Nations, Ambedkar spent his last years 
developing Buddhism as an alternative to both liberal democratic and Hindu ethics.   
Ambedkar’s letter to Dubois also seems significant for its indication of a likeness 
between dalits and African Americans and for the nature of this likeness.  At a time when 
the dominant political logic behind the dalit movement was based on social 
differentiation, Ambedkar recognized a similarity condition between two groups with 
distinct histories in vastly different places. The likeness that Ambedkar refers to is one of 
“position,” not of identity or history. This “position” was the product of being 
“oppressed” and desiring liberation from that oppression. Based on Ambedkar’s other 
writings, I suggest that Ambedkar could discern this similarity because he did not accept 
the prevailing discourse of race and because he perceived a similar social and political 
predicament confronting both dalits and African Americans.  
In an essay on Ambedkar’s experience in the United States, Eleanor Zelliot writes 
that “a direct comparison between the Negroes of America and the untouchables of India 
does not appear in Ambedkar writings” and reasons that “this is natural, since Ambedkar 
denied that there was a racial basis for untouchability.”
108
 Indeed, Ambedkar vehemently 
argued against a biological or racial basis to caste distinctions in India and maintained 
that Indians could not be meaningfully divided on the basis of race.  As Zelliot astutely 
points out, this was “in contrast to the leaders of almost all other Untouchable 
movements,” who stressed that dalits were of a different racial stock from other 
Indians.
109
 Zelliot adds that Ambedkar’s “observation of obvious racial differences 
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between Negro and white Americans, and the segregation based on race in America” may 
have deepened his opposition to using the language of race to argue for dalit rights.   
In my reading, however, Ambedkar seemed suspect of the very discourse of race 
and the use of it to describe the divisions in both India and the U.S. For example, in 
Annihilation of Caste, written in 1936, Ambedkar points out that “Now ethnologists are 
of the opinion that men of pure race exist nowhere and that there has been a mixture of all 
races in all parts of the world…To hold distinctions of Castes or really distinctions of 
race and to treat different Castes as though there were so many different races is a gross 
perversion of facts.”
110
 Ambedkar stressed the singularity of the human species and 
deemed the science of race questionable at best, rejecting it as an explanatory category 
for social divisions. The similarity between dalits and African Americans that Ambedkar 
refers to in his letter thus emerges from a repudiation of the discourse of race, of a 
biological basis for social divisions, and from the discernment of a similarity in 
oppression and the goals of social justice.  It is a similarity in “position” and politics, not 
in a racial or any other essentialized notion of identity. 
In an essay titled “Parallel Cases,” Ambedkar argued that several other 
populations had suffered the same ‘position’ that had trapped dalits in India. “Social 
inequality is not confined to Hindus only,” he wrote, “It prevailed in other countries also 
and was responsible for dividing society into higher and lower, free and unfree, 
respectable and despised.”
111
  The examples he provided were not of potential political 
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allies of dalits, since the forms of inequality he described had been reformed or had 
disappeared. His discussion of slavery, however, lends itself to an interpretation that 
substantiates his claim that African Americans and dalits shared comparable ‘positions.’ 
Writing about slavery in the Americas, Ambedkar argued that while “neither slavery nor 
untouchability is a free social order,” untouchability posed a greater harm to society and 
the individual. The system of slavery, he reasoned, allowed for the possibility of 
emancipation and thus, also presented an “open and direct” form of enslavement. 
Untouchability, however, was deemed an “indirect form of slavery” and one that offered 
no escape; “if a man is deprived of his liberty indirectly,” Ambedkar wrote, “he has no 
consciousness of his enslavement.” Indirect enslavement amounted to, as he wrote, 
“tell[ing] an Untouchable ‘you are free, you are a citizen, you have the rights of a 
citizen,’ and to tighten the rope in such a way as to leave him no opportunity to realize 
the ideal.”
112
 As a self-professed “student of the Negro problem” who had read Du Bois’ 
writings, Ambedkar must surely have been aware of the segregation, discrimination, and 
violence in post-Emancipation United States. The “position” shared by dalits and African 
Americans thus emerges as a particular form of oppression, that of “indirect 
enslavement.”   
In Ambedkar’s correspondence with DuBois, there is indication of a discernment 
of a politics based not on an essentialized identity, but on “position.”  Ambedkar found a 
potential ally in Du Bois because despite the difference in historical and social contexts, 
dalits and African Americans were imagined as confronting similar struggles. The 
similarity in struggle promised an alliance that carried the potential of countering the 
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“isolation” of dalits in India.  Decades later dalit activists would espouse a non-elite 
South-Southism based on such ‘positions’ and would cite the Ambedkar-Dubois 
exchange as a key moment in this history. It wasn’t until the Dalit Panthers’ Manifesto of 
1973 that the inchoate South-Southism suggested by the Ambedkar-Dubois exchange is 
more fully worked out and made a central part of an anti-caste movement.  
 
Episode 2: Dalit Panthers 
Inspired by the Black Panthers in the United States and by the resistance and 
liberation movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Dalit Panthers were founded 
in Bombay in 1972.  A radical anti-caste and anti-capitalism organization, the Dalit 
Panthers espoused an internationalism that connected the plight of dalits to marginalized 
populations across the world and expressed this internationalism through their 
rearticulation of the term ‘dalit.’ The Panthers recognized a shared struggle with groups 
suffering from capitalist exploitation and made the political unity of all oppressed people 
– both within India and across the world – a foundational principle of its platform. The 
category of ‘dalit’ joined these groups in a liberation struggle that also targeted the 
annihilation of caste. 
The Panthers resignified ‘dalit’ in their Manifesto, written one year after the 
group’s founding in 1973.
113
 Largely drafted by Namdeo Dhasal, founder of the Dalit 
Panthers, and Sunil Dighe, a former radical Naxalite, the Manifesto announced their 
revolutionary aspirations and laid out the Panthers’ critique of both the Indian state and 
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  The authors stated that the document was written to address 
“misconceptions about the objectives of the ‘Panthers’” and to clarify their “commitment 
to total democratic and revolutionary struggles.”  In my discussion of the Dalit Panthers, I 
read their Manifesto as an episode of transnational activism.  The document emerges as 
an attempt to counter the isolation of dalits in India and connect with other groups.  I 
focus on the representation of ‘dalit’ in the Manifesto and analyze this as the identity 
mobilized by the Panthers for their revolutionary goals. From a minority identity 
produced through the caste system, ‘dalit’ appears in the Manifesto as an identity and 
experience shared by groups across the world.
115
 
My analysis of the Dalit Panthers’ evocation of other groups in political struggle 
is informed by Antoinette Burton’s notion of the “politics of citation” – the ways in 
which the citation of other groups aids the representation of a particular brand of 
postcolonial identity.  In Brown Over Black, Burton analyzes the citation of Africans and 
Africa in four literary works authored by people of South Asian descent and argues that 
the “citationary dynamic” in these works “tends to racialize as it relegates, locating 
people of African descent both below Indians in civilizational terms and behind them in 
temporal terms.”
116
 Brown Over Black is part of a burgeoning field of scholarship on 
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South-South or Afro-Asian solidarity.
117
  Burton, however, cautions against the 
assumption of “solidarity” and challenges a historiographical trend towards romanticizing 
Afro-Asian postcolonial linkages. Rather than the horizontal affiliations implicit in the 
notion of “Afro-Asian Solidarity,” Burton discerns the citation of Africans and Africa to 
“shore up and consolidate an Indian self dependent on a set of racial/izing hierarchies” 
and demonstrates how postcolonial linkages were often complicated by colonial racial 
economies.   
Burton’s contribution is an important one, but like most other works on this topic, 
Brown Over Black focuses on linkages created by postcolonial elites.  My research, 
however, analyzes the citationary politics of linkages created by dalits, a doubly (or 
triply) marginalized group in a globally marginalized space.  My reading of the Dalit 
Panther’s citation of other struggling communities does not suggest the replication of 
racial hierarchies, but here too, the politics of citation does help fashion a particular 
postcolonial identity for dalits.  It projects a cosmopolitanism constituted by knowledge 
of modernity’s underbelly and imparts an identity for dalits that unites them with 
struggling groups across the world.  For the Panthers, recognizing struggling African 
Americans, Africans, and Southeast Asians as fellow ‘dalits’ builds from a political logic 
of analogy that challenges the exceptionalism of caste and renders dalits part of a global 
‘minority.’ 
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The Dalit Panthers’ Manifesto defines ‘dalits’ as “all those who are exploited 
politically, economically and in the name of religion.”
118
 ‘Dalit’ refers to a non-
essentialized and relational social category; the experience of exploitation generates a 
dalit identity.
119
 The concept of subalternity as theorized by Fernando Coronil proves 
useful in illustrating the dynamism of this concept of dalit identity. Coronil revises the 
notion of subalternity implicit in the scholarship of the Subaltern Studies Collective and 
writes that subalternity may be better conceived as a  
relational and relative concept that refers to heterogeneous social actors that share 
a common condition of subordination…there are times and places where subjects 
appear on history’s stage as subaltern actors, just as there are times or places in 
which they play dominant roles.  Moreover, at any given time or place, an actor 
may be subaltern in relation to another, yet dominant in relation to a 





“Dalit” in the Dalit Panther’s Manifesto similarly refers to a “subjected state of being” 
rather than an essentialized identity. It is an identity that refers to a position and the 
condition of being dominated; in this sense, it simultaneously calls attention to relations 
of domination and subordination.  
  Sociologist Lata Murugkar explains that the Panthers emerged following a lull in 
social reform activities after independence, at a time when
 
faith in the effectiveness of  
democracy, the Constitution, and leftist parties to deliver solutions to the problems of the 
oppressed had eroded.  Although, as Murugkar writes, “laws did open up possibilities for 
advancement and change to the lower castes…they did not provide any leverage to 
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  Expectations of change were met with continued inequality and increased 
violence and both the Schedule Caste and progressive Hindu leadership seemed 
ineffective and apathetic.  The Dalit Panthers arose from the resulting frustration, 
discontent, and vacuum in leadership.
122
 They eschewed institutional forms of protest and 
put forward a trenchant critique of the state which highlighted its complicity in continued 
violence and inequality.
 123
 Murugkar argues that the Panthers’ “non-institutional way of 
struggle” represented a significant shift from previous anti-caste movements.
 124
 While 
appeals to the state – first the colonial state then the independent Indian state – and party 
politics had been the predominant modes of advocacy for dalits, the Dalit Panthers 
employed more militant methods.
125
  Critically, unlike previous anti-caste movements, 
the Panthers did not see the state as an ally or as a viable agent of progressive social 
change. They remained critical of political institutions of the modern Indian state as they 
turned abroad for community in their struggle.  
 By naming their organization after the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense, the 
Dalit Panthers claimed an affiliation with the U.S.-based group’s politics as well as 
identification with the position of African Americans in the U.S. A contemporary 
commentator pointed out that not only was there a history of anti-caste leaders’ drawing 
parallels between the sufferings and struggles of African Americans and that of the lower 
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castes in India, but the political context facing both groups bore many similarities.
126
 Like 
leaders of the Black Panthers in the United States, the Dalit Panthers had recognized that 
formal legal equality did not guarantee improved life conditions.
127
 They had been 
exposed to discrimination that had no basis in the law, but was just as efficacious in 
maintaining gross social and economic inequality as that buttressed by the legal 
system.
128
 The politics of the Dalit Panthers, however, should not be seen as derivative of 
that of the Black Panthers. Rather, their politics were rooted in a claim of similarity in 
condition, struggle, and goals between dalits and African Americans.  
The liberation movements taking place in Africa and Southeast Asia had an 
equally significant impact on the founding members of the Dalit Panthers.  As politically-
conscious observers of the situation both within India and across the world, the Dalit 
Panthers viewed the problems facing dalits in an international context and identified 
common causes of suffering for subordinated groups across the world. In a section of the 
Manifesto titled “The Dalits of the World and Panthers,” the Panthers discussed the 
similarity in condition and solidarity among dalits in India, the Black Panthers, and other 
struggling groups:  
Due to the hideous plot of American imperialism, the Third Dalit World, that is 
oppressed nations, and the dalit people are suffering. Even in America, a handful 
of reactionary whites are exploiting blacks. To meet the force of reaction and 
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remove this exploitation, the Black Panther movement grew. From the Black 
Panthers, Black Power emerged.  The fire of struggles has thrown out sparks into 
the country.  We claim a close relationship with this struggle. We have before our 




The Dalit Panther’s internationalism emerged from their recognition that capitalism and 
imperialism had produced a grossly imbalanced world, a world split into the dominant 
nations and the Third-world/ Dalit nations.  The Dalit Panthers’ Manifesto placed 
“American imperialism” in the same category as “Hindu feudalism”; both forces created 
relations of domination that produced the dalit subject.  
The “citationary dynamics” of the Panthers’ transnational references challenge the 
uniqueness of caste-oppression and reveal it as a form of subjugation analogous to racism 
and colonialism; this then renders the dalits of India as sharing an identity – an identity 
based on analogous structural position – with the groups cited. The term ‘dalit’ then 
becomes a channel for the Panthers’ internationalism for it unites disparate groups in its 
liberatory project.  For the Panthers, ‘dalit’ is not an essentialized identity or another term 
for the ex-untouchables of India, but rather a variable category that calls attention to 
relations of domination and exploitation.   
As a relational category, ‘dalit’ characterized groups at various scales. According 
to this logic, the Indian state – a state which the Dalit Panthers saw as beholden to upper 
caste Hindu interests – would also be part of the community of the “Third Dalit World.” 
Like Coronil’s concept of subalternity, ‘dalit’ is a relational category, and so, India 
becomes a ‘dalit nation’ in an international context. The Panthers argued that within 
India, modernity – its economic, political, and legal forces – had transformed the 
category of ‘dalit’ to encompass many more groups than just those at the bottom of the 
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caste hierarchy. The Panthers’ Manifesto claimed that while “Hindu feudalism” may have 
spawned caste inequality, the extension of “Hindu feudalism” by the modern Indian state 
had created oppression “a hundred times more ruthless.”
130
  This was because, as the 
Panthers explain, “Hindu feudal rule has in its hands all the arteries of production, 
bureaucracy, army and police forces, in the shape of feudal landlords, capitalists who 
stand behind and enable these instruments to thrive.”  The Panthers insinuated that while 
Phule and Ambedkar could deem untouchability a psychological pathology that would no 
longer be sufficient, for “the problem of untouchability…is no more one of mental 
slavery.”
131
 Ideology or religion alone, they argued, would not solve the problems of 
dalits, for the apparatus of the modern state – “the army, the prisons, the legal system and 
the bureaucracy” – had expanded the “framework of untouchability.”
132
 As the reach of 
caste oppression had expanded, groups who shared a political interest with India’s ex-
untouchables also increased. The unity of these groups was indispensable to the Panthers’ 
revolutionary project. “The dalit,” they wrote, “is no longer merely an untouchable 
outside the village walls and the scriptures.  He is an untouchable, and he is a dalit, but he 
is also a worker, a landless labourer, a proletarian.”
133
  These groups were subjugated by 
the forces of global capitalism with effects similar to the subjugation of untouchables by 
scripture and religion.  The net result, the Dalit Panthers claimed, was that “the caste 
nature of the term dalit is breaking down.”
134
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For the Dalit Panthers, “dalit” identity was thus not singularly related to caste 
oppression or a history of caste oppression; it became an identity that indexed particular 
kinds of relationships in modernity, namely relationships spawned by capitalist 
exploitation and the reinforcement of traditional oppression by the modern state. As the 
Manifesto stated, dalits are “members of the scheduled castes and tribes, Neo-Buddhists, 
the working people, the landless and poor peasants, women and all those who are being 
exploited politically, economically, and in the name of religion.” While still referring to a 
collective identity, ‘dalit’ was neither naturalized nor essentialized in this 
conceptualization; rather it became an identity that emerged when subjected to 
dominance and exploitation. “Friends” of the Dalit Panthers did not have to be subject to 
this, but had to share the “revolutionary” goal of eradicating suffering based on class and 
caste. Consequently, the “enemies” of the Panthers, as stated in the Manifesto, the agents 
– the forces, individuals, and institutions – responsible for generating and maintaining 
oppressive relationships included “power, wealth, and price…landlords, capitalists, 
money-lenders and their lackeys…parties who indulge in religious or castist politics and 
the government which depends on them.”
135
  
Despite their aspirations for a transnational unity of the oppressed, the Dalit 
Panthers had difficulty maintaining unity among their leaders. The group split into two 
factions, each of which split into more factions and in 1977, Raja Dhale announced the 
dissolution of the group. Meanwhile, across oceans, dalit immigrants to Europe and 
North America had begun to organize and advocate for dalits in India. Their actions laid 
the foundations for an anti-caste movement that would ultimately span the globe as a 
human rights movement.  
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Episode 3: Activism by the Dalit Diaspora  
Ambedkar once remarked that time abroad had enabled him to experience 
amnesia of caste identity. “My five years of stay in Europe and America,” he wrote, “had 
completely wiped out of my mind any consciousness that I was an untouchable and that 
an untouchable whenever he went in India was a problem to himself and others.”
 136
 For 
later generations of overseas dalits, however, this was not always the case. The Indian 
diaspora in the U.S., U.K., and Canada was fractured by caste identities and practices, 
which at times reproduced the exclusion and discrimination experienced in India. For 
many dalits, caste inequality and marginalization continued to be experienced abroad.
137
  
Memories of India, experiences in the diaspora, and a commitment to improving the 
status of dalits in the subcontinent compelled these immigrants to establish dalit 
associations and advocate locally and globally against caste discrimination. This activism 
was initiated by members of, in dalit studies scholar Vivek Kumar’s terms, the “new” 
dalit diaspora.
138
 Kumar divides the dalit diaspora into two categories: the “old,” which 
comprised of indentured laborers to Fiji, Trinidad, and Malaysia, and the “new,” the 
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skilled and professional immigrants who migrated to the U.K., U.S., and Canada after 
independence.  The latter, who resided in the most powerful countries in the world, were 
able to take advantage of innovations in communication and the expansion of NGOs at 
local, national, and international levels. 
139
 Through their activities, as Gail Omvedt 
writes, “gradually, a worldwide Dalit movement began to take shape.”
140
 This activism 
was crucial for increasing the global visibility of caste discrimination and for courting the 
attention of international human rights organizations.   
The first of these diasporic associations was established by dalit immigrants to the 
United Kingdom.
 
Punjabi immigrants to Wolverton in the English Midlands founded the 
Dr. Ambedkar Memorial Committee of Great Britain in 1969.
141
 Three years later in 
1972, dalit immigrants established the Bheem Association – later renamed the Dr. 
Ambedkar Mission Society – in Bedford, England.  The 1970s saw the launching of 
several Ambedkarite associations, including ones in Birmingham, Southhall, and East 
London.
142
 In 1985, the Federation of Ambedkarite and Buddhist Organizations, U.K. 
(FABO UK) was founded to coordinate the activities of the associations within the U.K. 
and to advocate for dalits in India. The FABO UK began raising awareness of the 
conditions facing dalits in India at both the national and international levels, most notably 
during a series of events from 1989 to 1993 celebrating the birth centenary of Ambedkar.   
These organizations developed around the figure of Ambedkar, but while memorializing 
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Ambedkar remained a focus of diasporic organizations, as FABO shows, these groups 
also began to advocate against caste discrimination in India and abroad.   
 Groups in North America were established with the explicit aim of protesting and 
advocating for dalits in India, and here too, Ambedkar remained a key symbol for 
community development. The first association in the United States, Volunteers in the 
Service of India’s Oppressed and Neglected (VISION), was founded in the early 1970s in 
New York City by Dr. Shobha Singh. Singh was an immigrant from New Delhi who had 
graduated from Johns Hopkins University in 1957 with a Ph.D. in Physics and went on to 
build an illustrious career at AT&T Bell Laboratories. VISION organized its first 
demonstration with dalits from across the U.S. and Canada in June, 1978.  The 
demonstration was outside of the United Nations and was planned to coincide with Prime 
Minister Morarji Desai’s address to the General Assembly for the Special Session on 
Disarmament.  The organization was protesting the Indian government’s handling of 
upper caste violence against Jatvas, a dalit community in Agra, Uttar Pradesh. As part of 
their celebration of Ambedkar’s birthday, Jatvas in Agra held a parade in which an 
elephant – an animal associated with the high caste and kings – carried a portrait of 
Ambedkar.   As the parade marched through high caste neighborhoods on April 14, 1978, 
its participants were hit with stones and bricks. Jatvas retaliated, causing damage to a few 
small shops. Following the initial clash, leaders of the Jatvas scheduled a silent and 
peaceful march to protest the insult that had been done to Ambedkar. Another violent 
clash with members of the police and upper caste ensued and over the course of the next 
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few days, 303 Jatvas protesters were incarcerated.
 143
  After a two-week conflagration, the 
Indian army had to be called in to restore calm. VISION mobilized dalits from across the 
U.S. and Canada to protest the Indian state’s management of the ordeal.
 
 
In Canada, the Ambedkar Memorial Mission was founded in Vancouver in 1978, 
but moved to Toronto the next year and was renamed the Ambedkar Mission. VISION 
and the Ambedkar Mission, together with the assistance of Chennai-based Dalit 
Liberation Education Trust, successfully persuaded the London-based human rights 
organization Minority Rights Group to create a working group on untouchability.
144
 The 
organization assisted in a conference in 1983 titled “Minority Strategies: Comparative 
Perspectives on Racism and Untouchability” which was hosted by the City University of 
New York and Columbia University’s Southern Asian Institute.  Papers from the 
conference were later published as a book, Untouchable! Voices from the Dalit 
Liberation Movement.
145
 A follow-up conference in India was planned, but blocked by 
the Indian state, which refused to grant visas to the American organizers of the 
conference.
146
 In the years that followed, diasporic groups expanded their outreach and 
helped lay the foundation for a transnational advocacy movement for dalit rights. 
Diasporic groups also began to use the language of human rights to communicate 
the problems of dalits and in this way, began to frame caste inequality as a human rights 
violation. VISION and the Ambedkar Mission represented dalit issues at the Osaka 
International Conference Against Discrimination in 1982 and the Nairobi World 
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Conference on Religion and Peace in 1984. Dr. Laxmi Berwa, an oncologist based in the 
Washington D.C. area who took over the leadership of VISION after Singh, became the 
first person to testify on the plight of dalits before the U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights in 1982. Dr. Berwa’s work illustrates two of the most important trends in the 
development of an international anti-caste movement: the shift from an identity-based 
politics to one that courted non-dalit groups and the increased use of the language of 
human rights to communicate the problems of dalits and arguments based on comparison 
and analogy.   
Dr. Laxmi Berwa, a practicing Buddhist and student of Ambedkar’s social and 
political philosophy, arrived in the United States in 1971 after receiving an MBBS from 
the All India Institute of Medical Sciences in New Delhi. He completed his internship 
and residency in Brooklyn, N.Y. and a fellowship in Buffalo, N.Y. in 1977. From 1977 to 
1980, he served as a commissioned officer in the U.S. Air Force and then began 
practicing internal medicine and oncology in the Washington D.C. area.  In addition to 
providing testimony at the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in both 1982 and 1995, 
Berwa testified before Capitol Hill for the Congressional Human Rights Caucus in 1993 
and spoke on the situation of dalits in India at a diverse range of venues, including, for 
example, the Medicine Department of Cook County Hospital, Howard University, 
George Mason University, a conference of the International Studies Association, a 
meeting of the American Federation of Muslims, and a meeting of Communities United 
to Fight Under-Development in Trinidad. He publicized his attempts to hold meeting 
with Indian dignitaries such as Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi when they visited the 
United States and organized demonstrations around these visits to draw attention to the 
75 
 
situation of dalits in India, specifically, the impunity with which violence and 
discrimination was enacted against them.   
 To communicate the severity of conditions and suffering experienced by dalits to 
audiences unfamiliar with caste discrimination, Berwa relied on analogies between dalits 
and other groups. In his testimony at the Human Rights Commission in 1982, Berwa 
claimed that the state of dalits in India – which he described as a “constant state of terror 
and humiliation” – was akin to “the condition of Jewish people in Hitler’s time.”
147
  At 
this and other forums, Berwa supplemented this analogy with two other ones: that of 
slavery and of the situation of African Americans under Jim Crow laws.
148
 On several 
occasions, he used the term “crime against humanity” to describe untouchability. The 
term ‘crime against humanity’ translated untouchability as an affront to human dignity on 
par with the Holocaust and Apartheid.  Berwa thus utilized a form of argumentation 
based on analogy as well as a vocabulary that rendered untouchability and caste 
discrimination gross violations of human rights.  
Berwa found common cause with other minorities, both Indian and non-Indian, 
and rallied for their alliances in the face of majoritarian repression. He reached out to 
Indian Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians in the United States and argued for their solidarity 
with struggles faced by their counterparts in India. The problems facing minorities in 
India, he argued, were analogous: all minorities, he claimed, faced accusations of not 
belonging, of being “outsiders” to the nation. Not only do minorities experience similar 
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problems, Berwa maintained, they also faced a “common aggressor,” namely Hindu 
extremists.
149
 Berwa pointed out that minorities lacked the resources and capital available 
to the Hindu right and implored all Indian minorities to “stick together, help each other 
and work with the other secular minded Hindus to fight the communalists.”
150
  In another 
presentation, Berwa called attention to status of Indians in the U.S. as minorities and 
compared the relative tolerance and peace they enjoyed to the repression and violence 
experienced by minorities in India. He argued that Hindu aggression towards minorities 
in India would be analogous to “Christian-right hoodlum groups like K.K.K. and skin 
heads acted destroying Hindu temples and raping Hindu Women” in the U.S. “Let us not 
forget,” Berwa announced to a Seventh-day Adventist church in Maryland, “that Hindus 
outside of India are a minority and they are subject to the same reprisals as the minorities 
in India.”
151
   
During a lecture celebrating Ambedkar’s one hundred and sixth birth anniversary 
at Howard University in 1998, Berwa argued for the relevance of Ambedkar’s thought to 
minority issues in the U.S., in particular that of African American struggles for 
equality.
152
 The trustee elect of the Graduate Student Council, Randy Short, had invited 
Berwa to speak about Ambedkar to an audience that included students, professors, the 
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ambassador to India, and a member of the executive board of the NAACP.
153
  It was the 
first time an African American institution had commemorated Dr. Ambedkar’s birthday, 
and Berwa saw the event as “a new beginning in the human rights movement between 
Dalits and Afro-Americans.”
154
  He spoke of the universality of Ambedkar’s theories of 
liberation and argued for their relevance to all minority issues “whether about Dalits in 
India, the Indian in U.K., Canada, or America for that matter, whether it was an issue of 
Afro-Americans in America or any persecuted minority.” He also noted that there were 
ideological similarities between the leaders of the civil rights and dalit rights movements.  
Both Ambedkar and Martin Luther King, Jr., he argued, knew that “no one was 
going to give them their rights.”
155
 They understood that securing rights would require 
struggle and that oppressed groups “must fight for their rights from their oppressors”
156
 
Berwa concluded his speech by “urg[ing] the Afro-Americans in this country whether 
academicians, civil rights or political leaders…[to] join hands with the Dalits in India 
with the same message which our two leaders gave and that one message was equality.”  
Berwa represented himself as a spokesperson for “the millions of speechless 
untouchables” and strove to, as he said, bring the plight of dalits “to the attention of the 
whole civilized world.”
157
  This required not only strategic analogies and broader 
networks of affiliation, but also the deployment of the logic and vocabulary of human 
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rights. The language of human rights allowed Berwa to counter the Indian state’s 
adamant refusal to view caste as an issue appropriate for foreign or international forums. 
Globalizing dalit issues meant countering the view of caste as a problem “internal” – both 
in terms of occurrence and jurisdiction – to India. During Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to the 
United States in 1987, Berwa protested violence against minorities in India and declared 
that even though the government of India had blocked the discussion of caste at the 
United Nations, the movement “must press on and meet the U.N. Secretary General to 
have a personal hearing and submit a memorandum on Human Rights Violation in 
India.”
158
  In his presentation to the United Nations Human Rights Commission, Berwa 
cited “police inaction,” “police terrorizing,” and state neglect of dalits in India and 
requested international surveillance and pressure for “corrective action.”
159
  
Berwa’s advocacy shows a keen awareness of the politics of human rights.  For 
example, in 1982 Berwa appealed to the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, for assistance, during what has been described as a period of “acrimonious” 
relations between the U.S. and India.
160
  Kirkpatrick, who has been remembered as “a 
beacon of neoconservative thought,” had spoken of the denial of rights to untouchables at 
the United Nations in December 1982.
161
 Eighteen months earlier, during Kirkpatrick’s 
visit to India, she and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had publicly clashed over economic 
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and arms aid to Pakistan. Tensions increased a few months later when the U.S. objected 
to India’s application for an IMF loan.
162
 In addition to her mention of untouchables in 
1982, Kirkpatrick had also referred to India’s untouchables three years earlier in 1979. In 
an essay that extolled the benefits of some autocratic governments for U.S. foreign policy 
interests, Kirkpatrick wrote that those living under autocratic governments grow 
accustomed to their society as “children born to untouchables in India acquire the skills 
and attitudes necessary for survival in the miserable roles they are destined to fill.”
163
 
Representing untouchables as inured to the “miseries of traditional life,” Kirkpatrick’s 
statement implied that they were passive and content, lacking the desire let alone the will 
to change their circumstances. Therefore, when T.C.A. Rangachari, India’s representative 
at the U.N., denounced Kirkpatrick’s 1982 use of the “cause of human rights” as 
strategic, he seemed somewhat justified. His retort that the Indian Constitution abolished 
untouchability and provided for the protection and uplift of the Scheduled Castes, 
however, remained an insufficient response on the issue of dalit rights. 
Although Kirkpatrick’s politics and depiction of dalits would seem counter to the 
emancipatory project of dalit rights – and Ambedkar’s in particular – Berwa nonetheless 
appealed to her to help advance the dalit cause.  In his letter to Kirkpatrick, Berwa 
described a situation of rising caste atrocities and government inaction in India and 
recounted his own experiences being silenced by the Indian government.  He wrote that 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had refused to meet with VISION during her visit to the 
                                                 
162
 See George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 233. 
163
 See Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” Commentary (November 1979). This was 
one of Kirkpatrick’s most influential essays. She distinguished between right-wing pro-American 
dictatorships and left-wing anti-American governments and argued that the U.S. should support the former.   
80 
 
United States and had sent him a statement criticizing his activist work in the U.S.
164
 He 
added that Dr. Gopal Singh, chairman of the Indian National Commission for Minorities 
had asked for a meeting with him after his testimony at the U.N. Human Rights 
Commission. Berwa recounted that at this meeting, Singh pleaded with him to abandon 
his international advocacy work, saying, as reported in the letter, “I beg of you that 
whenever you write to us or write to the Prime Minister you should wait for the decision 
to be taken in the country before you bring them to the world forum.”
165
 Given that the 
Government of India had consistently obstructed any communication on the issue of dalit 
rights, as Berwa explained in his letter, he was left to seek the assistance of international 
human rights organizations. Berwa also pointed out to Kirkpatrick that his request at 
Geneva for the appointment of a U.N. special commissioner to investigate human rights 
violations in India was supported by an American expert but blocked by the Indian 
government. Also, in an apparent attempt to utilize Cold War’s political logic to his 
advantage, he shrewdly added that the Indian position was backed by the delegate from 
the USSR. He concluded his letter with an ideological dictum: “All Governments who are 
concerned about Human Rights should pressurize the Indian Government to improve the 
situation.”
166
   
 In 1999, after over two decades of advocacy for dalits from abroad, Laxmi Berwa 
was invited to speak at the Centre for Alternative Dalit Media in New Delhi. In this 
lecture, Berwa recounted the successes of dalit activism in increasing the global visibility 
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of dalit issues. He cited an episode of the news program 60 Minutes on untouchability in 
India as well as other stories in the U.S. media.
167
  Dalits who had left India, he 
explained, had not forgotten about the situation of their counterparts in India. These 
privileged few had used their positions abroad to mobilize a broader base of support and 
would continue to “expose the high caste hypocrisy and the Indian government’s 
negligence and indifference” if the Indian state failed to support an environment where 
dalits could “live as equals with dignity and pride.” Berwa pointed out that dalits abroad 
had helped direct the attention of the U.S. academy towards the situation of dalits and had 
forged both academic and activist partnerships between African Americans and dalits.  
“Thus,” he concluded, “it is a warning to dalit oppressors that Indian Dalits are no longer 
alone in their struggle for equality but overseas Dalits and the rest of the civilized world 
is expressing their solidarity in no uncertain terms.”
168
  Berwa – like Ambedkar – thus 
perceived the problem of dalits in India as one of isolation. He characterized his work 
abroad – the courting of allies and the publicizing of dalits’ predicaments in 
internationally recognizable terms – as a way to dismantle this isolation so that dalits 
were "no longer alone in their struggle.”  Through the work of Berwa and other activists 
both within India and the diaspora, transnational alliances became a significant avenue of 
dalit activism.   
  
Episode 4: Caste Becomes a Global Problem 
Diasporic dalit activism was instrumental in framing caste discrimination as a 
human rights violation and to directing the attention of international human rights 
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organizations to dalit issues. Over two decades of activism came to fruition with two 
major successes in the mid-1990s: recognition from the U.N. Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and subsequently, a publication on caste 
discrimination and untouchability by Human Rights Watch (HRW).  The Government of 
India had signed on to the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 
1968, but had consistently maintained that the Convention - which “condemns” “any 
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on…descent” – did not apply to 
caste.
169
 In 1996, the CERD Committee’s response to the Indian state’s report stated that 
the “system of castes” was “among the factors which impede the full implementation of 
the Convention [in India]” and affirmed that the “situation of the scheduled castes and 
scheduled tribes falls within the scope of the Convention.”
170
 This statement was the 
closest a U.N. body had come to officially recognizing caste discrimination as a human 
rights violation. It facilitated subsequent pronouncements against caste discrimination by 
U.N. treaty bodies and also gave activism at the international level new viability.   
The CERD statement was a milestone for dalit activism; it also helped persuade 
HRW in 1997 to commit to a project on untouchability and caste discrimination in India. 
HRW received a grant from the Ford Foundation, and led by Smita Narula, a recent law 
school graduate, the organization began research on caste based discrimination and 
violence in January 1998. HRW interviewed over three hundred dalit men and women 
and over a hundred others, including activists, social workers, and government officials 
for the report. The project also supported the founding of a national dalit human rights 
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organization. HRW facilitated a series of meetings that brought together dalit activists 
from across India to identify the issues that would be featured in the report.  The National 
Campaign for Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR) - which later proved critical for forging 
links with international groups and for increasing global visibility of caste based 
discrimination and violence – was formed from this initiative in December 1998.  
Political scientist Clifford Bob points out that organizations such as HRW and 
Amnesty International have “credibility and access to the media and governmental 
institutions,” and their support for an issue can have a “tremendous impact on its 
international recognition.”
171
 The HRW report, Broken People: Caste Violence Against 
India’s ‘Untouchables,’ was published in 1999 and as many activists told me in 
conversation, the report exposed the plight of millions of dalits to the global public and 
galvanized international support for recognizing caste discrimination as a human rights 
violation. The report focused on the impunity with which violence and discrimination 
was carried out against dalits and argued that for this population, “caste is determinative 
for the attainment of social, political, civil, and economic rights.”
172
 It called attention to 
the continuation of untouchability in practices such as debt bondage, the devadasi system, 
and manual scavenging and provided detailed analysis of incidences of violence against 
dalits, including a massacre in Bihar, police open-firing on dalit protesters in Mumbai, 
and retaliatory violence against political and economic assertion in Tamil Nadu.  
Violence against dalit women, who were characterized as bearing the “triple 
burden of caste, class, and gender,” was given attention in a separate chapter which 
interpreted the epidemic of rape against dalit women as serving as a “caste custom,” 
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“village tradition,” or “retaliation” for the assertion of rights. The report concluded that 
dalits “remain at risk of systemic human rights violations on the basis of the caste into 
which they are born” and that the Indian state was guilty of a “failure to ensure equal 
protection under the law” and of a “pattern of complicity and collusion on behalf of 
police and local officials.”
173
 
The HRW report acknowledged the “difficulty of slotting caste-based abuses into 
the standard categories of human rights violations.” Although HRW did not explicitly 
link this difficulty to the implication of caste in Hinduism, the presumed specificity of 
caste and untouchability to India and Hinduism may have accounted for the prior neglect 
of caste-based human rights violations by the international human rights community. 
Starting in the late 1990s, dalit conferences and global outreach increasingly framed caste 
as a global problem not specific to India. This framing redefined caste as a universal 
wrong rather than a particular of Indian culture and facilitated links between dalits and 
marginalized groups across the world.   
In 1998, the first World Dalit Convention took place from October 10-11, 1998 in 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The conference was sponsored by the Indian Progressive Front, 
a Malaysian political party, and brought together dalit activists from across the world, 
Indian politicians, and activists of the Buruku community in Japan. Despite the 
differences among the participants – including differences in nationality, region, 
language, rank, religion, and gender – the statement adopted at the Conference declared 
that participants had “dedicate[d]” themselves “for the blessed unity of Dalit community 
throughout the world and would solidly stand united to struggle relentlessly for better and 
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brighter future, dignity and respect of Dalits and other downtrodden communities.”
174
  
The Conference in Kuala Lumpur called for the creation of a U.N. Special Rapporteur to 
investigate caste-based human rights violations in India and other countries and 
supported this demand rhetorically by arguing that dalits face “a fate far worse than South 
African or American Apartheid.”
175
 This document thus communicated the plight of 
dalits not through analogy, but through comparison: dalits faced a predicament worse 
than the other internationally recognized systems of oppression.  
The second international dalit conference took place from May 16-18, 2003 in 
Vancouver, Canada. Largely funded and organized by the Shri Ravidass Sabhas of 
Vancouver and other Canadian cities, the 2003 Conference brought into relief the 
significance both of diasporic activism and religious institutions to providing community 
support for this activism. Guru Ravidass was a radical anticaste15
th
 century sant. Omvedt 
writes that unlike other radicals of the period who were “absorbed in the general 
cooptation of ‘bhakti,’…the Ravidass movement has developed a strong sense of anti-
Hindu identity.”
 176
  She adds that in the diaspora, “freed from the economic and political 
hegemony of the upper castes, institutions like the Guru Ravidass Sabha have 
flourished.” Unlike the Kuala Lumpur statement, the Vancouver statement did not 
“declare” the unity of dalits, but rather, “call[ed] upon the Dalits of the world to unite in 
their activism in the true spirit of interfaith dialogue and multiculturalism, and resolve to 
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work tirelessly for the upliftment of the community.”
177
 It called for the establishment of 
“a formal institutional structure for better networking among the Resident and Non-
Resident Indian Dalit community” and for more forceful outreach to the international 
community, including political and economic institutions such as the United Nations, 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and educational and research institutions in 
North America and Europe.  The Vancouver Conference declaration expressed its 
internationalist vision not only by pledging to “propagate knowledge of Babasaheb as a 
philosopher of emancipation to all the oppressed anywhere in the world,” but also by 
“affirm[ing] that every human being has the inherent right to life and dignity and that 
Black is Beautiful and Dalit is Dignified.”  
The phrase “Black is Beautiful” references the cultural message and movement of 
the African American civil rights movement. This citation along with the other citations 
of international struggles by dalit activists has pedagogical value. For dalits, at the 
conference and in India, and for the global public, these citations provide a model of 
mass social movements.  They develop analogies that instruct its audiences to understand 
dalits in a particular way; they suggest that dalits suffer just as black people living under 
apartheid in South Africa or Jim Crow in the American South did.  Both were the target 
of mass social movements; the former also mobilizing a global movement. Comparing 
the situation of dalits to apartheid then instructs the global human rights community of 
the situation in India and the need for global assistance in protest.   
 The work of the activists in the diaspora together with the advocacy of dalit 
leaders in India led to formal establishment of the International Dalit Solidarity Network 
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(IDSN) in March 2000. Based in Copenhagen, Denmark, the IDSN – together with 
national-level organizations in India and eight state-level networks in Europe – was 
critical to the creation of a “vibrant and increasingly dense transnational advocacy 
network.”
178
 The network helped increase the visibility of dalit issues through targeted 
media activism and lobbied states and international institutions As Clifford Bob notes, 
the IDSN also represented a shift in how the problems facing dalits were framed 
internationally: whereas religious and development organizations had focused on the 
various problems that India’s poor faced such as illiteracy and forced labor, the IDSN 
argued “an approach that frames the Dalits’ many problems in comprehensive terms – as 
outgrowths of caste-based discrimination endemic to Indian society.”
179
  
 The IDSN also sponsored knowledge production on caste as a global problem, a 
problem found across the world and one that deserved the attention of the international 
human rights community. The network identified caste-like phenomena and caste-
affected populations in South Asia, East Asia, the Middle East, West Africa, East Africa, 
and areas with immigrant communities from these areas. The IDSN defined caste systems 
as the division of people into groups fixed at birth in which the “the assignment of basic 
rights among various castes is unequal and hierarchal” and maintained through the threat 
of a “system of social and economic penalties.”
180
  The IDSN defined untouchability as 
the classification of a group of people as “impure” and polluting” and assigning these 
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groups the most “menial” and “hazardous” jobs in a society.  “The division of a society 
into castes,” the IDSN claimed, “is a global phenomenon not exclusively practised within 
any particular religion or belief system.” In addition to the countries of South Asia – 
Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka – the IDSN stated that caste 
discrimination occurs in Japan, Yemen, Senegal, Nigeria, Mauritania, Niger, Kenya, and 
diaspora communities in other countries. It noted that while caste in South Asia is 
justified by Hindu ideology, in Japan it is associated with “Shinto beliefs” and in Africa, 
it is based on “myths.”
181
    
Clifford Bob argues that this articulation of caste was intended “to underline the 
problem’s scope and attract broader support from international actors, some of whom 
might otherwise be reluctant to offend the Indian government.”
182
  While this may be the 
case, in my reading, the severing of the caste system from its conventional associations – 
namely, India and Hinduism – enabled its recognition as a universal wrong. This 
articulation of caste helped activists translate caste as fundamentally antithetical to the 
ideals of liberal thought. The IDSN categorized caste systems as “a form of social and 
economic governance” which holds “the doctrine of inequality” at its “core.”  It thus 
negated an understanding of caste as a ‘cultural’ practice open to relativistic tolerance, 
and placed it in the realm of the political.  By politicizing and globalizing caste, the IDSN 
was able to reframe its imposition on individuals and communities as a human rights 
violation. The IDSN thus argued for a concept of caste that incorporated similarities with 
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other forms of inequality and discrimination that exist around the world.  The network 
promoted using these similarities, rather than a notion of caste’s radical difference from 
social forms in other areas, as a mode of comprehending caste in India.  This approach 
then also shows how transnational activism required a political logic that highlighted 
similarities between dalits’ experiences and the experiences of other communities.   
 
Episode 5: The Dalit Majority 
This final episode in the history of dalit transnational activism was not one 
referred to in the accounts given to me by activists. Rather, it is based on dalit activist 
Martin Macwan’s hope for the future of anti-caste activism.  Macwan founded Navsarjan 
Trust, co-founded the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights, received the Robert F. 
Kennedy Human Rights Award, and was instrumental in mobilizing the dalit rights 
contingent at the World Conference Against Racism, 2001. At the time of my interview 
with him in 2009, he had retired from leadership roles in dalit organizations and spent 
much of his time writing educational materials for children. During our conversation, he 
advocated reconceptualizing the meaning of ‘dalit’ and put forth a vision of the future of 
dalit activism in India and abroad based on this resignification.  
In “Navsarjan on the Unbeaten Track,” a booklet that both documents the history 
of Navsarjan Trust and lays out the organization’s ideological positions, Martin Macwan 
recounts the development of his views on identity and community. In 1976, as a student 
at St. Xavier’s College in Ahmedabad, Macwan worked closely with two professors and 
a Spanish priest on a development program for Gujarat’s farmers.  During this project, as 
the booklet states, Macwan was surprised to learn that even though the professors and 
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priest he worked with were not from Schedule Caste communities, they nonetheless 
“took their meals with them, mingled with them and maintained [an] equal relationship 
with them.”
183
 According to the text, this experience alerted Macwan to the possible 
expansiveness of social affiliations. An adolescent at the time, Macwan recalled learning 
that bonds of associations were “often…forged not on the basis of sharing a particular 
caste, but by sharing the experience of injustice.”
184
  
Macwan’s conception of the boundaries of social affiliations underwent another 
transformation sixteen years later in 1992 during his first trip to the United States. 
“Navsarjan on the Unbeaten Track” details Macwan’s participation in a two-month 
training program in advocacy. During this program, Macwan worked at the National 
Council of La Raza, the largest Latino civil rights and advocacy organization in the U.S. 
and wrote a final paper titled “Comparison Between Dalits and Latinos.” Macwan 
recalled that he remained focused on the issues affecting dalits in Gujarat and that his 
experience working on social and political advocacy in the U.S. deepened his 
understanding of the situation in India. Macwan noted that after studying how “in other 
countries collective groups like Dalits progressed by getting organized,” his 
understanding of the problems facing dalits “acquired a global solution.”
185
  He 
recognized that communities like the dalits existed across the world; “their problems,” he 
realized, “should become our problem.” Macwan also discovered the possibilities of 
transnational exchanges of knowledge in both inspiring and revising local models for 
social change. “If Martin Luther King can learn something from Gandhiji,” he noted, 
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“then why should we find it difficult to accept something not just from Gandhiji but also 
Martin Luther King.”  
 Macwan remained attuned to the opportunities created through affiliations across 
caste, region, and nation in his career as an activist. A transnational vision of community 
can be discerned behind much of his advocacy work, whether international or local in 
scope. This vision was not only of ideological significance, but also of pragmatic 
expedience. As Macwan explained to me, “I have learned from my experience, personal 
and professional experience, that ultimately it [achieving social change] is a question of 
identity.” “You cannot win any war,” he continued, “if you don’t have a majority.”
186
 In 
his quest to find an identity that could, as he said, “break the barrier of caste,” Macwan 
reinterpreted the meaning of ‘dalit.’ Whereas ‘dalit’ is conventionally associated with a 
caste identity, Macwan insisted that the term should refer to people who share a moral 
position, namely an unwavering belief in equality: “dalits are those who believe in 
equality; dalits are those who practice equality; dalits are those who protest for 
equality.”
187
  With this logic, a non-dalit is then someone who “cooperates with 
inequality.” “That hits people,” said Macwan. With this definition of dalit, asking if one 
identifies as a dalit is akin to asking, in Macwan’s words, “are you a progressive person 
or are you a backward person.”
188
  The majority of Indians, Macwan speculated, would 
want to be identified as progressive, would want to embody ‘modern’ values, and would 
thus have to identify as dalit.  By resignifying ‘dalit’ in this way, Macwan hopes to 
transform both the political logic behind the movement for dalit rights and the social 
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determinants of individual and collective identity.  Macwan shared an example to 
illustrate the problems he sees with current identification practices:   
I have friends who are married for 30 years and they still introduce themselves ‘I 
am dalit. My wife is not.’  So, I say, let’s take this – this woman has given you 
children.  The woman cooks for you.  For thirty years, [she does] the most anyone 
can do [for you], but still you say she’s a nondalit.  So, what we are saying to the 
world is that the caste system will remain, and we will make sure it remains, we 
want it to remain…I believe that it has to go; it can go.  So, I’m looking for ways 
to break it. 
 
Macwan reasons that if an identity cannot be shared by two people in an intimate bond 
such as marriage and parenthood, the prospects for building solidarity through some form 
of identification for the nation – or a collective of nations – are dismal.  His redefinition 
of ‘dalit’ contains the possibility of dissolving caste distinctions and building solidarity 
through both empathy and shared ideology.  While Macwan acknowledged that his 
thinking on this matter has been branded “idealistic” and “utopian” by other activists, he 
insists that his resignification of ‘dalit’ is having tangible affects. No longer officially 
working for either the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights or Navsarjan Trust, 
Macwan has dedicated himself to the education of dalit children in rural Gujarat. He has 
shared his definition of ‘dalit’ with them and proudly avers that “one hundred percent” of 
the children he works with define ‘dalit’ as those whose “believe in equality.” “This new 
perspective is a lasting thing,” he argued, “we’re changing the whole course of the dalit 
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For Macwan, the redefinition of ‘dalit’ has revised advocacy outlooks by 
translating a minority politics into claims made from membership and participation in a 
global struggle.  Redefining ‘dalit’ has helped him – as it did the Dalit Panthers – counter 
the political isolation of dalits in India and build solidarity with groups outside of India. 
Throughout this chapter, I have tried to analyze the shifting contours of the collectives 
with whom dalit activists have partnered themselves.  I have employed an episodic 
approach to this history both to intimate the narrative of the internationalization of dalit 
issues offered by activists and also to draw attention to the political logics that recur – 
without causal connection – in different historical moments.  In addition to the 
rearticulation of “dalit,” the imagining of similarity in structural position with groups 
outside of India and the reconceptualization of caste as a global problem have also 
recurred in the five episodes recounted in this chapter. The next chapter will provide a 
deeper history to this last contention – that caste is not specific to India – by analyzing 




Generalizing Caste: Histories of Caste as Inherited Inequality  
 
“…in dealing with caste, as with schizophrenia, we can never be sure where the fantasies 





In his seminal essay “Theory in Anthropology: Center and Periphery,” Arjun 
Appadurai discusses the close association between places and analytic concepts in 
anthropology since World War II.
191
  He argues that this association has confined the 
study of certain non-Western areas to a limited set of topics. In the case of India, “caste” 
and “hierarchy” have served as “gatekeeping concepts,” concepts which function to 
“limit anthropological theorizing about the place in question, and that define the 
quintessential and dominant questions of interest in the region.”
192
 Appadurai also points 
out that the inverse – the constraints “place” puts on the theorizing of a concept – poses 
difficulties for cross-cultural or regional comparison.  
In this chapter, I illustrate the consequences of this inverse for the concept of 
caste and the place of India.  The English term ‘caste’ usually refers to two local 
concepts of social relations: varna and jati. The varna system corresponds to the four-
fold social order laid out in Hindu religious texts. Dalits are not formally a part of this 
system, but are included within it through their very exclusion. Unlike varna, jati refers 
to the endogamous communities most relevant for the everyday operations of social life. 
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There are thousands of jatis in India, and the identities and arrangement of these 
communities vary from area to area. This chapter does not take up the concepts of varna 
or jati, but rather, focuses on “caste.” “Caste” is not only a translation and abstraction, 
but is also an analytic category in anthropology and sociology with two-fold political 
significance: it denotes a system of social stratification and inequality, and also has been 
used ideologically to represent a stagnant Indian society, its underdevelopment and 
degeneracy.   
Today, dalit activists argue that caste is not particular to India and that ‘caste-
affected’ societies exist across the world. This view of caste as a global phenomenon 
challenges a longstanding assumption that caste is unique to India and is uniquely Indian. 
Although scholarship over the last few decades has effectively critiqued the view of caste 
as a rigid and unchanging institution that stands in as a metonym for Indian civilization, 
caste still emerges in most anthropological and historical studies as a phenomenon that is 
found only in India. 
This chapter delineates the political and theoretical implications of circumscribing 
the concept of caste to the place of India. I trace a history of ‘caste’ as a generalizable 
category not specific to the study of India. I discuss examples from the nineteenth and 
twentieth century of the use of the term to identify systems of inherited inequality, mostly 
in the United States. In these examples, India provides an instance of caste, but the 
phenomenon itself is not geographically restricted to the Indian subcontinent nor is it 
exclusively associated with Hinduism. The use of caste to describe social systems outside 
of India, however, was not without controversy and in this section, I also draw out the 
key themes in debates that ensued over the use of caste to describe race relations in the 
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Jim Crow South. Through this exposition, I argue that if “caste” is deemed unique to 
India, then it appears as an exceptional, cultural practice; in this case, caste inequality 
cannot be categorized as a form of discrimination, but rather, is given legitimacy under 
the rubric of culture. Alternatively, if “caste” is a generalizable category, then it appears 
as a form of a social structure based on inequality, the effects of which violate liberal 
humanist conceptions of rights.  The significance of this argument will be more fully 
illustrated in the following chapters. Chapter 5, in particular, analyzes dalit activism at 
the 2001 World Conference Against Racism and the attempt to have caste discrimination 
recognized as a universal human rights violation. While the debates discussed in this 
chapter and in Chapter 5 are separated by over a half century, they pivot on one central 
question: whether caste is specific to India or a generalizable category that can be applied 
to structures of inequality in other societies. 
  
Caste in the History and Anthropology of India 
 Caste has been a central component in narratives of the Indian past and its society. 
An account of caste often encodes an evaluation of the dynamism or lack thereof of 
Indian political and philosophical traditions. The view of caste as the social expression of 
a religiously inspired principle of hierarchy, a view most notably advanced by French 
anthropologist Louis Dumont, renders the caste system a harmonious yet rigid system 
that stands in as a metonym for a historically stable and unchanging Indian civilization.
193
  
Here the caste system, with its built-in mechanisms of reproduction that preclude 
resistance or conflict, is also causally implicated in the lack of Indian history and politics. 
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In this reading, the caste system is a hierarchal order which structures social life and 
critically, establishes a social order which subordinates political and economic activity to 
the religious; a principle of hierarchy, motivated by an opposition between purity and 
pollution, becomes the essence of India and constitutes its fundamental difference from 
an individualistic and egalitarian West.  
While Dumont is often cited as having put forth this view, his critics, such as 
McKim Marriott and Arjun Appadurai, have pointed that his description of caste does not 
significantly deviate from colonial understandings of caste.
194
 Colonial authorities had 
already rendered caste a fundamentally religious system that structured social life in 
India.  Orientalist scholars derived this understanding of caste from their readings of 
ancient Hindu texts, which were aided by their Brahmin pundit interlocutors.  Later 
colonial enumerative and ethnological projects, as Bernard Cohen and Nicholas Dirks 
have shown, reproduced this view and strategically simplified very complex social 
phenomena into a religious and hierarchal notion of caste.
195
  Dirks implicates colonial 
policies in making caste the primary referent for Indian social relations. He argues that 
caste in India is neither the totalizing constant in Indian history nor the source and 
manifestation of the value of hierarchy that determines Indian civilization and its 
difference from the west. Rather. He contends that caste, as it is known today, is a 
product of colonial practices and constructions. 
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Readings of religious texts had undergird colonial ethnological and enumerative 
projects and generated the categories and rankings used to make sense of Indian social 
groups.  With the rise of anthropology as a discipline in the twentieth century, scholarship 
undertaken after independence increasingly relied on ethnographic field work rather than 
textual studies to understand caste in India. Many of these accounts focused on a village 
community, which anthropologist Gerald D. Berreman suggested “was found by many 
anthropologists to be the most manageable unit for ethnological research.”
196
   Although 
the villages were “manageable units,” anthropologists challenged the notion of the village 
as an isolated, self-contained unit.
197
  In studies of caste, local phenomena were then 
connected to more generalized, pan-Indian categories and abstracted in order to produce 
theories of caste. Although a rich and varied field of scholarship, in my review of this 
field, I will focus on only three aspects of the conceptualization of caste most relevant for 
the intellectual history that follows in this chapter:  definitions of caste; the notion of 
consensus in the caste system; and the issue of unity in categories across India.   
 The caste system is generally defined in association with the rankings of 
traditional occupations, rules of endogamy and commensality, and notions of purity and 
pollution.  G.S. Ghurye, writing in 1932, describes castes the most generalizable unit of 
social organization and offers a definition that incorporates both the interdependence of 
different castes and their separation.
198
  Castes were separated by rules related to 
marriage, occupation, feeding and social intercourse, resulting in the limitation of 
“community feeling” to within a caste, but were nonetheless “welded together and 
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interdependent for the purposes of civic life.”
199
 Adrian Mayer, like Ghurye, argued that 
the study of caste was central to understanding social life; almost all social, political, and 
economic actions could be attributed to workings of caste.
200
  In a similar vein, M.N. 
Srinivas viewed castes as fundamentally religious groups, which created Indian social 
structure through bonds of both “horizontal solidarity” – caste bonds that span across 
villages – and “vertical solidarity” – bonds created through the division of labor and 
allegiance to a village.
201
  Srinivas also pointed that that varna was not the “real unit of 
the caste system,” but rather jati – “a very small endogamous group practicing a 




The notions of purity and pollution, central to Dumont’s view of caste, figure 
differently in these theories of caste. For example, Stephen Tyler, following Dumont, 
suggested that the “underlying ideology of purity/pollution” was central to the 
organization and ranking of castes.
203
  McKim Marriott, however, challenged this notion 
and argued that purity and pollution were not inherent qualities, but rather, were 
produced through transactional processes, such as the transfer of services and food.
204
 
Caste rankings, he suggested, were the result of a transactional system: upper castes 
receive more services and lower castes provided more services; whereas lower castes 
receive more food and upper castes provide more food.  For Marriott, caste ranking in 
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India was not uniform, but rather was based on the structure of a local community; castes 
were ranked through local interactions and economic power, but the interactions between 
communities could then map onto pan-Indian ritual hierarchies.
205
  
In most of the ethnographies, castes appear as, in Andre Beteille’s terms, 
“enduring groups” with “fixed boundaries.”
 206
  This is attributed to the rules of 
endogamy; caste membership, as Bernard Cohn writes, “is by birth.  Caste status is 
ascriptive and unchanging for the individual.”
207
  The hereditary nature of caste status is 
thus credited with the endurance of caste groups.  In several ethnographies, the endurance 
– of both caste groups and the caste system – was also related to cultural consensus on 
the various aspects of caste. As Ghurye wrote, “Complete acceptance of the system in its 
broad outlines by the groups making up that system…not only prevented the exclusivist 
organization of the groups from splitting the system into independent units, but created 
harmony in civic life”; this was a “harmony of parts equally valued, but of units which 
are rigourously subordinated to one another.”
208
  Concepts of equality and rights were 
deemed “modern,” and thus only introduced to the subcontinent with European contact. 
S.C. Dube acknowledged that “Untouchables certainly resent their degraded status, but 
are careful not to voice their protests too loudly,” but also claimed that “the fundamental 
concepts of the rights and equality mean little” to the villagers he studied.
209
 Michael 
Moffatt argued for a “fundamental cultural consensus,” claiming that “Untouchables and 
higher caste actors hold virtually identical cultural constructs, that they are in total 
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conceptual and evaluative consensus with one another.”
210
  He concluded that “those 
people who are, in egalitarian terms, among the most oppressed members of Indian 
society are also among the truest believers in the system that so oppresses them.”
211
  
Joan Mencher refuted these claim of cultural consensus and argued that understandings of 
the caste system vary depending on perspective; lower caste people, she maintained, were 
far from complacent in their positions and had very different values from the upper 
caste.
212
  Her analysis explored beyond initial responses and immediate appearances and 
discovered that people on the lower end of the caste hierarchy tended to view it in more 
material terms and as a system of economic exploitation.  Gail Omvedt has similarly 
argued against the assumption of consensus, pointing out that lower caste groups have a 
long history contesting caste values and mobilizing around rights and equality.
213
  
Mencher and Omvedt, however, remained minority voices in ethnography of caste; most 
studies either assumed consensus and harmony or explicitly cited it as a reason for the 
endurance of caste.  
 Ethnographic studies of caste reproduced nationalist assumptions about an 
underlying unity across Indian cultures, a unity created by Hindu ideology. M.N. 
Srinivas’ suggested the creation of “cultural uniformity” across India through lower caste 
emulation of the “Brahmanic way of life,” a process he termed “Sanskritization.”
214
 This 
not only assumed the dominance of Brahmins across India, but also failed to conceive of 
Brahmanism as an ideology that subordinated lower castes. As Kamala Visweswaran 
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argues, Srinivas “never seems to understand it [Sanskritization] as an oppressive ideology 
since the process of adopting sanskritic practices appeared to be voluntary.”
215
  
Furthermore, as Dirks points out, Srinivas ignored the role of colonialism and nationalism 
in making Brahmanic values and behaviors the “pervasive idiom of social mobility.”
216
  
A cultural uniformity across India was also assumed by Marriott, who interpreted this 
unity in terms of Sanskritic-Hindu concepts.  His development of ethnosociology, an 
approach that was supposed to use Indian categories to avoid an ethnocentric bias and 
deliver a more accurate picture of Indian social life, reproduced Hindu textual categories 
for the analysis of social life and reinforced a holistic view of caste and Indian 
civilization in which religion was primary.
217
  
 Since the 1980s, many of the conclusions made in the ethnological studies of 
caste – the structuralist and the ethnosociological – have been effectively critiqued. The 
notion of the caste system as a harmonious hierarchy has been supplemented with dalit 
perspectives on the violence of inequality and exploitation. The idea of timeless religious 
values structuring social life has been replaced with accounts of the impact of colonialism 
in flattening the role of power and politics and in privileging the religious in 
representations of Indian history.  The concept of a pan-Indian Sanskritic Hindu 
foundation to cultural life has similarly been challenged by histories of nineteenth century 
socio-religious reform movements and nationalist resistance. While this scholarship is 
attentive to changes over time in the structure of caste and its variations across regions, 
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caste still appears in most scholarship as a set of relationships based in Hinduism and 
particular to the Indian subcontinent: caste is still a uniquely Indian phenomena and a 
phenomena unique to India.  Consequently, a notion of caste’s difference from any other 
form of social organization still seems to guide understandings of caste.
218
  Contemporary 
dalit rights activists argue for a concept of caste that incorporates similarities with other 
forms of inequality and discrimination that exist around the world. They promote using 
these similarities, rather than their differences, as a mode of comprehending caste in 
India.  In what follows, I offer a history of the conceptualizations of caste that privilege 
similarities with other forms of social organization, rather than the differences. 
 
Caste as Slavery and Racism 
 As early as 1869, Charles Sumner, a Radical Republican senator from 
Massachusetts, used “caste” to refer to a system of inherited inequality. For Sumner, 
caste was a system with “two distinct elements: first, separation, with rank and privilege, 
or their opposite, with degradation and disability; second, descent from father to son, so 
that it was perpetual separation from generation to generation.”
219
 Sumner noted that 
while the term “signifies primarily the orders of ranks in India,” caste also refers to, “by 
natural extension, any separate and fixed order of society in other countries.”   He applied 
the term to past societies such as “Assyria,” “Egypt,” and “Attica” and suggested that 
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although “hereditary discrimination” was found in modern Europe – where “the son of a 
noble being a noble, with great privileges” and “the son of a mechanic being a mechanic, 
with great disabilities” – the French Revolution made considerable progress towards 
destroying this system. This was because, as Sumner argues, “just in proportion to the 
triumph of Equality does Caste disappear.”
220
  
Sumner describes the social organization in the U.S. under slavery in the U.S. as 
akin to caste in India.  He even refers to caste in the Indian context as India’s “peculiar 
institutions,” – a euphemistic term used for the slavery in the South – cementing the 
equivalence between Indian caste and American slavery.
221
  According to Sumner, in the 
United States – where “the Caste hereditary rank and privilege is white…[and] the Caste 
doomed to hereditary degradation and disability is black or yellow” –  caste had 
continued after the abolition of slavery. The “white man,” Sumner writes, “is a Superior 
Caste not unlike the Brahmin, while the black man is an inferior Caste not unlike the 
Sudra, sometimes even the Pariah.”
222
 Sumner argues that caste, whether in India or in 
the United States, is abhorrent to humanity’s moral senses and to the universal laws of 
nature; among humans, he writes, there is an “overruling Unity” and this “common 
humanity” precludes divisions such as caste. Delivered just four years after the abolition 
of slavery, Sumner’s lecture demanded the conferral of the equal rights and the 
protections of citizenship to all men within the country so that caste can be “trampled 
out.”
223
 Sumner professes that ridding the country of caste is in the “best interests of the 
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‘Caste’ provides Sumner with an analytic concept that conveys the conditions 
under slavery as well as the legacy of slavery in the organization of society.  ‘Caste’ 
highlights the perpetuation of an unequal and immoral system after slavery was legally 
abolished; it communicates the continued exclusion of segments of the population and the 
denial of the rights and protections that should be guaranteed to them in a liberal 
democratic republic.  For Sumner, “caste” signified both the “dreadful system” of India 
as well as social principles  –  such as inherited entitlement and inequality – which stood 
in stark opposition to Enlightenment thinking, Christianity, and Republicanism.  In other 
words, the rhetorical power of the term “caste” enabled Sumner to argue that the 
continuation of inequality in reconstruction-era America was contrary to the laws of God, 
citizenship, and human progress.  As Sumner maintained, while the concept and term 
came from the Portuguese understanding of India, “caste” was far from a social system 
restricted to Hinduism or the Indian subcontinent; rather, it was a social system that had 
functioned in various societies, past and present.  Sumner predicted that caste would be 
destroyed as acceptance of man’s “common humanity” grew and was replaced with a 
republicanism that offered universal and equal rights for all citizens.  Sumner’s lecture 
illustrates how a term that emerges from the study of Indian society enters the vocabulary 
of political and sociological discourse and is made available for the analysis of other 
human societies.  
 Across the world in India and five years after Sumner’s treatise, (Mahatma) 
Jotirao Phule published Slavery (in the Civilised British Government under the cloak of 
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Brahmanism), which also used an analogy between slavery and caste to argue for 
governmental action against social inequality.
225
  For Phule, however, it is the rhetorical 
power of the term “slavery” that bolstered his demand that the colonial government 
intervene to cripple the functioning of caste in society. In Slavery, Phule offers a 
speculative history of India in which the Brahmins originate from Iran, conquer the 
Indian subcontinent and enslave its indigenous people. In this account, the shudras and 
atishudras of today are the descendants of the subcontinent’s indigenous population.  In 
Slavery, Phule alleges that the Brahmins conquest subdued the subcontinent’s indigenous 
people through force, “compelled [many] to emigrate,” and carried out instances of 
“wholesale extermination.”
226
  The atrocities that accompanied this conquest were 
compared to those committed during the conquest of the Americas. As Phule writes, “the 
cruelties which the European settlers practiced on the American Indians on their first 
settlement in the new world, had certainly their parallel in India on the advent of the 
Aryans and their subjugation of the aborigines.”
227
 Phule claims that after the military 
defeat of the indigenous population, Brahmin dominance was institutionalized through 
“that weird system of mythology, the ordination of caste, and the code of cruel and 
inhuman laws.”
228
  Phule argued that the institutionalization of caste – and its 
accompanying gradation of privileges and economic exploitation – enchained the native 
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population in a system of physical and mental slavery.  He pointed out that British rule 
had brought an end to the physical slavery of the shudra and atishudras, but mental 
slavery, the perpetuation of ignorance and the inculcation of helplessness, continued 
unhindered under the British Raj.  Phule divulged that the purpose of writing Slavery was 
not only to “tell my Shudra brethren how they have been duped by the Brahmin, but also 
to open the eyes of the Government.”
229
  He criticized the colonial state’s education 
policy, claiming that its focus on higher education perpetuated Brahmin dominance and 
the subjugation of the masses of India’s indigenous population. As he wrote,  
the benevolent British Government have not addressed themselves to the 
important task of providing education to the said masses…That is why the 
Shudras continue to be ignorant, and hence, their ‘mental slavery,’ regarding the 
spurious religious tracts of the Bhats [Brahmins] continues unabated.
230
   
 
Phule envisaged that the revelations of his account of India’s past would force the 
colonial state to “recognize the error of their ways” and “take the glory into their own 
hands of emancipating my Shudra brethren from the trammels of bondage which the 
Brahmins have woven around them like the coils of a serpent.”
231
  
 Forty years after the abolition of slavery in the British Empire and eight years 
after its abolition in the United States, Phule harnesses the power of the term “slavery” to 
draw attention to the situation of the lower castes in India. The equivalence between caste 
and slavery is central to his rhetorical strategy for changing the colonial state’s thinking 
on caste.  If caste was analogous to slavery, it was not an issue of social or religious 
tradition, issues theoretically beyond the purview of the colonial state after 1858, but 
rather was an issue of universal and fundamental rights and thus demanded political 
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intervention.  According to Phule, the conditions experienced by lower castes in India 
and slaves in America were “identical.” “The hardships heaped upon the slaves in 
America,” he writes, “were also suffered by the depressed and downtrodden people in 
India at the hands of the Bhats [Brahmins].”
232
  Phule notes only one difference between 
the kinds of subjugation experienced by the two groups: while slaves were “captured” in 
Africa and then enslaved in America, the lower castes were “conquered” within their 
homeland and then enslaved.  Phule reports that many in Europe and America are now 
“genuinely ashamed of themselves for this heinous crime [of slavery]” and that “many 
liberal-minded souls in England and America tried hard to abolish this bad practice by 
waging war against their oppressors.”
 233
  This has yet to take place in India and Phule 
implores the British government to end caste inequality and exploitation as it had 
abolished slavery. Here, the liberation of the “depressed and downtrodden” of India 
becomes part of a historic struggle for the abolition of slavery. Phule dedicates his 
account of the Brahmin conquest of India and enslavement of its indigenous people to the  
good people of the United States as a token of admiration for their sublime 
disinterested and self-sacrificing devotion in the cause of Negro Slavery; and with 
an earnest desire, that my countrymen may take their noble example as their guide 
in the emancipation of the Sudra Brethren from the trammels of Brahmin 
tradition.
234
   
 
In this passage, a perceived similarity in experiences also fosters solidarity with the 
former slaves in America.  Phule writes that “the depressed and downtrodden people of 
India feel specially happy at this auspicious development [the abolition of slavery], 
because they alone or the slaves in America have experienced the many inhuman 
hardships and tortures attendant upon slavery.” Thus, not only does the equivalence 
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between caste and slavery provide a rhetorical strategy with which to appeal to the 
colonial government, but it also provides for an affective connection between the 
“depressed and downtrodden” of India and the former slaves of America.  
 Within the United States, the politically salient connotations of caste were 
supplemented with academic scholarship on the nature of caste. Caste appears in 
American sociology as an analytical category free of any reference to India as early as 
1904. In an article focused primarily on the analysis of racism, William I. Thomas, a 
sociologist/social psychologist at the University of Chicago, argues that from a 
psychological perspective, “caste-feeling” and “race-prejudice” are the same 
phenomena.
235
  Although they are produced through different processes, they are, as he 
writes, “at the bottom the same thing, both being phases of an instinct of hate.”
236
 
Thompson writes of racism as a reflex triggered by the very notion of people with 
different physical characteristics; it is an impermanent and instinctual response to 
physical difference, rooted in “the tribal stage of society, when solidarity in feeling and 
action were essential to the preservation of the group.” In Thompson’s assessment, the 
sentiments associated with caste, however, are generated through social interaction. Caste 
feeling is produced when the privileges of one group are dependent on the subordination 
and exploitation of another group.  Thompson explains that caste-feelings develop when 
“the lower caste has either been conquered and captured, or gradually outstripped on 
account of mental or economic inferiority.”
237
  The higher caste must then enforce a 
sense of their superiority and the other’s inferiority to maintain the power imbalance 
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between the groups. Thompson argues that while the feelings that whites have towards 
blacks are an example of race-prejudice, the sentiment felt in the South is an example of 
caste-feeling. Northerners have little contact with blacks, but nonetheless, Thomas writes, 
experience a “horror” and “repulsion” at the difference in skin color. In the South, a 
system of caste had been established and color indexed rank in this system; it 
consequently “was impossible for a southern white to think the negro into his own 
class.”
238
   
Thompson’s article indicates that by the early twentieth century the social 
relations and accompanying psychology of caste had already been associated with racism 
in American sociological theory.  Furthermore, caste in Thompson’s article has no 
association with India.  Thompson employs the term without clarification and without 
any mention of potential objections to its application to the American South.  While this 
application proves controversial later in the century, at this point, caste appears as if it is 
already a theoretical concept with a sociological meaning unanchored in India. The term 
is therefore available for the analysis of other geographical areas and social contexts.  
Although caste does not emerge as a significant concept in the anthropological and 
sociological study of the American South for another thirty years, this early use of caste 
indicates that neither the term’s meanings nor the range of its application had yet been 
fixed.  
In 1916, Lala Lajpat Rai, an anti-colonial and nationalist leader, developed an 
analogy between race and caste in his account of his travels in the United States.  In The 
United States of America: A Hindu’s Impression and Study, Rai claimed that the lower 
castes in India and African Americans in the United States lived under similar conditions. 
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“The Negro is the PARIAH of America” he writes.
239
 He acknowledges that the 
situations in India and the U.S. are not exactly the same, but maintains that the 
similarities are strong enough to warrant a study of racial problems in the U.S. for the 
insights it would generate on caste problems in India.  His primary purpose in developing 
the analogy between caste and race, however, seems to be to counter claims of the 
exceptionalism of India’s caste system and consequently, to repudiate arguments against 
India’s political advancement that were based on its presumed social backwardness.  Rai 
argues that although “we are led to think that caste distinctions are a peculiarity of 
Hinduism and are to be found nowhere else in the world,” the underlying principles and 
social manifestations of discrimination are common to many other societies.
240
   For 
example, restrictions on inter-dining and inter-marriage as well as stark disparities in 
access to justice and education are viewed as elements of both caste-based and race-based 
inequality: “the worst features of the code of Manu,” Rai argues, “find their parallel in 
American life.”
241
 For Rai, just as caste in India is attributed to Hinduism, the “color-
line” in America is associated with Christianity, albeit a “standing comment on the 
doctrine of the equality of men and of universal brotherhood preached by Christianity.”
242
 
Rai derides the hypocrisy of “Christian writers” who do not object to the color-line in 
America, and yet write scathing and defamatory critiques of Hinduism and caste; he 
claims that popularity of the film Birth of a Nation is a “better and surer index of 
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Christian feeling in this country than any number of books written by Christian 
missionaries.”
243
   
In this way, Rai uses the analogy between caste and the color-line to counter 
claims that social problems such as caste made India unfit for political autonomy.  Rai 
also claims that the “color line…is not the only caste line in the Western world.”
244
  He 
suggests that feudal Europe, with the gradation of privileges and lack of social mobility 
among the serf, laborer, trader, feudal lord, and priest, operated like a caste system.  
While the feudal system may have been defeated, Rai points out that “modern industrial 
system is almost as cruel and crushing.”
245
 Rai concludes that America is in fact “doubly 
caste-ridden,” for both the color-line and modern industrial capitalism foster a rigid social 
structure and function to create discrimination and disabilities for groups of people.
246
 
While the caste system in India was a “social curse and cannot but be denounced in the 
most unmeasured terms,” it thus was not a “bar to political advancement along the lines 
of the West.”
247
 According to Rai, not only was caste in India originally developed as a 
benevolent and economically efficient system, but even after it was corrupted and power 
and privileges were assumed by the Brahmins, it still did not approximate the social 
system created by a “soul-killing industrial system” in the modern West.
248
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‘Caste’ in Rai’s work – as in Thompson, Phule, and Sumner’s – is not unique to 
India; caste or its equivalent is found across the world. For all four thinkers, “caste” is 
rendered analogous to the racial situation in America during slavery and/or post-
Emancipation. While the meanings of “caste” and the political impetuses behind the use 
of the analogy with slavery or racial discrimination vary among Sumner, Phule, and Rai, 
caste emerges in all three tracts as a social phenomenon that has parallels in other 
societies; it is not a geographically fixed descriptor, but rather is rendered available for 
various political arguments.  While not overtly political, Thompson’s usage of caste is 
significant. He does not qualify his use of the term and assumes that the application of 
caste to areas outside of India is neither ingenious nor controversial. The term’s place 
among sociological concepts is taken for granted and its utility for social analysis self-
evident.  Even the similarity between “race-prejudice” and “caste-feeling” is not argued 
as a unique contribution; rather, it is the proposed common origin of the two in a 
primordial bio-psychological instinct that is Thompson’s stated contribution. 
 
Ethnographies of Caste in the American South 
Caste reappears in American social science theory in the 1930s with the Caste 
School of Race Relations. In her recent book, Un/common Cultures, Kamala 
Visweswaran discusses the Caste School and its use of “caste” to understand social 
relations in the American South.
249
  Visweswaran’s book offers a history of the concept 
of “culture” in anthropological theory and argues that the discipline has been complicit in 
creating and reifying rigid notions of cultural difference which then serve as a substitute 
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for hierarchal notions of race. She draws on the work of the Caste School of Race 
Relations to provide an example of a moment in the history of anthropology – albeit 
short-lived – when caste was not deemed a unique cultural phenomenon, but rather, was 
rendered analogous to racial discrimination. Visweswaran’s compelling account is 
focused on the genealogy of “culture” in disciplinary anthropology. While her work is 
suggestive of the implications of this concept for considerations of “caste,” it does not 
fully explore these implications – let alone those for dalit activism; her narrative seems to 
most powerfully impact understandings of anthropology’s history.  My discussion of the 
Caste School of Race Relations, however, analyzes its usage of the concept of “caste” 
because it offers an example of “caste” as a generalizable category. In this way, the work 
of the Caste School provides an example of the historicity of “caste” as signifying a 
system of inherited inequality and thus becomes helpful to think with when considering 
dalit activism in the late twentieth and early twentieth century.   
Primarily from the University of Chicago, the Caste School departed from the 
prevailing Marxian approach to the study of racial divisions in the American South and 
argued that caste, rather than class, was the most accurate category for understanding 
social relations in the South. Anthropologist W. Llyod Warner’s 1936 article “American 
Caste and Class,” is considered to be the inaugural piece of this school of thought.
250
  
Warner distinguishes between caste and class on the basis of social mobility. While a 
class structure maintained certain channels for vertical mobility, including interclass 
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marriage, a caste system inhibited social mobility. In Warner’s account, a caste system 
has two primary characteristics: a system of graded inequality and endogamy.
 251
 These 
two characteristics are deemed responsible for perpetuating social divisions generation 
after generation.  
In an essay published three years later, Warner and fellow anthropologist Allison 
Davis elaborate on the analytic concept of “caste” in anthropological and sociological 
inquiry. Warner and Davis offer a “comparative typology of the kinds of ranking found in 
the societies of the world.”
252
 Caste, with its prohibition of social mobility, and class, 
with its limited sanction of upward mobility, are two categories in this typology. Warner 
and Davis define caste as a “rank order of superior-superordinate orders with inferior-
subordinate orders which practice endogamy, prevent vertical mobility, and unequally 
distribute the desirable and undesirable social symbols.”
253
 Caste and “caste-like 
structures” are found throughout the world and even in India, they argue, caste is not 
found in its “classical” or “ideal form.”
254
 Here, caste becomes a heuristic device, a 
conceptual tool with which social scientists can understand different forms of social 
relations and organization.   
                                                 
251
 Warner, “American Caste and Class,” 237. 
252
 W. Llyod Warner and Allison Davis, “A Comparative Study of American Caste,” in Race Relations and 
the Race Problem: A Definition and Analysis, ed. Edgar T. Thompson (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1939), 218. 
253
 W. Llyod Warner and Allison Davis, “A Comparative Study of American Caste,” 229. 
254
 W. Llyod Warner and Allison Davis, “A Comparative Study of American Caste,” 229, 231. Warner and 
Davis write that “one can say that where caste is supposed to be found in its most ideal form, India, it is not 
a rigidly organized, highly formalistic system with invariant rules of behavior but a variety of social 
systems which tend to recognize rules of endogamy, of descent, and of certain restrictions on relations 
which help preserve a not too rigidly organized rank order of relations.  It must also be emphasized that 
constant change is the rule rather than the exception.” W. Llyod Warner and Allison Davis, “A 
Comparative Study of American Caste,” 231-232.  They note that “caste is found in most of the major areas 
of the world: this is particularly true of Africa, Asia, and America.” W. Llyod Warner and Allison Davis, 
“A Comparative Study of American Caste,” 229. 
116 
 
Warner and Davis contend that while caste in India and the American South are 
distinct social systems with different historical causes and variations, they are “the same 
kind of social phenomena.”
255
  This, they claim, is significant not only for comparative 
anthropologists and sociologists trying to understand and categorize social life, but also 
for parties interested in changing the South. Warner and Davis argue that each caste in 
the South contains various classes, but that caste remains the determining factor in 
structuring life possibilities for an individual. Furthermore, they insist that the 
fundamental nature of inequality in the South can only be grasped by first recognizing its 
social relations as a form of caste. “Caste,” they argue, “is an interrelated system of 
controls,” and rather than focusing on the particulars of discrimination and violence, such 
as “prejudice” or “lynchings,” one must discern the interrelations in order to understand 
the social dynamic.
256
 Instances of discrimination and inequality are, in Warner and 
Davis’ terms, “symptoms,” and just as symptoms both reveal and disguise an ailment, a 
focus on the symptoms of race relations in the South does not offer an understanding of, 
let alone a resolution to, the real problem.  Warner and Davis contend that only once the 
caste structure of the South is recognized, can the “system as a whole” be understood and 
“an efficient reorganization of the society” developed.
257
 
Following Warner’s theoretical proposition, a series of ethnographic projects were 
undertaken by his students or scholars directly influenced by him. Warner had studied 
anthropology at University of California, Berkeley and had been heavily influenced by 
British functionalist and structural functionalist approaches, in particular by the work of 
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Bronislaw Malinoski and Alfred Radcliffe Brown.
258
  The ethnographies of caste in the 
American South showed this influence and accordingly, examined society as a discrete, 
systematically ordered unit and analyzed the relations and mechanisms that enabled the 
society to function.  John Dollard, a professor at Yale who was trained in sociology at the 
University of Chicago, published Caste and Class in a Southern Town in 1937.
259
 Based 
on five months of research in “Southerntown,” a pseudonym for a town in the Southeast, 
Dollard provides a detailed account of the caste practices in this town and the disparities 
generated by caste structure, in particular, disparities in standards of living and access to 
resources.  Dollard’s analysis focuses on the psychological consequences of caste or, as 
he puts it, the “emotional structure” that runs parallel to the “formal social structure.”
260
  
This psychosocial approach was also taken by Buell Gallagher, who would later serve as 
Assistant Commissioner of Higher Education for the Department of Education and also 
as President of both Tallageda College in Alabama and City College of New York. In 
1938, he published American Caste and the Negro College, which analyzed the 
detrimental effects of caste on the psychology of both whites and blacks. 
261
  He argued 
that caste can only be undone through a change in both individual and group perspectives 
and by revamping of traditional education facilities for blacks.  In 1940, Allison Davis 
and John Dollard published their study on the effects of caste on the development of 
Southern black children and adolescents. In Children of Bondage, Davis and Dollard 
show how children of the lower caste, black children, have “terrifying experiences” with 
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the upper caste, the white population.
 262
 They illustrate the damage these experiences 
inflict on children and the obstacles they present to the growth of an individual. A year 
later in 1941, Allison Davis along with Burleigh B. Gardener and Mary Gardener 
published Deep South: A Social Anthropological Study of Caste and Class, an 
ethnography based on fieldwork conducted between 1933 and 1935 in rural 
Mississippi.
263
  Davis and his wife, Elizabeth Davis, both African American researchers, 
lived in the black section of the town and the Gardners, a white couple, lived in the white 
section. Together the four anthropologists provide a rich account of the practices and 
institutions that produced and reinforced a caste structure in the community they 
researched.   
In all of these ethnographies, caste emerges as the key mechanism responsible for 
the distribution of resources, privileges, and opportunities and for the maintenance of 
social divisions. These accounts depict a social structure in which caste is established at 
birth and mobility exists within a caste but not across the caste-line; caste is rendered the 
ultimate determinant of life possibilities. All of the ethnographies cite sexual prohibitions 
as a key mechanism in the maintenance of a caste society.  The researchers pointed out 
that legal family life could only occur within a caste, but that sexual relations between an 
upper caste man and a lower caste woman were common; in these situations, caste 
blocked “legitimate descent” and designated the children of these unions to the lower 
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  Dollard explains that the upper caste man has sexual access to women of both 
castes and thus receives a “sexual gain” in the caste structure.
265
 The lower caste man, 
however, was deemed “disadvantaged” and a strict taboo policed against sexual relations 
between a lower caste man and an upper caste woman. As several ethnographers point 
out, this taboo was enforced in part through the monitoring of the respectability and 




The scholarship of the Caste School of Race Relations demonstrated that 
endogamy and sexual prohibitions effectively blocked mobility between groups in the 
South and that this lack of mobility was the defining characteristic of the caste structure. 
The ethnographers illustrated the multiple social exclusions that blocked mobility and 
consequently also blocked the acquisition of basic needs by restricting physical 
movement and the accrual and use of money. In Children of Bondage, Davis and Dollard 
discuss how “caste punishments,” which take the form of violence or less pay, are 
administered to the lower caste for violations of appropriate behavior.
267
  Davis, Gardner, 
and Gardner claim that the division between groups is honored through “a very definite 
code of behavior by which every individual knows how he should act and what he can 
expect from his relations with the other group”; part of this code of behavior is the 
“deference, the respectful yielding exhibited by the Negroes in their contact with 
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  The ethnographers describe how the etiquette of caste is reinforced by all 
social institutions and how this maintains an unequal distribution of resources between 
groups and keeps the white caste in a position of power.  For example, exclusion from 
political participation and an educational system that focuses on vocational training – 
which he argues is a “type of training that would prepare him for, but not beyond, the 
opportunities of lower-caste status” – also conspire to prevent mobility and uphold the 
caste system.
269
    
Caste then emerges in these ethnographies as a system that preserves the 
distinctions in rank and resources that were created under slavery. As Dollard contends, 
caste has “replaced slavery as a means of maintaining the essence of the old status order 
in the South.”
270
 In a similar vein, Gallagher prefaces his study with the story of the 
Amistad.  He discusses the founding of the American Missionary Society, which came 
about from the efforts to defend the mutineers of the Amistad.  The Society made its 
central goal the eradication of “slave-holding, polygamy, and caste.”
271
 Gallagher points 
out that while slavery and polygamy have since been legally abolished, caste was “as 
firmly entrenched and as powerful as it was a century ago.” He argues that caste has 
prevented the extension of full citizenship to black Americans and he warns that “caste-
controlled America …presents to the Negro today the same alternatives it held the illicit 
cargo of the Amistad – servitude or mutiny.”
272
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All of the ethnographies show that the affective structure of caste includes an 
“idea of uncleanliness” and the fear among the white caste that “contact with them 
[blacks] may be contaminating.”
273
  Behavior to avoid pollution – such as avoiding inter-
dining, using the same dishes used by the lower caste, or wearing clothing that had been 
worn by a member of the lower caste – is not deemed a central mechanism of caste, as 
endogamy is, but rather, an accompanying set of practices that reinforces the logic of 
separation. To violate these sanctions is to violate caste. For example, as Gallagher 
writes, to sit at the same table is “to break eating taboos is to defy caste.”
274
 These 
sanctions are also evident in the depiction of the spatial separation among the castes. The 
ethnographies document how the upper and lower castes live in separate neighborhoods 
and illustrate how spatial segregation is not only a symbolic means of expressing social 
divisions and subordinating the black caste, but also correlates to stark differences in 
infrastructure and material amenities.    
In a project contemporary to, but distinct from, the scholarship of the Caste 
School of Race Relations, Gunnar Myrdal, a Swedish economist, also employed the 
category of ‘caste’ to describe relations between blacks and whites in the South.  Myrdal 
had been commissioned in 1938 by the Carnegie Corporation of New York to study the 
situation of African Americans in the South. His findings, published as An American 
Dilemma in 1944, argued that intergroup dynamics in America were in sharp 
contradiction with the “American creed.” Myrdal described this creed as the strong 
conviction that all people possess rights to equality, liberty, and justice and claimed that 
the dissonance between the conditions of blacks in the U.S. and these ideals constituted a 
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grave dilemma for the American people.
275
  Like many of the anthropologists of the 
Caste School, Myrdal saw caste as the product of a history of slavery.  The caste system, 
he argued, was “fundamentally a system of disabilities forced by the whites upon the 
Negroes.”
276
  For Myrdal, the categories of “race” and “class” could not accurately 
represent the nature of social relations in the South. For Myrdal, race – understood as an 
objective, biological fact – was deemed largely meaningless for the “interracial” Southern 
population and class systems were considered more “open and mobile” than the system in 
place in the South.
277
 In his view, a caste system maintained its stratifications by 
eliminating competition. As Myrdal writes, a caste system “consists of such drastic 
restrictions of free competition in the various spheres of life that the individual in a lower 
caste cannot, by any means, change his status.”
278
   
Myrdal granted that the particulars of caste varied in different contexts, but 
argued that the similarities across contexts were too significant to preclude 
generalizations. He added that even in the antebellum, slave-holding South and in Hindu 
India, two contexts where the term “caste” was applied without controversy, there were 
many regional and historical variations of the phenomenon.
279
  Myrdal acknowledged 
that caste is always already an abstraction: it provided the outline of fundamental power 
relations without reference to historical or social specifics.  As Myrdal writes, “concepts 
are our created instruments and have no other form of reality than in our own usage”; the 
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determining factor behind the use of a concept is “practicality.”
280
   For Myrdal and the 
scholars of Caste School of Race Relations, the concept of ‘caste’ captured an aspect of 
the social reality that ‘class’ or ‘race’ could not. Caste referenced not just a system of 
inequality, but an array of social practices and beliefs that together subordinated and 
denigrated a group of people.  Caste conveyed the feeling of being stuck, of having little 
recourse to justice, and of being denied one’s full humanity.  Here, caste relations and the 
caste system bear a trace of the Indian context, but are rendered sociological descriptors 
available for the analysis of other social contexts.    
One of the strongest challenges to this use of caste and the approach to race 
relations taken by Myrdal and the Caste School came from Oliver Cox, a sociologist 
originally from Trinidad who also trained at the University of Chicago.  Cox’s work is 
also significant because of its influence on Louis Dumont, a French cultural 
anthropologist whose scholarship on caste dominated the field for decades. In a series of 
articles in the early 1940s and in Caste, Class, and Race, published in 1948, Cox argued 
that caste was unique to India and was not an appropriate category for the analysis of race 
relations in the South. Social dynamics in the South, he added, could most accurately be 
described in terms of class, rather than caste. Cox condemned the work of the Caste 
School of Race Relations and Myrdal for providing what he considered to be a theoretical 
justification for the violence and inequality of race relations in the U.S. His argument, 
however, was based on a misreading of Indian caste, a reading which reproduced some of 
the most pernicious orientalist assumptions about India. In Cox’s account, Indian 
civilization had functioned harmoniously with little change over the centuries. The 
absence of universal values in India, Cox claimed, enabled a passive acceptance of caste 
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inequality. India, in Cox’s view, was an “assimilated society,” in which different 
segments of society worked together without antagonism despite the persistence of 
gradations in rights and privileges.
281
  The caste system, Cox argued, produced a culture 




Cox’s analysis of Indian caste did not consider the violence of enforcing caste 
distinctions.
283
 Instead, Cox assumed that the lower castes, lacking a belief in universal 
values or rights, did not contest their position and that a mutual desire for distance 
impaired social relations between castes. He insisted that “in India the theory of ‘liberty, 
equality, and fraternity’ could have universal meaning only as a weapon against the 
foreigners who invented it.  Even the depressed classes could not conceive of themselves 
as aspiring to this state.”
284
 The caste system, he contended, created “personalities” that 
were “normal for that society” and thus, although the caste system produced a structure 
of inherited differential privileges and disabilities, social relations in India could not be 
described as discriminatory.
285
   
With this understanding of caste in India, Cox denounced the application of the 
term to race relations in the American South. He argued that  
The caste interpretation of race relations in the South does not see that the 
intermarriage restriction laws are a social affront to Negroes; it cannot perceive 
that Negroes are smarting under the Jim Crow laws; it may not recognize the 
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overwhelming aspiration among Negroes for equality of social opportunity; it 
could never realize that the superiority of the white race is due principally to the 
fact that it has developed the necessary devices for maintaining incontestable 
control over the shooting iron; and it does not know that ‘race hatred’ may be 




This evaluation of the Caste School of Race Relations stems from Cox’s failure to discern 
the relations of power that enforce caste in India and as well as his misreading of lower 
caste subjectivities.
287
  Cox’s argument also relies on the construction of fundamental 
differences between India and the West. The caste system, he claimed, creates only 
corporate identities and unlike Western societies, does not allow for individuation. Cox 
added that the cultural underpinnings of Indian caste are fundamentally different from 
Christianity.
 288
  In his view, the exceptional character of modern society precluded 
comparisons between Western social phenomena and caste. Whereas previous societies 
were “based mainly upon production for a ‘sufficiency of existence,’” modern society is 
an “aggressively exploitative, profit-making system.”
289
 Thus, for Cox, race relations 
could only be analyzed in terms of “class exploitation” and the capitalist system.
290
  
Although Cox discussed race in terms of social relations, he also collapsed the 
category into a biological essence to further discredit the analogy between racially-
divided and caste-divided societies.  In an argument that foreshadows future arguments 
against the analogy between race and caste, Cox maintained that the nature of inheritance 
was substantially different in systems of racial and caste stratification.  While caste was a 
system of inherited “cultural or personality attributes,” racial inheritance was physical; it 
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was the inheritance of physical characteristics which visibly marked an individual in a 
way that caste did not.
291
 In neither case did Cox conceive of heredity as the inheritance 
of social relations, an embodied identity, or inequality and disadvantage.   
 
Caste in Typologies of Inequality 
While the Caste School of Race Relations was not active after the mid-1940s, the 
analogy between caste-based discrimination and racial discrimination continued to be 
discussed, utilized, and critiqued among anthropologists and sociologists. In 1959, Gerald 
Berreman, an anthropologist trained at Cornell University who later taught at University 
of California, Berkeley, delivered a paper at the annual meeting of the American 
Anthropological Association on the similarities between caste relations in India and race 
relations in the U.S. Later published in the American Journal of Sociology, Berreman’s 
paper draws on ethnographic research conducted in Sirkanda, a village in northern Uttar 
Pradesh and compares the relations between “touchable” and “untouchable” castes in 
India to relations between whites and blacks in the American South.
292
  Berreman had 
spent two years, 1953 to1955, in Montgomery, Alabama before beginning his graduate 
studies.  During this time, Berreman bore witness to the social effects of events such as 
the Supreme Court’s ruling prohibiting racial segregation in public schools, the formation 
of the White Citizens Council in Alabama, and the racial integration of the military. 
Berreman investigated illegal segregation at the Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama and 
an incident of racially motivated charges against a black soldier at the base.  He 
acknowledged that these experiences affected his view of caste when he encountered it 
                                                 
291
 Cox, Class, Caste, and Race, 457.  
292




during his doctoral research in India. He writes that though he was struck by the 
differences between the situation in the South and that in India, he was “more impressed 
by the similarities.”
293
  Since the similarities could not be attributed to parallel historical 
processes, he came to recognize that, as he writes, “birth ascribed stratification has 
common consequences for the people who live it and the societies which harbor it.”
294
    
Berreman renders caste relations and race relations analogous by stripping them of their 
“cultural details” and focusing on their core processes and structure.
295
 He notes that 
while any social phenomena can be defined narrowly enough to be location and time 
specific, cross-cultural comparisons can only be made through abstractions and 
generalizations.  He explains that within India there is considerable variation in the 
details of caste. Thus, even the defining of “Indian caste” requires the evacuation of 
variations and specificities and the abstraction of general principles.  Accordingly, he 
offers a definition of the ideal type of the caste system: a “hierarchy of endogamous 
divisions in which membership is hereditary and permanent” and concludes that race 
relations in the American South constitute a caste system.
296
  Berreman writes that both 
social structures are maintained by the imposition of “rigid rules of avoidance between 
castes” and “powerful sanctions” by the higher castes on the lower castes.
297
 The lower 
castes in both systems are obligated to perform an etiquette of deference, while the upper 
castes benefit from economic and sexual gains.  Berreman explicitly confronts Cox’s 
assumptions about caste in India and his argument against the application of the concept 
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to the American South.  He condemns the assumption that the caste system in India is the 
stable and “nonconflictive” social structure Cox describes.  He explains that the lower 
caste feel deep resentment at their caste position but do not express this resentment 
publicly.  Berreman recounts witnessing many private expressions of this anger and 
discontent during his field research. He concludes on the basis of his cross-cultural 
analysis of caste in India and the American South that “no group of people is content to 
be low in a caste hierarchy – to live a life of inherited deprivation and subjection – 




Oliver Cox responded to Berreman’s article in a letter to the editor of the 
American Journal of Sociology.  He reaffirmed his argument about the distinctiveness of 
Indian caste and again argued that caste divisions could only be understood through the 
logic of Hinduism.
299
 He criticized Berreman for misconceiving the system and for 
underestimating the role of religion and religiosity in Indian caste as well as its difference 
from Christianity in the U.S. He erroneously stated that India had not seen a “progressive 
social movement for betterment among outcaste castes” nor did it present “any tendencies 
for radical social change in the caste system.”
300
  Cox reasserted that the comparison 
between race relations and caste relations served to obfuscate the social reality of both 
and that the caste system was a social phenomenon unique to India.  Berreman in turn 
responded with another letter to the editor in which he proposed that that Cox’s “view of 
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static Indian caste” was analogous to a “White Citizen Council member’s view of race 
relations ‘in the good old days.’”
301
    
 Cox’s disagreement with both the Caste School of Race Relations and Gerald 
Berreman foreshadows debates about the scope and definition of caste that, decades later, 
would become of utmost significance to dalit international activism.  The question of 
whether caste was unique to India, however, does not disappear from the intellectual 
landscape of American sociology and anthropology.  For example, George de Vos, an 
anthropologist trained at the University of Chicago, co-edited a volume on caste and race 
in 1966.
302
  De Vos had researched the situation of the Burakumin, an outcaste 
community in Japan, and was struck by the similarities among the situation of Burakumin 
in Japan, dalits in India, and African Americans in the United States. The volume 
included essays from scholars of Japan and India, two of which were authored by Gerald 
Berreman.
303
 The volume worked off the premise that, as stated in the introduction, “from 
the viewpoint of comparative sociology or social anthropology, and from the view point 
of human psychology, racism and caste attitudes are one and the same phenomenon.”
304
  
It criticized the assumed biological basis of race and argued that caste and race can only 
be viewed as social phenomenon: Whereas racism is rooted in a “secularized pseudo-
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scientific biological mythology,” caste ideologies are based on “pseudo-historical 
mythology.”
 305
 Both are thus socially manufactured.   
De Vos had approached the Ciba Foundation in 1964 with an idea for an 
international conference on caste and race in 1964. The conference, held in 1966, was 
chaired by Gunnar Myrdal and brought anthropologists, sociologists, historians, and 
social psychologists together to discuss caste and race relations through a comparative 
perspective. Its participants included Gerald Berreman and Louis Dumont, among 
others.
306
  Given the same year as the French publication of Homo Hiearchicus, 
Dumont’s paper, “Caste: A Phenomenon of Social Structure or an Aspect of Indian 
Culture,” argued that caste was uniquely Indian and could only be understood through the 
logic of Hindu culture.
307
  Dumont claimed that caste could not be abstracted from the 
whole of culture and turned into a category for general or comparative social analysis, an 
argument very similar to that made by Oliver Cox almost twenty years earlier. Caste, in 
Dumont’s account, was not simply a system of social divisions; rather, these divisions 
were implicated in a larger cultural structure. This structure was brought together through 
an ideology of hierarchy motivated by a religiously inspired opposition between pure and 
impure. In Dumont’s view, terms like “discrimination” were thus inapplicable to caste 
structures. Like Cox, Dumont concluded that the classification of caste and race relations 
under the same analytic category was detrimental to the understanding of both.  
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 Dumont directly addressed the work of the Caste School of Race Relations and 
Oliver Cox in “Caste, Racism and ‘Stratification’: Reflections of a Social 
Anthropologist,” an essay first published in French in 1960, six years before Homo 
Hierarchicus.
308
 In the essay, Dumont takes on the question of whether “caste” exists 
outside of India. He directly addresses the work of Lloyd Warner, Allison Davis, and 
Gunnar Myrdal and argues that Indian caste can only be understood through a structural 
analysis of the whole of Hindu culture.
309
 The Caste School of Race Relations, he claims, 
had severed features, such as endogamy and lack of vertical social mobility, from the 
whole of culture to define caste. Borrowing from structural linguistic analysis, Dumont 
argued that these features were implicated in relationships within the cultural structure 
and derived their meaning from these relationships. He warned that these same features 
could have different meanings if differently positioned and that sociologists needed to be 
more attentive to the ideology that created the relationships between different cultural 
features. For example, Dumont argues that endogamy can have different meanings in 
different cultures and that the Caste School of Race Relations erred by confusing 
endogamy as a “fact of behavior” rather than a “fact of value.”
310
  Dumont adds that a 
caste system can only exist if “the entire society must without remainder be made up of a 
set of castes.”
311
 By this, Dumont suggests the society must include multiple castes and 
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that a society with a bi-partite division, such as that in the American South or Japan, 
cannot be described as a caste society.   
Alongside his critique of the Caste School of Race Relations, Dumont also praises 
Oliver Cox for his “admirable insight” on the issue of caste.
312
  He notes that although 
Cox was working with secondary and tertiary sources, he still accurately made “the 
essential point: the Indian system is a coherent social system based on the principle of 
inequality, while the American ‘colour bar’ contradicts the egalitarian system within 
which it occurs.”
313
 Thus, in Dumont’s view, a dramatic divergence in essential cultural 
values and ideologies – equality in America and hierarchy in India – precludes the use of 
the same analytic concept for both societies.   
This sketch of the different usages of caste and their surrounding debates reveal 
certain general themes in the meanings ascribed to the caste system. When caste is 
defined as exclusive to the Indian subcontinent or Hinduism, it appears as a scripture-
based ideal that is, for the most part, stable throughout India’s history. In these accounts, 
caste inequality does not produce dissent or discord and Indian history is largely static. 
While caste is seen as in symbiosis with the values of Indian society, race relations are in 
sharp contrast to the values of American society.  In this assessment, reform movements 
such as Bhakti, Buddhism, and non-Brahmanism are ignored in both evaluations of the 
caste system and in narratives of Indian history. In addition, any change to the system or 
even the desire to change the system is attributed to an external force, namely, 
colonialism and the Western, universal ideologies accompanying it. These accounts also 
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make a distinction between an apparent biological basis to race relations and the strictly 
cultural ideology behind caste relations.   
If caste is deemed a general phenomenon and accordingly, a category in 
anthropological and sociological theory, it is defined through a synchronic analysis of its 
features. Differences in the historical production of these features are acknowledged, but 
do not factor significantly into the evaluation of the social structure.  Among the features 
given the most attention in this scheme are restrictions on mobility and sexual 
prohibitions, such as endogamy and upper caste men’s sexual access to lower caste 
women.  Here, caste formations most often refer to bi-partite divisions of society, with 
one marginalized, outcaste group and a general, unmarked population. These accounts 
attempt an understanding of the psychological harms of caste, on both the upper and 
lower castes, and also detail the practices that constitute caste as a lived reality.  The caste 
system does not generate harmonious social functioning in these assessments, but rather, 
breeds conflict and discord. When conflict is incorporated into understandings of the 
caste system, such as in the speech of Charles Sumner or the scholarship of the Caste 
School of Race Relations and Gerald Berreman, the struggle against the caste system is 
also rendered part of a global and universal struggle equality and dignity.  
 Gerald Berreman points out that the issue at hand is essentially one of definition 
in the social sciences. Caste can be defined to restrict its application to India; 
alternatively it can also be defined more broadly so that it describes, as Berreman writes, 
“societies that bear no historical connection to India.”
314
 Either conceptualization could 
stand, as long as it is applied consistently. Why then have a broader definition?  
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According to Berreman, limiting the definition of caste to Hinduism or India precludes 
cross-cultural analysis and “cross-cultural comparisons,” he argues, “are essential to 
progress in social science.”
315
  He writes that his own cross-cultural comparison of caste 
relations in India and the United States have led to the conclusion that “no group of 
people is content to be low in a caste hierarchy, to live a life of inherited deprivation and 




For Berreman, cross-cultural analysis revealed a social universal – a desire for a 
life of dignity, security, and equality – that had been disputed by the privileged and 
powerful of both societies. The definition of caste, and indeed any sociological term, 
carries political implications.  In later chapters, I discuss how dalit activists have 
reflexively conceptualized the category of caste. By arguing for an analytic concept of 
caste unanchored in India and Hinduism, dalit transnational activism has framed the 
movement against caste as part of the universal struggle for human rights. This 
conceptualization of caste not only had the promise of cross-cultural comparison, but also 
enabled cross-border political alliances. A broader definition of caste has enabled dalit 
activists to frame their struggles as part of a global movement for human rights and forge 
connections with other social justice movements.   
 
******** 
 As Appadurai stated in “Theory in Anthropology: Center and Periphery,” the 
connection between places and concepts in anthropological theory is not without political 
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significance. The close association between caste and India has not only impeded 
anthropological inquiry, but has also led to a warped representation of India as an 
unchanging society with a rigid, religiously-inspired hierarchy. What Appadurai did not 
appreciate, however, was that the conceptualization of ‘caste’ has had other political 
implications as well. For the subjects of caste, the association between concept and place 
has been more than a theoretical problem; it has also been of enormous practical concern. 
By delinking caste and India and arguing that caste was a category of social relations 
found across the world, dalit activists have been able to render caste inequality a 
universal wrong. In this chapter, I have provided a deeper history to the conceptualization 
of caste – that of caste as inherited inequality – that recurs in dalit human rights 
campaigns. In doing so, I have tried to illustrate the power and politics behind the 
production and use of social scientific categories. The sense and reference of ‘caste’ has a 
long political and intellectual history and remains of great significance to the many who 
use the concept to express and negotiate the structural impediments to their experience of 





The NCDHR’s Black Paper: Countering State Neglect with Dalit Human Rights 
 
Since at least the early 1980s, dalit activists have turned to the institutional and 
discursive complex of human rights to seek redress to caste inequality.  They have 
appealed the United Nation treaty bodies and lobbied international human rights 
organizations to recognize caste discrimination as a human rights violation.  This turn to 
rights was given institutional form in India with the creation of the NCDHR in 1998.  The 
NCDHR and dalit human rights activism, however, have faced considerable obstacles. 
First, the Indian state’s official laws against caste discrimination made the claim of 
human rights violations largely untenable.  The NCDHR also faced resistance from the 
government of India, which maintained that caste-discrimination was an internal issue, 
beyond the purview of international law, and that the state’s laws and policies were 
sufficient evidence of its commitment to the betterment of its Scheduled Caste 
population.  
In this chapter, I analyze the issues surrounding the use human rights by dalit 
activists through a discussion of the formation of the NCDHR and its articulation of 
human rights.  I begin by offering an overview of the Indian state’s laws and policies 
regarding caste discrimination and then turn to the inaugural campaign of the NCDHR. 
This initial campaign, published as the Black Paper, demonstrated that caste was a grave 
problem in India, despite its laws and policies, and in addition, claimed that caste 
discrimination and violence could only occur at such epidemic proportions with state 
complicity.  This complicity was argued by citing the poor implementation of laws, the 
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collusion of agents of the state in violence against dalit, and the withdrawal of the state 
from its responsibilities to protect and advance its more vulnerable citizens, a contention I 
conceptualize as the violence of neglect.  While arguing against caste discrimination in 
the language of human rights, the NCDHR also challenged the liberal precepts 
undergirding the principles of rights. The NCDHR laid out its conceptualization of 
human rights in its “Campaign Manifesto” that was included as part of the Black Paper. 
The NCDHR’s conceptualization of universal rights critiqued the scope of acceptable 
liberty in liberal theory, challenged the state-centered approach implicit in both the theory 
and practice of human rights, highlighted the need for positive obligations from the state, 
and underscored the violence of neglect. In short, the NCDHR deemed the existing 
framework of human rights both inadequate and potentially injurious.  
 
The Promise of the Constitution and the “Caste-minded” State 
In a section of his autobiography titled “Atoning for the Injustices,” Martin Luther 
King, Jr. compared the state in India and in the United States with respect to its work 
towards ending discrimination and empowering its vulnerable minority populations.
317
 
He pointed out that although both countries had federal laws against discrimination, the 
government in India had taken on an active role in facilitating the integration of dalits. 
“India,” he wrote, “appeared to be integrating its untouchables faster than the United 
States was integrating its Negro minority.” Furthermore, in his view, the state in India 
had made the integration and advancement of this community “a matter of moral and 
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  He referred to the constitutional provisions for reservations in 
higher education and noted that Nehru had described these reservations as “our way of 
atoning for the centuries of injustices we have inflicted upon these people.” King 
lamented that the U.S. had not yet “reached this level of morality” and that it still needed 
to develop “its own ways for atoning for the injustices she has inflicted upon her Negro 
citizens.” 
King correctly identified the role of the state as described in the Indian 
Constitution. The Constitution disavowed the perpetuation of privilege and 
discrimination and also established an active role for the state in advancing its historically 
disadvantaged groups to equality. In the late colonial period, as Anupama Rao has shown, 
“equality” was interpreted in relation to manifest inequities and was ingeniously 
rearticulated by B.R. Ambedkar as caste equality.
 319
 The Directive Principles of the 
Indian Constitution call for a state that would be a proactive agent for social change and 
would have positive obligations towards its most vulnerable citizens: “The State shall 
promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections 
of the people, and in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, and shall protect 
them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation” (emphasis mine).
320
 Although 
“promoting” the interests of certain sections of civil society and “protecting” select 
populations may stray from classical interpretations of the role of the state under liberal 
constitutionalism, the Indian state – as King accurately imparts – was given the task of 
rectifying past injustices in order to produce a future of greater equality.  Legal scholar 
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Marc Galanter contends that while this represented “a deliberate departure from formal 




The Constitution of India provides for several measures to rectify caste 
inequalities.  Article 17 abolishes untouchability and criminalizes the imposition of 
disabilities associated with the practice, and Article 17 promises the right to life and 
liberty, which the Supreme Court has construed as including the right to be free from 
degrading treatment. The Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 – which punishes 
prohibitions on entering places of worship and sharing water supplies, among other 
practices – was enacted to better enforce Article 17. The Protection of Civil Rights Cell, 
1973 amended the 1955 Act because the latter had not yielded convictions.  In 1989, the 
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act was passed and 
included more severe regulations against untouchability. The Act categorized both 
symbolic degradation and physical violence as caste “atrocities” and saw the growth of a 
bureaucratic complex to monitor caste violence.
322
  The promotion of the political 
participation of dalits is addressed in Articles 300 and 332, which call for a reservation of 
seats for Scheduled Castes in the Lok Sabha and in the state legislative assemblies.  
Article 15 (4) empowers the state to take additional measures for the advancement for 
disadvantaged groups.  This article has supported the reservation of seats for members of 
the Scheduled Castes in government employment and higher education, measures which 
are overseen by the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Tribes and the 
Ministry of Welfare of individual state governments.   
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While the Constitution provides for special measures directed at the development 
of the Scheduled Castes and federal legislation includes comprehensive laws punishing 
the imposition of untouchability, activists contend that the state remains implicated in 
rights violations.  They argue that agents of the state and the criminal justice system 
remain biased against dalits and that cases of violence and discrimination are 
underreported and often go unregistered by the police when they are reported.  This was 
explained to me early in my research when I met a dalit scholar and activist in 
Ahmedabad, Gujarat. She worked with dalit labor migrants and refugees from village 
violence that had come to live and work in the city.  After describing the continued 
occurrence of untouchability and the prevalence of caste-based violence and 
discrimination in India, she lamented the ineffectiveness of the state structures meant to 
protect and advance dalits. “All the systems in India – the police, the courts, the 
government – are caste-minded,” she said, “So, where can we go for help.”
323
 In her 
view, the turn to human rights activism was precipitated by the failings of a legal system 
that stalled justice and a state that was apathetic to the plight of millions of its dalit 
citizens.   
Many activists pointed out that in addition to its failure to live up to its promises, 
the state was also susceptible to reproducing hierarchal social differentiation. Martin 
Macwan, co-founder of the NCDHR, explained to me how caste beliefs can skew the 
interpretation of law:  
So, we have a case where a dalit boy of ten or something was overrun by a truck 
and he died. It was an accident. Now, they [the boy’s family] claimed a case for 
compensation and the insurance claim came to a judge, district judge. Now the 
company was willing to pay but the judge says…that much money should not be 
paid.  So, he wrote in the judgment.  ‘He’s a boy, who is an untouchable.  His 
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parents are laborers. No way he is going to be a doctor. No way he is going to be 
an engineer. He would have lived a life of laborers.  So, even if I give him 10,000 
rupees, his parents will be happy about it.’ When the company was going to give 
him one lakh [100,000]. The judge thinks that 10,000 is enough.  In another story, 
a judge in Uttar Pradesh, washed his entire courthouse with holy water from 
Ganges river when the previous occupant was a dalit, a dalit judge.  So we think 
that a judge can give justice, but we are not looking at a person’s socialization in 




In the story Macwan shared, there was no universal standard by which justice for the loss 
of life and the trauma of losing a child could be conceived.  Instead caste status acted as 
the determining variable in calculating the cost of death and the value of life. Caste 
ideology, not the abstract humanism that grounds law in a modern democratic republic, 
informed the idea of justice.  As Mr. Macwan argued, the “the caste system is more 
powerful than the Constitution.”  
 
The Founding of the NCDHR and the “Ambedkar Yuga” 
The internationalization of dalit issues and the use of human rights as a language 
of both protest and demands has been framed as a response to the ineffectiveness of the 
Indian Constitution and state policies in annihilating caste inequality. Dalit activists had 
courted international human rights organizations for over a decade when Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) agreed to undertake a report on caste-discrimination and violence in India. 
HRW’s project, funded by a grant from the Ford Foundation, subsequently provided the 
infrastructure for the founding of a national human rights advocacy organization for 
dalits, the NCDHR. The NCDHR was founded in 1998 after a series of three meetings 
arranged by HRW brought together dalit activists from across India. These meetings were 
organized by HRW to get assistance in identifying the most pressing issues facing dalit 
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communities. The activists that gathered for the meetings were keenly aware of the 
importance of a national organization for internationalizing dalit issues, and mobilization 
around the HRW report was instrumental in helping develop the NCDHR.
325
 In addition, 
part of the Ford Foundation grant to HRW was earmarked for the support of dalit 
activism at both the national and international levels.   
The NCDHR was founded with an institutional structure consisting of one 
national committee and ten state-level committees. Now housed in a building in northeast 
New Delhi, the NCDHR established a branch for dalit women’s rights – the All India 
Dalit Mahila Adhikar Manch (AIDMAM) [All India Dalit Women’s Rights Forum] – in 
2006. AIDMAM was launched after four of the founding figures of the NCDHR 
recognized, in the words of one activist, “that the leadership of the dalit movement was in 
the hands of men” and that dalit organizations “were not too gender sensitive.”
326
  At the 
time of my fieldwork, the AIDMAM took up the second floor of the building. The main 
office was a floor above and consisted of several rooms in which researchers and activists 
worked in cubicles on various projects, ranging from outreach to international 
organizations to preparing survivors of violence to present their stories as testimony at 
conferences.  The ground floor included a library and selection of the NCDHR’s projects 
and campaigns; this center for research and documentation was initiating after the 2001 
campaign at WCAR. 
From its inception, the organization adopted “a human rights perspective” for 
dalit issues. This “perspective” was one which analyzed the issues confronting dalits in 
terms of human rights conventions and moved away from an understanding that 
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explained the situation of dalits in terms of a Hindu caste system. It avoided cultural or 
religious framings and articulated caste violence and discrimination as human rights 
violations.  This perspective dismantled a sense of the ‘exceptionalism’ and ‘uniqueness’ 
of caste discrimination and described the structural position and experiences of dalits as 
akin to other marginalized communities around the globe. A change in the addressees of 
dalit complaints also accompanied the adoption of a language of human rights: activists 
now addressed a global public of concerned individuals and international human rights 
organizations in addition to the Indian nation-state and Indian public.  
The founding of the NCDHR was initially criticized by other human rights 
organizations in India, who claimed that the inclusion of a caste analysis into an already 
universalist perspective was unnecessary and divisive.
327
 Despite this criticism, activists 
launched the NCDHR with a year of various protests aimed at increasing the visibility of 
rights violations and at challenging the government’s complacency on dalit issues. 
Among the activities planned for this year was a national public hearing on human rights 
violations; a signature campaign with the goal of collecting 1 crore, or 10 million, 
signatures from across the country and submitting them to the Indian Prime Minister and 
the U.N. High Commissioner of Human Rights; and the dissemination of the Black Paper 
– a booklet which described the condition of dalits in India and laid out their demands.   
The NCDHR’s Black Paper consisted of a series of factsheets and a manifesto 
which laid out the Campaign’s conception of rights.  The document was framed as an 
articulation of dalits’ “anguish,” “anger,” “protest,” and “identity,” and was intended to 
serve as an “instrument of campaign,” “symbol of assertion,” “cry of appeal,” and 
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  Addressed to the Government of India, the United Nations, and 
international human rights organizations, the Black Paper laid out the NCDHR’s specific 
demands of each entity.  It asked that the Indian state ensure the protection of dalits from 
violence and discrimination, provide dalits with both the land and financial resources to 
improve their social condition, and produce a White Paper on atrocities against dalits and 
the implementation of reservations since 1947.  The NCDHR asked the U.N. to appoint a 
Special Rapporteur or Working Group on untouchability in Asia and explicitly include 
caste as a form of descent-based discrimination.  In order to achieve these goals, it 
requested the international human rights community to support their demands and 
mobilize around the goal of eradicating untouchability.  The Black Paper’s central 
appeal, an appeal made to all three entities, was for the immediate recognition of “dalit 
rights as human rights.” The inclusion of the United Nations and international human 
rights organizations indicates a use of a politics of shaming; by addressing institutions 
beyond the state and deriding the Indian state to an international forum, activists used a 
threat to India’s international reputation to demand for both more accountability and 
action.
329
 Coming shortly after the economic reforms of the early 1990, addressing 
entities outside of the state also alludes to another grievance of dalit activists: the 
enervation of the state’ agency with economic liberalization.     
The recent passing of the fiftieth anniversary of Indian independence in August 
1997 and the upcoming fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in December 1998 provided a symbolic occasion for the inauguration of the 
NCDHR.  The symbolism of time is furthered with the announcement in the Black Paper 
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that the next millennium would be declared the “Ambedkar Yuga.” The Ambedkar Yuga 
was described as a time in which dalits would assert themselves “as Dalits shedding all 
our other identities that have been made to cling to us through the compulsions of 
history.”
330
 This era would see the amelioration of caste-induced suffering and the 
revitalization of dalit culture. The very characterization of this better future as the 
“Ambedkar Yuga” meshes secular time and Hindu conceptions of temporality. This 
allows the NCDHR to replace the Brahmanical dystopic notion of the Kali Yuga, the age 
of moral degeneration, with a vision of the next millennium as a time when the struggle 
for dalit human rights and Ambedkar’s ideals would be actualized.
331
  
The future regeneration of dalit culture imagined by the Ambedkar Yuga was 
premised on the notion that dalits once constituted a culturally and ethnically 
homogenous group that was indigenous to the subcontinent, but was conquered, divided, 
and ranked into a caste system by a foreign group. Dalits were conceptualized in the 
Black Paper as “the earth dependent indigenous people” that have suffered centuries of 
“subjugation.”  The NCDHR predicted that in the future – in the Ambedkar Yuga – dalits 
would “take pride in asserting our indigenous culture which was wantonly and 
systematically destroyed by the invading alien culture.” This future was projected as the 
“affirmation of the submerged aspirations of these people of this land for Liberty, 
Equality, Fraternity, Self-respect, Self-reliance”; 
 
it was the revival of dalits’ ancient, 
egalitarian culture, a culture which also existed “in defiance of the existing normative 
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order” and constituted a “counter-culture statement of the subaltern groups.”
 332
 The 
NCDHR internationalized the significance of its campaign by proclaiming that the 
Ambedkar Yuga would be “an era when Ambedkar will be declared as one of the World 
Leaders of oppressed peoples” and “an era which has relevance not only for the Dalits 
but for the whole of humanity.”
333
  In this passage, the NCDHR projected a unity among 
the world’s “oppressed peoples” and asserted the significance of its message for the 
restructuring of power relations across the globe.  
The NCDHR framed its objectives as the ‘submerged aspirations” of dalits. While 
the organization’s campaign boasted a universal resonance to its message, it also 
perpetuated the notion of dalits’ difference from other Indians. Dalits appeared in this 
campaign as a distinct ethnic group in India with distinct historical origins. While this 
“ethnicization” held possibilities for the unity of dalits across South Asia, it also erased 
important differences in national, regional, linguistic, class, and religious identity and in 
power differentials among dalit groups.
 334
 Furthermore, this conceptualization of dalits 
represented a significant departure from the convictions of the campaign’s key symbol, 
Ambedkar: while Ambedkar argued for dalit difference in terms of political interest, he 
rejected the idea that dalits were an indigenous group. Ambedkar always maintained that 
caste distinctions were not based in racial or ethnic distinctions.  In Ambedkar’s account, 
untouchability was a punitive measure against those groups that refused to convert to 
Brahmanism after the fall of Buddhism; it was not the result of the conquest of a foreign 
group.  While Ambedkar’s account did establish an ancient, egalitarian culture for the 
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ancestors of today’s dalits – that of Buddhism – this culture was not unique to dalits, but 
rather was shared by the entire subcontinent. While the claim of indigeneity then departed 
from Ambedkar’s message, it does correspond with the claims of other anti-caste leaders, 
such as Jotirao Phule and E. V. Ramaswami (Periyar).  In addition, this claim proved 
expedient for it aligned dalit rights with human rights movements by indigenous groups 
in the Americas and Australia.    
 
Dalit Human Rights: A Critique of State Neglect and the Violence of Inaction  
The NCDHR’s representations of dalit history coupled with its use of the modern 
language of rights cast the Ambedkar Yuga as an iteration of the past as well as the 
fulfillment of political modernity. The NCDHR used the terminology of international 
agreements on human rights to describe both the adversities facing dalits as well as their 
future resolution.  Each factsheet in the Black Paper focused on a particular 
internationally-recognized right – such as the right to livelihood, education, life, and 
security – that was systematically violated or denied to dalits. The factsheets began with 
guidelines established by the UDHR, ICESR, ICERD, CEDAW, and the Indian 
Constitution and concluded with relevant quotes from Ambedkar, thereby incorporating 
two different discourses of protest and ethics into its campaign.  
The Black Paper used official government statistics to portray the state’s failure 
to facilitate the realization of rights to livelihood, education, land, life, security, 
reservations, and employment. While many of these rights may be deemed outside of the 
formal obligations of the state, the NCDHR maintained that the policies that constitute 
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this “departure” were core elements of the “governance system in India.”
335
 The Black 
Paper argued that the “preferential treatment of the Dalits in all areas of national life” is 
part of the commitment to governance “based on social justice,” a commitment 
established by the Indian Constitution. The NCDHR contended that the objective of this 
commitment was to “enable… Dalits to emancipate ourselves from the centuries-old 
generational slavery perpetuated by the caste system.”  The factsheets in the Black Paper 
cited deep disparities between dalits and the general population in development indicators 
such as literacy, poverty, electricity, sanitation, infant mortality, and malnourishment and 
argued that the Indian state, through both sheer disregard and complicity with the 
dominant castes, had failed to create an environment where basic human rights could be 
realized by dalits.  The state was faulted for privileging wealthier sectors of society and 
for having become “callous to the very basic needs and rights of Dalit citizens” and “de-
sensitised to the situation and basic needs of the poor class.”  
This assessment of the state reads as a moral indictment. The Black Paper also 
translated the (in)action of the state into the language of human rights as a “crime against 
humanity”
 
and “genocide of a different order against a vast section of its Dalits 
citizens.”
336
  This is not genocide through orchestrated and purposeful acts, but rather, 
through lack of concern and care, through what I characterize as “neglect.” I 
conceptualize “neglect” as a relation constructed when the care and assistance that is 
promised and expected is not provided. The charge of neglect is a morally tinged 
denouncement that, in the case of dalits, is directly related to the ideals of social justice 
laid out in the Constitution.  The NCDHR suggested that neglect can be just as effective 
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in violating the right to life, dignity, security, and livelihood as direct, agentive acts.  The 
NCDHR thus demanded that the state maintain its positive obligations – its responsibility 
to ‘promote’ and ‘protect’ dalits – and argued that the failure to uphold these obligations 
constituted a human rights violation.  
The violence of neglect has been under-theorized in the scholarship on human 
rights.  It seems that the theory and practice of human rights law is premised on the 
model of sovereign power rather than, in Foucault’s terms, that of governmentality, one 
of the principal facets of political power in modernity.
337
  Human rights law counters 
power in the negative sense.  This is power that, as Foucault’s states, “excludes,” 
“represses,” “censors,” “abstracts,” “masks,” “conceals”; it does not, however, address 
the power that “produces.”
338
 Governmentality, while not forsaking power in the negative 
sense, works through the power that produces. Historically, this mode of governance 
emerged alongside the growth of administrative structures and statistics, which revealed 
and isolated a new social unit, that of the “population.” Foucault argues that 
governmentality developed as governments recognized that an intensification of power 
towards its population, in particular, towards its well-being, was the most viable means of 
increasing its dominance. Elaborating on Foucault’s theory, political theorist John 
Ransom explains that “one of the chief ways states could increase their power and 
influence was to promote the health, morals, fecundity and attitudes of their 
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 This was accomplished through governmental interventions, both through 
direct and indirect technologies, which worked to align the interests of the individual with 
that of the population.   
While governmentality is often considered critically – for example, in terms of the 
production of “rituals of truth,” “docile bodies” and “technologies of self” – dalit activists 
seemed to identify certain processes of governmentality that need to be strengthened and 
extended. The NCDHR argued that state neglect – the absence of sufficient and 
appropriate governmentality – amounted to conditions which precluded the realization of 
human rights. On the one hand, factsheets in the Black Paper called attention to the 
violence of certain forms of governmentality.  The NCDHR documented acts such as 
police sanction of crimes against dalits, police brutality towards dalits, and the imposition 
of degrading occupations and argued that this kind of governmentality harmed dalits in 
order to preserve the privileges and comforts of other segments of the population. The 
overriding picture represented in the Black Paper, however, was of insufficient 
governmentality, of the state’s failure to work in the interests of marginalized 
communities and its profound governmental neglect of dalits. The NCDHR demanded an 
increased governmental response to the conditions facing dalits. It called for more state 
protection from violence, the promotion of the development of SC/ST communities, 
access to free education, the fulfillment of reservation quotas, and the improvement of 
facilities providing food, water, housing, and healthcare.
 340
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Life under conditions of governmental neglect can be described as what 
philosopher Giorgio Agamben theorizes as “bare life.”
341
  Bare life is neither zoe, natural 
life, or bios, qualified life within society, but rather is “life exposed to death.” Agamben 
shows that in today’s political world, life and death have become political concepts, not 
natural or scientific ones, and that politics itself “has transformed into the power to 
decide the point at which life ceases to be politically relevant.”
342
  Agamben’s argument 
helps make sense of the NCDHR’s demands of positive obligations from the state. 
“Governance,” the NCDHR claimed, “is a key factor in the promotion, protection as well 
as in the violation of human rights.”  It suggested that in the contemporary political and 
economic world, lack of governance results in a denial of human rights, in a condition in 
which individuals are made vulnerable through a lack of access to governmental 
structures; subsequently, living is transformed into “life exposed to death.” The 
NCDHR’s Black Paper portrays a situation where the inaction of the sovereign power 
and its neglect of segments of its population, results in these communities being reduced 
to bare life.  Its inaugural document argues that in order for human rights to become a 
more effective tool for the world’s marginalized and poor, the continued and systematic 
production of preventable suffering – a violence created through neglect – must be 
internationally recognized as a crime against humanity. 
The NCDHR’s conceptualization of human rights was thus not limited to 
entitlements against state power, but rather incorporated entitlements that mandate certain 
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types of state action; the state’s failure to pursue such actions was rendered equivalent to 
the violation of human rights.  The organization maintained that the state had a 
responsibility to provide some measure of social and economic equality and reiterated 
Ambedkar’s critique of the “contradiction” of political democracy without social 
democracy, of formal equality in a context of economic and social inequality. The 
NCDHR contended that the state’s move away from socialist policies and its “opting for 
the market economy” after 1991 had only deepened this contradiction, claiming that it 
had rendered dalits “the hapless victims of liberal democracy.” This characterization of 
dalits – as “hapless victims of liberal democracy” – points to another aspect of the 
NCDHR’s interpretation of human rights, namely its critique of the liberal underpinnings 
of rights.  
 
A Critique of Human Rights 
The NCDHR’s interpretation of human rights was more fully explicated in its 
“National Campaign Manifesto,” which was also included in the Black Paper portfolio.  
This text articulated the NCDHR’s revision of the tenets of internationally recognized 
human rights and also critically assessed the politics and practice of human rights. While 
the organization did not forsake human rights as a liberating discourse, it called for a 
radical revision, contending that human rights have become a tool with which to further 
exploit marginalized communities. The “National Campaign Manifesto” expounded the 
NCDHR’s critiques and interpretations of the meanings and limits of rights. These 
interpretations depart from liberal notions of the subject of rights, the relationship 
between liberty and security, equality, and the role of the state in human rights violations.  
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The “National Campaign Manifesto” illustrated how the conceptualization of the 
bearer of rights in liberalism did not sufficiently address the needs of the dalit subject. 
The bearer of rights in liberal discourse is an autonomous, self-possessed, and self-
determining individual.   This subject is a juridical abstraction; it is an individual 
conceptualized without relational and historical content, an isolated individual that is both 
outside of context and exists pre-context. Critics argue that the unitary and autonomous 
self of liberal theory is based on an erroneous premise: it denies the complexity of the 
self, its contradictory elements, as well as the critical function of intersubjectivity in 
identity formation. The NCDHR’s critique centered on the need for a conception of the 
collective as a bearer of rights and on the necessity of a historical and relational context 
for identifying this subject.  It suggested that for groups such as dalits, who experience 
cultural subordination based on group dynamics alongside institutional and interpersonal 
discrimination and violence, the notion of the individual in the liberal theory of rights 
was inadequate. Activists argued that in matters of cultural, minority, or collective rights, 
a different notion of the bearer of rights was required. This was reiterated in the statement 
“dalit rights are human rights,” a statement which recurs throughout the Black Paper and 
other documents inaugurating the inception of NCDHR. The NCDHR claimed – as 
feminist and indigenous groups have also done – that the abstract criteria that constitutes 
the universal subject of the liberal discourse of rights was inherently exclusionary. 
The “National Campaign Manifesto” defined dalits as a separate group in India, a 
group differentiated and “distinct from others because of…[their] specific historical 
context, violations, exploitation and atrocities.”
343
 The NCDHR argued that a theory of 
human rights could only be meaningful to dalits if this context of past and present 
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relations of exploitation, discrimination, and violation were recognized, as the Indian 
Constitution had done. A theory of collective rights could appreciate that rights were 
denied or violated on the basis of group membership and could identify the individual 
through his or her membership in a group. The NCDHR also maintained that cultural 
subordination could only be overcome if the individual was not been seen in isolation, 
but rather, be viewed as a part of a social collective.
344
  As scholars of human rights have 
pointed out, social collectivities are themselves relationally and historically produced and 
individual subjects within the collectivity cannot be conceptualized a priori; group 
identity, like the identity of the self, is created through social relations and subsequent 
social differentiation. In other words, whereas the liberal theory of rights conceptualized 
individuals in social isolation, a theory of collective rights could view individuals as 
members of groups in social relationships.
345
  The NCDHR claimed that the situation of 
dalits in India and many other marginalized communities in the world highlighted the 
need for an understanding of collectivities as subjects of rights and the need “to advocate 
the corporate rights of the people.”
346
  
 The centering of the individual in the liberal theory of rights has also been 
criticized for the propagation of self-interest and the legitimization of exploitative 
economic structures. Most famously argued in the mid-nineteenth century – a century 
before the development of internationally recognized human rights – by Karl Marx in his 
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prescient essay “On the Jewish Question,” this critique argues that liberal rights 
undermine human beings’ natural social interdependence by separating humans from one 
another and encouraging the pursuit of self-interest. The valorization of liberty in 
classical liberalism provides a basis for the pursuit of self-interest while impeding the 
development of social solidarity. As Marx writes, “liberty as a right of man is not based 
on the association of man with man but rather on the separation of man from man.  It is 
the right of this separation, the right of the limited individual limited to himself.”
347
 Marx 
adds that the right to liberty is intended for the protection of the right to private property, 
which, he maintains, is the “right to enjoy and dispose one’s possessions as one wills, 
without regard for other men and independently of society.” It is the right to pursue one’s 
self-interest without consideration of other and according to Marx, this right and the 
valorization of the individual on which it is premised enables and legitimizes harm to 
others.
348
   
I find this critique of liberal rights reverberating in the NCDHR’s “Campaign 
Manifesto.” The NCDHR stated that rights were initially only applicable to “men of 
property” and that “the question of right itself has come from a retarded political 
positioning.”
349
 This “positioning” is the “Liberalism of the Enlightenment period” and 
according to the NCDHR, it has skewed the development and interpretation of rights 
towards the benefits of some at the expense of many. The NCDHR locates one of the 
main hindrances to a fully emancipatory theory of rights in the tenet of individual liberty:  
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The discourse on individual liberty has ultimately led to liberalism which in terms 
of security victimizes and marginalizes communities of people. The very same 
individual liberty has denied freedom of access to benefits of liberty to the poor in 




The NCDHR conceptualized this problem as the contradiction between liberty and 
security.  It explained that individual liberty, the ability to pursue self-interest and private 
wealth without regard for others, posed a threat to the security of other people, the 
maintenance of their livelihood and integrity of their bodies. The NCDHR defined 
“security” as rights to resources and to the processes by which resources are allocated and 
contended that the right to security is denied to communities, not individuals.  In other 
words, one’s community affiliation determines one’s capacity to realize the right to 
security.
 351
 The NCDHR claimed that it is the exercise of liberty by the ruling sections of 
society that results in the marginalization of groups such as dalits. As the “Manifesto” 
claimed, “The ‘swaraj’ of the dominant order would violate the security of the 
communities of Dalits and other backward caste peoples.”
352
  
 In an essay that argues for a “right-to-be-human approach” in modern human 
rights theory, legal scholar Upendra Baxi conceptualizes the contradiction between 
liberty and security as the tension between human needs and human rights.
353
 He argues 
that “the model of universal human rights for all human beings contradicts the idea that 
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all human beings, without exception, have the right to be human.”
354
 Baxi notes that the 
right to liberty precludes categorizing many forms of exploitation that are endemic to 
capitalism as harms; in fact, the exercise of the right to liberty actually produces a space 
within society for exploitation and domination.  Far from guaranteeing the security of 
livelihood and, indeed of life, of the marginalized, the right to liberty actually precludes 
the fulfillment of their basic needs, such as nourishment, shelter, health care, education, 
and dignity.  “In order that some classes may have human rights,” Baxi writes, “masses 
have to cease being human.”  Baxi argues that the neglect of basic needs in modern 
human rights theory makes it utterly ineffective in confronting the problems most 
pressing to the world’s poor.  A theory of human rights, he suggests, must address issues 
of “redistribution, access, and needs” in order to work in the interests of social justice.  
The NCDHR argues that this is a matter of security – of protecting the right to life – of 
marginalized communities.  For the NCDHR, in order for human rights to be a more 
meaningful theory of justice and liberation, it must have as its foundation in the security, 
the rights to resources and to the power to distribute them, of subordinated communities.  
 In a similar vein, the NCDHR argued that the concept of security enshrined in 
modern human rights theory was an extension of the privileging of individual liberty. It 
claimed that the institutions of the state, such as the police or military, functioned to 
protect the interests of a small segment of society at the expense of the well-being of the 
masses.  The “Campaign Manifesto” stated that  
The discourses of national security by the state imply generally the security of the 
ruling class to such an extent that majority of the people’s security and interest 
would be sacrificed by the state to safeguard the interest and security of the ruling 
class minority…The state either subdues or eliminates by the indiscriminate use 
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of the State Machinery, those who genuinely endeavor to make the State a level 
playing field for all communities of people.
355
   
 
In this account, the discourse of national security protected the ruling classes’ access to 
resources and their power to allocate resources. Since hunger, preventable illness, or 
poverty was not considered a violation of one’s rights to security, the concept was made 
available for the protection of the wealth, property, and liberty of the dominant groups.  
The NCDHR added that the discourse of security extends beyond society and the nation 
and has functioned globally to maintain an international imbalance of power; “global 
security” protected the interests of powerful nations while thwarting the attempts of less 
powerful nations to create a more just international order.”
356
  “Under the garb of global 
security,” the “Manifesto” declared, “the rights of nations are violated and in turn under 
the garb of national security the rights of people are violated while both take shelter 
under the discourse of individual liberty”; the discourses of individual liberty, national 
security, and global security “join together to deny individual and community security to 
people in the subjugated sphere of the world.”
357
 
 The NCDHR’s “Campaign Manifesto” critically analyzed the concept of equality 
in the modern theory of human rights, a concept grounded in the liberal humanist idea of 
the individual. Scholars have shown that equality in liberal theory is premised on 
anthropological notions of the commonality or sameness among humans.
358
 Equality in 
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the liberal discourse of rights is conceptualized in terms of abstract human attributes; 
equality is not grounded in the context of actual social relationships and provides little 
recourse to those suffering endemic material inequality.
359
 As feminist legal scholar 
Catherine MacKinnon has explained, the idea of equality in the “international human 
rights tradition” is “more abstract than concrete, more transcendent than secular, more 
descendent from natural law than admittedly socially based.”
360
 In a similar vein, the 
NCDHR argued that while liberal theory proclaimed a natural or metaphysical equality 
among human beings, it permitted, even enabled, social and material inequalities.
361
  
Accordingly, it proclaimed that “the needs of the Dalits, are in the material realm and not 
in the metaphysical realm” and that the denial of equal access to basic material needs for 
survival constituted a violation of dalits’ human right to equality. 
362
 For the NCDHR, a 
principle of equality could only work effectively in situations of systemic inequality if 
supplemented with an approach to rights that viewed the state as a key agent in protecting 
and enabling the realization of rights. 
 Accordingly, the “Campaign Manifesto” demanded that the Indian state take all 
necessary steps to ensure that every citizen enjoy equality in access to rights and here, its 
demands of the state constituted a key intervention into the prevailing practice of human 
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rights. Liberal rights protect the individual from the power of the state.
363
  While the state 
is prevented from certain actions, such as the arbitrary arrest or inhumane treatment of its 
citizens, it is not obligated to provide an environment in which all citizens can enjoy their 
rights or even have access to them.
364
  The state is only prevented from violating human 
rights; it does not have any positive obligations to its citizenry.  The “Campaign 
Manifesto,” however, argued that the state had an obligation in the “provisioning, 
safeguarding and protecting the rights of equal opportunity” to access “education, health, 
communication, technology, markets, etc.”
365
 In this way, the NCDHR suggested that the 
Directive Principles of the Indian Constitution provided a better guideline for the duties 
of the state vis-à-vis its citizens then the international human rights tradition. 
Noting that dalits are “a people who have been systematically deprived of their 
right to information and knowledge systems,” the “Campaign Manifesto” reiterated the 
state’s a responsibility to rectify past injustice and repair imbalances in material and 
ideological power among its different communities.  In the NCDHR’s conceptualization 
of human rights, the failure to create an environment for the enjoyment of rights becomes 
equivalent to the violation of rights, and the state’s failure to fulfill its positive 
obligations amounts to complicity in crimes against humanity. As the “Campaign 
Manifesto” stated, “the way to establishing Human Rights is not simply monitoring 
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violations but looking at Human Rights as a key constituent element of governance.”
366
 
The NCDHR argued that the Indian state lacked the commitment to implement laws 
prohibiting discrimination and violence against dalits and claimed the poor standing of 
dalits on all major development indicators as evidence of inadequate and improper 
governance. This assessment of the state renders its failure to fulfill positive obligations – 
its neglect of its citizens – as a “crime against dalits” and a “crime against humanity.”   
 The NCDHR also called for a more complex understanding of the perpetrator of 
human rights violations.  Since liberal notions of human rights, emerging from natural 
law theory, are conceptualized as restrictions on the power of the state, it follows that 
state involvement in a wrongful act is what distinguishes human rights violations from 
other crimes.
 367
  In India, the official laws have made it difficult to show state 
involvement in caste-related crimes.  Moreover, the Indian state has argued 
internationally that caste-based problems are social issues and not governmental ones.
 368
 
While this position has impeded the recognition of caste-based discrimination as a human 
rights violation, activists have highlighted state neglect of dalits and collusion in acts of 
violence and in the maintenance of discriminatory structures. For example, the NCDHR 
has pointed out that officials at the local, state, and national levels have denied dalits 
proper protection and blocked dalit attempts at legal recourse for injustices.  In addition, 
police forces have also been known to tolerate and even participate in violence against 
dalits. Local government officials, it argues, have defied federal and state law in hiring 
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practices. For example, even though manual scavenging has been outlawed, local 
governments, especially in Gujarat and Rajasthan, have been known to hire manual 
scavengers.  By pointing to such acts, dalit activists have shown that the distinction 
between state and civil society, the distinction upon which the notion of ‘human rights 
violations’ is premised, is not universally relevant or accurate. 
The NCDHR’s “Campaign Manifesto” demonstrated that a conventional state-
centered approach to rights violations also failed to recognize violations by economic 
bodies and by the dominant sectors of society, both of which, the NCDHR contended, 
were in alliance with the state.  The “Manifesto” claimed that “as political governance is 
gradually being replaced by economic governance, violations of Human Rights by 
economic bodies is increasing and will increase.”
369
  The theory and practice of human 
rights, it argued, thus must account for these kinds of violations. The NCDHR explained 
that the acts of multinational and transnational corporations, acts which exercise the 
“liberal rights of individuals,” have been devastating to groups across the world: “scores 
of communities of people have been decimated and have been brought to nothingness” by 
these acts.
370
 The NCDHR added that, although not always immediately visible, there 
were alliances and links of complicity between the state and these economic bodies. It 
characterized the Indian state as “an active conniver with economic forces of 
exploitation” and claimed that despite the state’s laws and Constitution, “civil rights 
[were] constantly being violated through collaboration of the state machinery.”
 371
 The 
NCDHR suggested that this was because the state was also in collusion with “that part of 
the civil society which assiduously seeks to maintain the hegemony it has established 
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over the indigenous people and women.”  Untouchability, it argued, was a tool to 
maintain this hegemony and served as an “agent of the caste system.”
372
  It followed that 
the state was complicit in wrongful acts attributed to economic or social bodies within 
society.  The separation of state and civil society in the liberal theory of human rights was 
again shown as inaccurate and not meaningful for marginalized communities such as 
dalits in India.   
With its claim of indigenity, the NCDHR argued that dalits needed the protection 
of their cultural rights.  Here, the NCDHR claims “dalit difference” from other Indians, 
but, in contrast to Ambedkar, this difference is cultural and ethnic, not political. Dalits’ 
cultural rights were premised on the notion put forth in the Black Paper that dalits were a 
distinct ethnic group in India; also, here echoing Ambedkar, the NCDHR claimed that 
unique experience and history of “violations, exploitations, and atrocities” made dalits a 
distinct group in India.
373
  The “Campaign Manifesto” asserted that dalits “do not belong 
to the Hindu religion but possess a deeply spiritual and indigenous religion of our 
own.”
374
  It argued that the state had a positive obligation to preserve dalit culture and 
protect dalits from the “hegemony of dominant castes.”
375
     
 
******** 
 The NCDHR’s activism thus did not indicate a turn to human rights as a 
discourse of emancipation; indeed, the Indian Constitution emerges in the NCDHR’s 
campaign as a better guide for social justice than the decrees of the United Nations. 
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Unlike other human rights campaigns, the NCDHR does not protest the state’s laws, but 
rather, uses human rights to challenge state neglect.  It censures the state for its failure to 
live up to its commitments, as it censures the human rights regime for its condoning, if 
not enabling, social, economic, and cultural inequality.  The internationalization of caste 
discrimination and the turn to human rights as the dominant language of protest and 
demands may seem unlikely in this context, but human rights activism at a global scale 
can galvanize discussion about caste in both the national and global public. The next 
chapter turns to the NCDHR’s largest and most globally visible campaign: its campaign 
for the inclusion of caste discrimination at the WCAR, 2001. As exemplified by the 
NCDHR’s activism at Durban, international activism generates visibility and forges 
alliances between dalit activists and other social justice activists; also, as in the case of 





Dalit Activism at WCAR, 2001 
 
In 2001, the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR) helped 
organize over 200 dalit activists to travel to Durban, South Africa to protest caste-based 
discrimination and violence at the World Conference Against Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance (WCAR).
376
  The NCDHR had one 
primary message for the United Nations and the international human rights community: 
the caste system constituted discrimination and in particular, a type of discrimination 
analogous in form and effects to racism.  This understanding of caste, although with 
significant precedent, represented a rhetorical shift in dalit activism as it worked to build 
global support. At Durban, as in other transnational dalit campaigns, caste appeared as a 
form of “discrimination based on work and descent,” a category of social relations 
unequivocally in violation of international human rights law. Activists also maintained 
that caste was a practice not unique India and that “caste-affected” societies existed 
across the world. As one scholar wrote regarding dalit activism at Durban, “Once you see 
caste as ‘parochial’…caste is reduced to local politics even if it encompasses 240 million 
people…Racism is recognizable as a universal pathology while caste is read as a local 
aberration. Unfortunately, local aberrations do not usually command universal attention 
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of UN or international agencies.”
377
 The success of dalit activism at international human 
rights forums thus hinged on the globalizing of caste and the translation of caste-based 
discrimination as a human rights violation.  
The Government of India, however, had obstructed the internationalization of 
caste discrimination for over two decades when at the WCAR and its preparatory 
conferences it opposed dalit activists’ concept of caste and caste-based discrimination. 
The Indian state’s opposition to the NCDHR comprised of two main arguments: (1) that 
through its laws and policies, the state had already established its commitment to 
betterment of its Scheduled Caste population, thereby making human rights activism 
unnecessary and redundant; (2) that caste issues were domestic, social ones, thus outside 
the purview of the international human rights bodies. In the months leading up to the 
WCAR, the debate over the meaning and scope of caste went beyond official declarations 
and entered the mainstream Indian media.  By tracing the different meanings attributed to 
caste in the discussions leading up to and at WCAR, I hope to draw attention to shifting 
parameters of “caste” and the political stakes of this debate.  
In this chapter, I focus on the debates and discussions leading up to and at the 
WCAR.  In the months prior to the conference, debate over the meaning and scope of 
caste went beyond official declarations and entered the mainstream India media. In many 
ways, the disputes over the definitions of caste paralleled the discussions of caste in 
American anthropology and sociology over a half-century earlier discussed in Chapter 3. 
Although not historically connected to the earlier discussions, the debate over the 
                                                 
377
 Shiv Visvanathan, “Durban and Dalit Discourse,” in Caste, Race, and Discrimination: Discourses in 




inclusion of caste at WCAR is another example of the analogy between caste-based 
discrimination and racism and of the conceptualization of caste as a form of inherited 
inequality.   
 
World Conference Against Racism: Background and Framing Documents 
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD) was entered into force in 1969. While the Convention does not 
define “race,” it condemns racial discrimination and any notion of superiority based on 
race. It specifically targets racial segregation and apartheid and reaffirms the U.N.’s 
denunciation of colonialism as contrary to the principle of dignity and equality enshrined 
in the Charter of the United Nations. The scope of racial discrimination delineated in 
Article 1 of the Convention includes “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference 
based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin.” Ironically, it was the Indian 
state that insisted on the inclusion of “descent” during the drafting of the Convention.
 378
  
India ratified ICERD in 1968, but has since maintained that “descent” in the Convention 
refers only to race and does not refer to caste.
379
  Dalit activists, however, used this part 
of Article 1 to support their claim for the inclusion of caste-based discrimination at 
WCAR.  
The discussion of racial discrimination at WCAR and its preparatory and NGO 
meetings was as much about interpreting the past and its legacy as it was about 
contemporary manifestations of racism. For example, two of the conference’s three main 
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themes – the causes of racism, the victims of racism, and recommendations for ending 
racism and compensating its victims – required a historical assessment of discrimination 
and intolerance.  The conference identified the slave trade, slavery, and colonialism as the 
main historical causes of racism today and as having affected “lasting economic and 
social inequalities in many parts of the world.”
 380
 Accordingly, the Conference report 
recognizes “Africans and people of African descent,” “Asians and people of Asian 
descent,” and “indigenous peoples” as victims of racial discrimination. The very design 
of the conference was premised on the conviction that the agenda for the future progress 
of humanity required that the “truths” of the past be officially recognized and collectively 
remembered.  The past in discussions at Durban thus was not an abstract concept, but 
rather a crucial ontological site populated by countless victims seeking recognition and 
justice.  Commenting on the importance of recognizing the crimes of the past and 
establishing a shared memory, Kofi Annan, then Secretary General of the United Nations, 
stated in his closing remarks that, 
The dead, through their descendants, cry out for justice. Tracing a connection 
with past crimes may not always be the most constructive way to redress present 
inequalities, in material terms.  But man does not live on bread alone.  The sense 
of continuity  with the past is an integral part of each man’s or each woman’s 
identity…there is still continuity between the societies and States of today and 
those that committed the original crimes…Each of us has an obligation to 
consider where he or she belongs in this complex historical chain.
381
    
 
Implicit in conference discussions was the establishment of a narrative of the past and the 
chains of causality relevant for understanding the contemporary world.  This also 
                                                 
380
 CERD, Report of the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and 
Related Intolerance, WCAR Report A/CONF.189/12, page 12, para 14.  
381
 WCAR Report, 148. 
169 
 
required the demarcation of global processes and ‘world history,’ the unspoken 
alternative of which would be particular, local, or culturally-specific histories.
382
   
In the WCAR report, the histories that explained racial discrimination were those 
of the transatlantic slave trade and colonialism, large-scale processes that traversed 
oceans and continents. The victims of racial discrimination were identified in terms of 
broad social categories and corresponded to geographical areas that had been conquered.  
This evaluation of discrimination and its causes and consequences, while vital and 
necessary to global social justice projects, proved limiting for groups such as dalits who 
do not identify European colonialism or the transatlantic slave trade as the primary causes 
of their oppression or the discrimination they experienced.  Implicit in the WCAR 
evaluation of discrimination was an assessment of what events, processes, and characters 
constituted ‘world history.’ Consequently, other historical processes linked to 
contemporary forms of discrimination were relegated to particular or local histories. The 
historical narrative developed at WCAR thus proved limiting to the dalit campaign and 
was vulnerable to manipulation by the Indian state in its attempts to block the discussion 
of caste discrimination.  
 
Statements by the Government of India and CERD  
Even before WCAR, statements by the Government of India to the U.N. projected 
a vision of India’s past that circumscribed caste to India, thereby also rendering it a 
phenomenon inassimilable into a narrative of global history. For example, India’s 1996 
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report to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) presented 
the dominant nationalist narrative of Indian history, a narrative which embedded a 
politically conservative understanding of caste.
 383
  Echoing Gandhian and Nehruvian 
visions of India’s past, the 1996 report cited the “assimilative character of the Indian 
civilization” and India’s history of “intermingling of inhabitants with waves of 
immigration.”
384
 Here, Indian history becomes a story of the relatively peaceful and 
harmonious mixture of various groups. Where anti-caste thinkers such as Phule, 
Ambedkar, and Periyar had identified processes of differentiation, segregation, and 
discrimination, the Indian state recognized only processes of “intermingling.” The 1996 
report also cited a benevolent origin to the caste system: the caste system, it stated, “has 
its origins in the functional division of Indian society during ancient times.”
385
  
According to the report, the caste system, unlike systems of racial differentiation, was not 
inherently exploitative; it was originally an effective and efficient form of social 
organization, and one that served the harmonious operation of society.   
In this report, the Indian state insisted that caste was particular to India. 
“Communities which fall under the definition of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes,” it claimed, “are unique to Indian society and its historical process.”
386
 
Reminiscent of both Cox’s and Dumont’s assessment of caste, the Government of India 
maintained that the particularities of the development and manifestation of caste in India 
precluded comparison with other forms of discrimination, such as racism. The report also 
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contended that the term ‘descent’ in the ICERD’s definition of racial discrimination 
referred only to race and thus, although caste was a system based on descent, the 
Convention could not apply to caste-based discrimination. 
387
  The report argued that 
unlike racial discrimination, which is a product of global historical processes, caste 
discrimination was specific to India, having developed from local and particular 
processes, and thus was outside the purview of U.N. covenants on discrimination. With 
this understanding of discrimination, India reminded the CERD committee of its historic 
role in the struggle against racial discrimination.  The report stated that India had been “in 
the forefront of actions of the international community” in the effort to eliminate racial 
discrimination, which was evidenced by Mahatma Gandhi’s passive resistance movement 





 By strategically restricting its understanding of discrimination to those 
forms directly connected to European colonialism, India emerged as both a victim of 
racism and an ardent champion of its elimination. This narrow definition of racial 
discrimination relegated caste to an internal issue and left no room for the Indian state as 
complicit in discrimination that is prohibited by human rights law.    
With an argument similar to that of the critics of the Caste School of Race 
Relations, the Indian state maintained that Indians were a racial “mix” and distinctions 
based on race did “not impinge on the consciousness or outlook of Indian citizens in their 
social relations.”
389
 “Caste,” it stated, “denotes a ‘social’ and ‘class’ distinction and is not 
based on race.”
390
 With this assumption of a biological notion of race, the Indian state put 
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forth another factor invalidating the analogy between race and caste. Rather than viewing 
race as a social construction generated from within a project of domination, the 
Government of India erroneously assumed that race corresponded to some biological, 
genetic, or physiological reality.  Thus, by suggesting that race existed outside its social 
manifestations, the report obfuscated the similarities between race and caste, namely how 
both demarcate relations of power and are socially constructed categories – albeit 
embodied experiences.  
In its response to the Indian state’s report, the CERD Committee disputed the 
exclusion of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes from the scope of the Convention and 
stated that the “system of castes” was “among the factors which impede the full 
implementation of the Convention [in India].”
391
 It also challenged the Indian state’s 
contention that “descent” in Article 1 of the Convention referred only to race. The 
Committee declared that “the situation of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes falls 
within the scope of the Convention” and underscored its “great concern” about the Indian 
state’s refusal to recognize this.
392
  While it acknowledged the many constitutional and 
legislative protections guaranteed to SC/ST populations, the Committee also noted the 
continued “widespread discrimination and the relative impunity of those who abuse them 
[SC/ST].”
393
   
These statements laid the groundwork for future U.N. deliberations on caste.  By 
implicitly broadening the definition of racial discrimination to include caste 
discrimination and by explicitly recognizing that caste discrimination was within the 
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purview of the Convention, the CERD Committee statement provided a foundation for 
the consideration of caste discrimination as a human rights violation.
394
  Accordingly, the 
interest of international human rights organizations in caste and untouchability increased 
after 1996 and advocacy at the U.N. became viable.  The CERD Committee’s statement 
on India was among the key factors that convinced Human Rights Watch in 1997 to 
conduct a report on the problem of caste-based violence and untouchability in India. 
 
WCAR Preparatory Meetings 
In the years following the CERD Committee report, dalit activism gained 
momentum as international human rights organizations began mobilizing against caste-
based discrimination. In March 1999, HRW released its report, Broken People: Caste 
Violence Against India’s Untouchables, which greatly increased the global visibility of 
the problem of caste-based discrimination. The formation of the National Campaign for 
Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR) in 1998 facilitated dalit international activism and, in 
particular, advocacy at the human rights treaty bodies of the United Nations. In the 
months preceding the WCAR, dalit activists utilized the connections that had been made 
following the HRW report and lobbied foreign governments and international institutions 
for the inclusion of caste-based discrimination at the conference.  
In January 2000, Paul Divakar, a co-founder of NCDHR, represented the 
organization at the Bellagio Consultation, a preparatory meeting for the WCAR 
supported by the Rockefeller Foundation and convened by Gay J. McDougall, executive 
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director of the Washington-based International Human Rights Law Group and member of 
CERD. The Consultation recommended that “caste systems” be explicitly included in the 
WCAR Declaration under “Forms and Manifestations of Racism, Racial Discrimination, 
Xenophobia Intolerance” and that dalits and the Burakumin of Japan be identified as 
“victims” of discrimination based on descent.  In March 2000, the International Dalit 
Solidarity Network (IDSN) was officially established in London and began lobbying 
organizations such as the International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination 
(IMADR) and the Lutheran World Federation. Two months later in May, a delegation of 
dalit activists travelled to Strasbourg and Brussels to appeal to the European Union at the 
European Regional Preparatory Meeting for WCAR. International dalit activism was 
given another significant boost in November 2000 when Martin Macwan, also a founding 
member of the NCDHR, received the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Human Rights 
Award. The award not only increased the international visibility of dalit issues, but also 
provided lobbying services by the RFK Center’s staff in Washington D.C. These 
developments in activism and visibility helped achieve an important U.N. development: 
in August 2000, the fifty-second session of the Sub-commission for the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights passed Resolution 2000/4. This Resolution declared 
discrimination based on work and descent to be illegal under international law and also 
stated that this type of discrimination was a global problem, a “feature of societies in 
different regions of the world” that “has affected a significant proportion overall of the 
world’s population.”
395
 The Resolution arranged for the preparation of a Working Paper 
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on discrimination based on work and descent in order to determine which communities 
were affected and to develop strategies for the elimination of this form of discrimination.   
A series of preparatory conferences for the WCAR took place over the next year. 
Dalit activists lobbied to have caste discrimination included in their reports and 
declarations, but were consistently opposed and blocked by the Government of India.  
The Indian state argued that racism and caste-based discrimination were distinct 
phenomena and insisted that caste was outside the purview of the WCAR. According to 
several sources, the government also established dubious NGOs which sent dalit 




Activism on the behalf of dalit women was crucial to calling attention to caste-
based discrimination at the preparatory conferences. Ruth Manorama, founder of the 
National Federation of Dalit Women (NFDW) served as vice-chairperson of the Expert 
Group Meeting on Gender and Racism, held in Zagreb, Croatia in November 2000.  The 
statement from this meeting categorized dalit women as “marginalized women” who 
were “directly impacted” by discrimination and intolerance; it also called upon the 
conference to provide sufficient representation to dalit women. The Beijing Platform of 
Action, adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women, had already provided a basis 
for recognizing multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination and had also facilitated 
a discussion of the specific predicament of dalit women in international forums.  In the 
meetings before Durban, dalit activists asserted that dalit women were among the most 
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marginalized in India and demanded that the intersectionality of their oppression be 
understood so that their needs could be better served.
397
   
The regional preparatory meetings also included parallel NGO forums which 
passed their own resolutions and recommendation. For example, while the Government 
of India blocked the inclusion of caste-based discrimination in the declaration and 
recommendations of the Asian Preparatory Meeting, held in Tehran, Iran in February 
2001, the activism of the NCDHR was able to secure the inclusion of caste discrimination 
in the NGO declaration.
 398
  The NGO declaration imparted a global conception of caste. 
In this statement, caste was described as “an immutable characteristic determined by 
one’s birth…irrespective of the faith they practice,” and thus was severed from roots in 
Hinduism.
399
 Caste in Indian society was deemed a form of “hidden apartheid,” “modern 
day slavery,” and “extreme forms of discrimination, exploitation, and violence.”  The 
terminology used – specifically “apartheid” and slavery” – not only translates the 
experience of caste into a globally recognized wrong, but is also an example of practices 
that mobilized transnational activist movements. The use of “apartheid,” given the history 
of the ICERD and its conferences, also renders the issue of caste discrimination a grave 
offense that requires urgent global action. The NGO statement maintains that caste-
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discrimination is not limited to South Asia, but is found in several parts of Asia and West 
Africa. It specifically names dalits in India and the Burakumin in Japan as victims of this 
form of discrimination and maintains that although constitutional and legislative acts 
were in place to combat discrimination, such laws largely remain unenforced.  The NGO 
declaration describes the experiences of dalits, in particular social prohibitions and 
differential access to resources, and contends that for them, “caste remains a 
determinative factor for the attainment of social, political, civil, and economic rights.”
 400
  
Following the Asian Regional Preparatory Meeting, dalit activists organized a 
conference in New Delhi to discuss caste-based discrimination and the upcoming WCAR 
conference.
401
 Attended by representatives from thirteen countries, the Global Dalits 
Conference Against Racism and Caste-based Discrimination heard testimonies from 
victims of caste-based discrimination and presentations from activists and scholars.
402
 
The final declaration of the conference put forth a global conceptualization of caste. It 
described caste as a form of discrimination that impacted millions of people “irrespective 
of religion” in South Asia, East Asia, and West Africa.  This declaration also explicitly 
stated that caste-based discrimination was a “distinct form of racism” and that its 
manifestations amounted to “a form of apartheid” and a “crime against humanity.” 
403
 
The statement prepared at the Asia-Pacific NGO Networking Meeting, which took place 
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in Kathmandu, Nepal in April 2001, reiterated these claims as well as the arguments from 
the Tehran NGO statement.  The Kathmandu statement added that “casteism and racism 
operate at personal, social and structural levels,” and that it “condemns” the efforts of 
both the governments of India and Japan to block the inclusion of caste-based 
discrimination in WCAR. It again described the manifestations of caste as a form of 
apartheid and boldly asserted that “untouchability is a crime against humanity.”  
 
Debates in the Media 
Following the preparatory conference in Tehran, the question of whether caste 
discrimination could or should be considered at WCAR became the focus of a series of 
newspaper articles and television programs in India. The debate in the media focused on 
two main issues: whether caste was akin to race and whether caste-based discrimination 
should be discussed in an international forum.  The conceptualization of the first issue 
was a warped representation of the key matter in question: that of discrimination and 
whether caste-based discrimination was analogous to race-based discrimination. 
Prominent social scientists, such as Andre Beteille and Dipankar Gupta, published 
articles on the nature of caste and race, and by using both anthropological and 
sociological theory and their authority as ‘experts,’ they argued that the two were 
fundamentally incomparable.  In the economy of knowledge on caste, these scholars 
supplied the expert assessment that provided the social theory to corroborate the Indian 
state’s position. While retorts from dalit activists and scholars of the dalit movement were 
also published, the government was able to use expert opinions to marginalize the 
statements made by dalit activists.  
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Then attorney general of India, Soli J. Sorabjee, represented the government at the 
preparatory conference in Tehran and published an article about the conference on March 
4,
 
2001 in the Times of India.  Sorabjee resurrected a biological notion of race and used 
the separate mention of race and caste in the Indian Constitution to dismiss activists’ 
claims, thereby averting the issue of discrimination all together.
404
 He described the effort 





, the Times of India published a rejoinder from Smita Narula, lead author of the 
Human Rights Watch report on dalits in India.
 406
 Narula described caste discrimination 
as a global phenomenon, one not limited to India but rather “rampant in numerous Asian 
countries.” Millions, she wrote, continued to suffer from the “segregation, modern-day 
slavery and extreme forms of exploitation and violence” endemic to this kind of 
discrimination. Narula argued that the Attorney General’s position “effectively 
undermine[s] India’s commitment to the universality of human rights” and that this 
position had been advanced without consulting Parliament, the National Human Rights 
                                                 
404
 Sorabjee concludes the article with somewhat cryptic discussion of public toilets as an index of “level of 
civilization.” He notes that most public toilets have an “unbearable stench.” He proceeds to describe a 
Hong Kong jewelry store which has a toilet made out of twenty-four carat gold.  Sorabjee explains that the 
jewelry store owner was inspired by a statement from Lenin in which he apparently said that he would 
make toilets out of gold for the public after the triumph of socialism. Sorabjee then explains that this vision 
would be inappropriate for India: “None of this capitalist opulence for socialist India though. We will rest 
content with clean-functioning toilets. Is this a utopian fancy?” Arjun Appadurai’s discussion of the “the 
politics of shit…a node at which concerns of the human body, dignity, and technology meet,” seems useful 
here. Basil Fernando of the Asian Human Rights Commission wrote a letter in response to Sorabjee’s 
article which reads his discussion of toilets in terms of the ‘politics of shit.’ See Arjun Appadurai, “Deep 
Democracy: Urban Governmentality and the Horizon of Politics” Public Culture 14:(1), page 39 and Basil 
Fernando, “The Dirtiest Engagement of Indian Diplomacy: Operation Toilet, A Letter in Reply to Soli 
Sorabjee, attorney general of India, Times of India [find citation]. Fernando states that a significant number 
of dalits are condemned to “collecting shit” and reads the attorney general’s statement as suggestion that 
this situation should continue. “To prevent the Untouchables from walking out of their toilets,” he 
contends, “is what the Brahmins and their spokespersons are struggling for at this conference and in other 
forums.  A world where caste will be annihilated is seen by them as a Utopia for these discriminated 
masses and as a smelly place for themselves.” 
405
 Soli Sorabjee, “Racism, Name-Changing and Toilets” Times of India, March 4, 2001.  
406
 Smita Narula, “Caste Away,” Letters to the Editor, Times of India, March 9, 2001.  
180 
 
Council, or the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. 
Sorabjee responded to Narula with another letter in which he reiterated his earlier 
arguments, but added that his arguments had been supported by the expert opinion of 
social anthropologist Andre Beteille.
407
 Sorabjee also pointed out that Narula lived in 
New York and worked for a “U.S. NGO,” thereby implicitly evoking a common theme in 
WCAR discussions: that foreign parties had both initiated and propagated dalit activism 
to weaken the Indian nation.  
Andre Beteille, prominent social anthropologist and professor at Delhi University, 
had published his assessment of the controversy in The Hindu on March 10, one day after 
the publication of Narula’s letter.
408
  Beteille, who has written extensively on caste in 
India, highlighted his training as a social anthropologist and identified himself as an 
expert on the sociological understandings of caste and race.
409
 Using Franz Boas’ work 
on the distinctions between race, language, and culture, Beteille argued that caste, a 
social category, had no relation to race, a biological category.  Beteille explained that 
race corresponded to a biological reality and that the Indian population could not be 
meaningfully categorized by race. He opposed the dalit appeal for inclusion at WCAR as 
both “politically mischievous” and “scientifically nonsensical.”
410
  He claimed that 
grouping caste and race in the same social category was politically convenient for 
“interested parties,” but that it amounted to “an act of political and moral 
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irresponsibility.” He compared the “irresponsibility” of including caste in WCAR 
discussions to claims for “superior rights” by white supremacists:  
We cannot throw out the concept of race by the front door when it is misused for 
asserting social superiority and bring it in again through the back door to misuse it 
in the cause of the oppressed.  The metaphor of race is a dangerous weapon 
whether it is used for asserting white supremacy or for making demands on behalf 
of disadvantaged groups.  
 
By upholding a biological notion of race, Beteille was able to ignore the social relations 
that produced the very ideas of human races and consequently, could ignore how race, 
like caste, is always already accompanied with some form of discrimination and 
inequality.
411
   
Gail Omvedt, esteemed scholar of B.R. Ambedkar and the dalit movement, 
responded to Beteille in an article in The Hindu on April 10
th
. Omvedt pointed out the 
contradictions in Beteille’s understanding of caste and race and reintroduced the issue of 
discrimination into the debate.  She pointed out that while caste and race have distinct 
histories, the central question in the debate over the inclusion of caste in WCAR was 
whether caste-based discrimination was comparable to racism. Omvedt contended that 
both racism and caste-based discrimination “attribute ‘natural’ or essential qualities to 
people born in specific social groups” and thus the “justifications for caste-based 
discrimination” are very much related to the “social phenomenon of ‘racism.’”  Kalpana 
Kannabiran, a law professor at NALSAR University of Law in Hyderabad, also 
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intervened in the debate with a critique of Beteille.
412
  She questioned the “science” that 
Beteille claimed for the category of race and argued that the division of humans into 
races was historically “part of a larger exercise of domination.” Dalit activists had 
translated caste as discrimination and had, as she wrote, revealed the “exclusion, 
untouchability, denial of constitutional rights and guarantees, violent subjugation and 
histories of slavery” that constituted the experience of many dalits in India. Kannabiran 
also claimed that this understanding of caste had its own “intellectual history,” one that 
did not date to disciplinary anthropology, but rather to “the political work of Indian 
ideologues who were committed to the establishment of an egalitarian order, and who in 
that endeavor saw caste as the single most powerful obstacle to the realization of that 
commitment.” Kannabiran included Jotirao Phule, Savitribai Phule, Pandita Ramabai, 
Periyar and Ambedkar as among these thinkers and leaders. The discussion of caste at 
WCAR and its inclusion within the purview of the ICERD, she concluded, would be 
“part of an effort to realize the visions of anti-caste movements in the earlier part of this 
century.” 
An article by another scholar, P. Radhakrishnan, a professor at the Madras 
Institute of Development Studies, rejected this intellectual history and implicitly accused 
the activists demanding the inclusion of caste at WCAR of opposing the interests of the 
nation.
413
 In his essay, Radhakrishnan cited Beteille and the Government of India, and 
argued that caste and race were distinct phenomena and that caste based discrimination 
did not meet the sociological definition required for inclusion in the WCAR. Caste, he 
noted, was an “internal” matter and it was neither appropriate nor prudent to expose 
                                                 
412
 Kalpana Kannabiran, “Race and Caste: A Response to Andre Beteille” PUCL Bulletin, August 2001.  
413
 P. Radhakrishnan, “Dalits and Durban,” The Hindu, August 27, 2001.   
183 
 
caste-discrimination to an international audience.  Like Sorabjee, Radhakrishnan 
suggested that the move to include caste in WCAR had been initiated by foreign parties. 
He blamed foreign activists and NGOs for instigating the move to include caste at the 
WCAR and pointed out that international Christian organizations, such as the World 
Council of Churches and the Lutheran World Federation, supported the dalit activist 
agenda for WCAR. He also suggested that this agenda was not beneficial to dalits in 
India. “Ambedkar himself,” he writes, “would have found it ludicrous and even abhorrent 
to showcase caste, even as a tableaux, in an alien land and through a world body of which 
India is a member-country.” Radhakrishnan questioned the motivations of dalit activists 
and accused dalit activists of “the political appropriation of the caste system” and of 
personally benefiting from the “Western dole.” In argument of spurious logic, he 
concluded that “if the Dalits could spawn such aggressive, articulate, globetrotting, and 
internationally acclaimed and influential leaders, they would have overcome long ago 
their precarious plight as the despised and the damned, the depressed and the 
downtrodden of the caste society.” Radhakrishnan’s statement reveals how activists’ 
internationalization of caste discrimination was met with accusations of disloyalty to the 
nation and of disingenuousness, two accusations that have plagued anti-caste movements 
since Ambedkar’s time.  Radhakrishnan seems to suggest that caste discrimination and 
violence are not as serious as activists contend and in addition, that activists, motivated 
by self-interest, are guilty of exaggeration and of unfairly harming the nation’s 
international reputation.  Policing the nation’s reputation seems to be a paramount 




Discussions at WCAR  
Two additional preparatory conferences took place the summer before the 
WCAR.  Both meetings – the first from May 17 to June 1 and the second from July 31 to 
August 10 – were held in Geneva and were attempts to reach a consensus on the draft 
statement for the WCAR.  Martin Macwan, co-founder and then head of the NCDHR, 
presented his appeal for the inclusion of caste discrimination at WCAR at the May 
conference. According to the records at his organization in Gujarat, Navsarjan, Macwan 
was approached by a government official after his presentation. The government official 
conceded that dalits did indeed face discrimination, but argued to Macwan, in a vein 
similar to Radhakrishnan, that “we should not wash dirty linen in public.”
414
 Macwan 
replied, “At least you’ve admitted that the linen was dirty and needed to be washed.  Now 
what remains to be decided is that who will do it.” Despite the government’s opposition, 
Macwan’s presentation in Geneva helped secure plans for a study on the situation of 
dalits in India.  Moreover, the draft declaration for WCAR included a discussion of 
discrimination based on occupation and descent: Paragraph 73 advocated for all 
“necessary constitutional, legislative and administrative measures, including appropriate 
forms of affirmative action,…to prohibit and redress discrimination on the basis of work 
and descent, and that such measures are respected and implemented by all State 
authorities at all levels.”
415
   
Just before the WCAR, in August 2001, the Working Paper called for by 
Resolution 2000/4 on non-discrimination on the basis of work and descent was presented 
to the fifty-third session of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
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Human Rights. The report – called the Goonesekere Report for its chief author, Rajendra 
Kalidas Wimala Goonesekere – reiterated that discrimination based on work and descent 
violated international human rights law. It also reaffirmed that “descent” in the ICERD 
did not solely refer to race and also referred to “tribal or caste distinctions as well.”
416
 
The sketch of discrimination based on work and descent offered in the Goonesekere 
Report paralleled earlier sociological understandings of caste. The report stated that 
discrimination based on descent affected those who have “membership in an endogamous 
group that has been isolated socially and occupationally from other groups in society”; 
discrimination based on work was described as a form of dual discrimination in which 
people were “suffering first from the work they must perform and suffering again by the 
denial of their rights because they perform work that is unacceptable.”
417
  It added that 
both forms of discrimination manifested themselves in terms of prohibitions on marriage, 
restrictions on access to resources, physical segregation, and restrictions on social 
contacts and relations. The report discussed discrimination based on work and descent in 
five countries – India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Japan, and Pakistan – but recognized that this 
form of discrimination may occur in other places in Asia, in Africa, and in South 
America.  Among the groups identified as victims of this form of discrimination were the 
“untouchables” of India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Pakistan as well as the Rodiyas or Rodi of 
Sri Lanka and the Burakumin of Japan.  Like the sociological studies conducted in the 
U.S. over fifty years earlier, the report made an implicit distinction between caste and 
class, describing India as a “stratified or compartmental society not based on class but on 
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 The report also discussed differences in the ideologies 
supporting this kind of discrimination.  For example, while a concept of uncleanliness or 
pollution often accompanies systems of discrimination based on descent and work, the 
report noted that in Pakistan, the concept of “ritual pollution” was not present, but ideas 
of “privilege and shame” served the same function.
419
  The report argued that regardless 
of these differences, the discriminatory relations in these places were to be categorized 
under one concept in human rights theory, that of discrimination based on work and 
descent.  It concluded that although the groups mentioned in the report may not constitute 
a race “as understood in the international instruments,” nonetheless these groups are “in 
fact a race of broken people with commonalities that bring them together.  They speak in 
many tongues but with one voice to ask for social justice and good governance that will 
end the miseries in their daily lives. They are a people subject to violations of their 
human rights.”
420
   
Despite the strength of this statement, coming just days before the start of the 
Conference, dalit activists were not successful in overcoming the Indian state’s 
opposition to the inclusion of any reference to caste-based discrimination in the final 
WCAR declaration and programme of action.  On September 2
nd
, the third day of the 
Conference, Omar Abdullah, Minister of State for External Affairs, spoke on behalf of 
the Indian state.
421
 Abdullah celebrated the historic struggle against apartheid in South 
Africa and referenced India’s international role in fighting racism as well as its domestic 
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commitment, “inspired by Mahatma Gandhi and guided by the legacy of Dr. Ambedkar,” 
to eliminating discrimination.  Despite the reference to Dr. Ambedkar, there was little 
mention of caste-based discrimination. Abdullah applauded the work the state has done 
towards eradicating discrimination and criticized dalit appeals to include caste 
discrimination in WCAR: “In the run up to the world conference,” he stated, “there has 
been propaganda, highly exaggerated and misleading, often based on anecdotal evidence, 
regarding caste-based discrimination in India.”  Abdullah attempted to block discussion 
of caste by repudiating the claims of dalit activists and by dismissing the perspective 
generated from their experiences as “anecdotal” and thus unsuited for such a venue. He 
added that the government did not consider caste an “appropriate” topic for the 
Conference, explaining that the purpose of the conference was to check against state-
sponsored racism, not, as he puts it, “to engage in social engineering within member 
states.  It is neither legitimate nor feasible nor practical for this Conference or, for that 
matter, even the UN to legislate, let alone police individual behavior in our societies.” In 
this statement, the internationalization of caste-based discrimination was couched as a 
threat and challenge to India’s sovereignty.
422
 Global support for dalit activism was 
deemed an act of “social engineering” and an infringement on the fundamental rights of 
the Indian nation-state in the international community.
423
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Dalit activists, however, were successful in getting a lengthy discussion of caste 
discrimination included in the final declaration of the WCAR NGO Forum. This 
statement unequivocally pronounced caste discrimination a global problem: “the caste 
system,” the Declaration reads, “discriminates against and enables segregation of 
communities on the basis of work and descent, such as Dalits in South Asia, the Buraku 
people of Japan, the Osu and Oru people of Nigeria and the Griots of Senegal.”
424
  Caste 
discrimination was not causally linked to Hinduism nor was it singularly associated with 
any one religion. The NGO statement also described the condition of dalits in some of the 
most powerful terminology in the language of human rights. It proclaimed that caste-
discrimination constituted a “system of ‘Hidden apartheid,’ and that “caste discrimination 
and ‘untouchability’ practiced against Dalits for centuries amounted to systemic 
‘generational and cultural Dalitcide,’ which is the mass-scale destruction of their 
individual and collective identity, dignity, and self-respect.”
425
 The term “dalitcide” 
evokes the gravity of genocide and mandates immediate international action.  Moreover, 
the statement recommends that “work and descent based discrimination, including caste 
discrimination,” be internationally declared “Crimes against Humanity.”
426
 The NGO 
statement also declares that communities most negatively impacted by caste and 
discrimination based on work and descent, such as the dalits and Buraku people, are 
entitled to reparations for “centuries-old wrongdoings committed against these 
communities.”
427
  Effected governments were asked to introduce mechanisms “for the 
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purpose of restitution, monetary compensation, rehabilitation and for ensuring guarantees 
of non-repetition.” 
At the onset of the conference, Paragraph 73 – the only reference to 
discrimination on the basis of work and descent and therefore caste discrimination – was 
supported by several countries; in fact, only the People’s Republic of China sided with 
the Indian government that this form of discrimination should not be included in the 
Conference document.  Despite public protests by dalit activists and a hunger strike by 
dalit representatives, Paragraph 73 was bracketed and left open to negotiation. By the end 
of the conference, Paragraph 73, along with fifty paragraphs related mostly to the 
situation of the Palestinians and reparations for the transatlantic slave trade, was dropped. 
The final Conference declaration did not include any language about caste discrimination 
or discrimination on the basis of work and descent. India’s “delay tactics” along with 
“trade-offs” with the USA and European countries – in which Indian support on issues 
related to the Palestinians and reparations for slavery was exchanged for support on the 
caste issue – were suspected in causing the removal of Paragraph 73.
428
    
 
******** 
“It was a repetition of the Second Roundtable Conference,” said Martin Macwan, 
describing the WCAR in our interview.
429
 Just as Ambedkar’s proposal for separate 
electorates was derailed by Gandhi’s refusal to see the Depressed Classes as a minority 
distinct from the Hindu community, the Government of India, Macwan suggested, 
similarly blocked the inclusion of any reference to caste-based discrimination in the final 
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WCAR conference statement. Gandhi had insisted that the problem of untouchability be 
resolved from within the Hindu community, through repentance and service to the 
downtrodden. Ultimately, however, it was not Gandhi’s argument against separate 
electorates, but rather, his “fast unto death” that forced Ambedkar to settle for reserved 
seats in the general electorate, a much more diluted form of political empowerment than 
that offered by separate electorates. Nearly seventy years later, with an argument similar 
to Gandhi’s, the Government of India claimed that caste-based discrimination was an 
internal matter, specific to India and outside the scope of international human rights 
instruments. Once again, it was not the strength of the argument or rhetoric about caste as 
an internal matter that thwarted the dalit political agenda, but instead, as many suspected, 
a politically convenient alliance between India, the United States, and European 
countries. There were other striking similarities between these two moments of the 
internationalization of caste discrimination.
430
 Accusations of disloyalty to the nation and 
of subverting the interests of the nation marred dalit activism at Durban as it had 
Ambedkar in negotiations with the British. Both events also blocked a key political 
mechanism for dalit empowerment and were experienced by many dalits as a betrayal.    
Despite the failure of the dalit initiative to obtain the international legal 
protections available to victims of race-based discrimination at WCAR, many activists 
saw the event as a success. Dalit activists had succeeded in galvanizing considerable 
support and increasing the visibility of caste-based discrimination and the plight of dalits 
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in India.  Activists were also able to bolster existing transnational alliances and create 
new ones. Furthermore, after the 2001 conference, not only did U.N. human rights bodies 
explicitly reference caste-based discrimination as a violation of human rights, but also in 
December 2006 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh conceded the gravity of the problem of 
caste and untouchability in contemporary India by comparing it to Apartheid.
431
  These 
post-Durban successes for dalit activism were due in part to the creative use of human 
rights and the definition and scope of “caste” in international dalit activism.  
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The NFDW and Transnational Dalit Feminist Activism 
 
In 1985, Ruth Manorama, a dalit social worker and community activist from 
Tamil Nadu, participated in what she described as a “cultural exchange program between 
blacks and dalits.”
432
 During an interview I had with her in 2009, Manorama spoke about 
her participation in the program. She said that she had been perplexed by black women’s 
relationship to the woman’s movement in the United States and had been interested in 
learning about why, as she said, “they are called black feminists” instead of just 
“feminists.” Manorama studied the issues affecting black women and their exclusion 
from the mainstream feminist movement in the United States. She also researched the 
situation of black women in South Africa and their participation in the movement against 
apartheid.  She recalled that what she learned helped her discern a similarity in condition 
and struggle with black women in the U.S. and South Africa: their lives, she claimed, are 
“so similar to the life of the dalits.” Ruth said that the program also enabled her to 
recognize that the predicaments facing dalit women – predicaments that were different 
from both other Indian women and dalit men – were shared by other marginalized 
communities and that a global perspective, a turn outward and abroad for alliances, could 
benefit dalit women. Ruth recounted that it was during the program that she first 
recognized the importance of asserting dalit women’s difference and of having, as she put 
it, “a dalit woman’s separate platform, a separate organization.” 
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In this chapter, I discuss this “separate platform” through an analysis of the development, 
ideology, and activities of the National Federation of Dalit Women (NFDW), an 
organization founded by Manorama to connect and represent dalit women from across 
India.  The NFDW provides a platform for dalit women to contend with two challenges: 
one, the male-dominated dalit movement; and two, a women’s movement in India 
dominated by upper-caste women, issues and concerns.  
In an article that came out shortly after the Fourth World Conference on Women 
in Beijing, Gopal Guru discussed the formation of autonomous dalit women’s 
organizations, such as the NFDW, and the rise of identity politics by dalit women.
433
 He 
argued that that dalit women “need to talk differently” because of factors internal and 
external to the dalit community: they experienced political and cultural marginalization 
within the dalit community, and mainstream feminists were resistant to analyzing caste in 
addition to class and gender inequality. Dalit women, he maintained, thus could not be 
represented by dalit men or non-dalit women; they could only represent themselves. Guru 
celebrated the emergence of a politics of difference among dalit women and suggested 
that it avoided many of the problems of identity-based politics. As he concluded, “dalit 
women’s perception while critical of the homogenization of a dominant discourse does 
not make a fetish of its own reality, and therefore prevents the ghettoisation of 
dalithood.”
434
 Guru failed to consider, however, that the problem with identity politics 
extends beyond the possibility of ghettoization; rather, it risks excluding some groups and 
fixing and privileging particular identities as authentic.  
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Sharmila Rege contested Guru’s suggestion that experience yields more authentic 
knowledge, the premise of his celebration of a politics of difference, and argued that his 
notion of “difference” could actually dilute the emancipatory potential of dalit women’s 
perspectives. Such a concept of ‘difference,’ she cautioned, “could render dalit women’s 
independent assertion an exclusive politics of identity.”
435
  Rege argued that the concept 
of difference had “limited political and analytical use” if not put into dialogue with other 
ideological positions. The mere assertion of difference and difference in epistemological 
standpoint would then simply lead to a plurality of standpoints, without interrogating 
upper caste/class assumptions. She notes that an analysis of patriarchy that captured how 
caste hierarchy was part and parcel of gender subordination had been glaringly absent in 
the major feminist campaigns of the 1970s and 1980s. For the leftist women’s 
organization of that time, the notion of sisterhood and an undifferentiated feminist 
standpoint superseded class and caste differences; in addition, caste as a category of 
analysis was subsumed by class and rendered redundant. The establishment of 
autonomous dalit women’s organizations, such as the NFDW, thus heralded more than a 
mere assertion of difference. As she concluded, “It is apparent that the issues underlined 
by the new dalit women’s movement go beyond the naming of ‘difference’ of dalit 




In this chapter, I draw from both Guru and Rege’s insights on autonomous dalit 
feminist organizing, but argue that the assertion of difference – difference in structural 
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position and epistemological standpoint – from both other Indian women and dalit men 
has also enabled affective and political bonds across nation-state borders. The concept of 
“difference” has been utilized for transnational activism and to put forth a critique of the 
mainstream social justice movements in India. This chapter demonstrates that NFDW 
aspires to overcome the limitations of these social movements by connecting with other 
comparably ‘marginalized’ communities of women and participating in transnational 
alliances.  
 
Establishing the NFDW, and ‘Dalit Women’ 
After completing the “exchange program between blacks and dalits,” Ruth 
Manorama joined Women’s Voice, a Bangalore-based NGO that worked with the urban 
poor. While at Women’s Voice, Ruth collaborated on a circular which invited dalit 
women from across India to attend a conference in Bangalore on International Women’s 
Day, March 8, 1987.
437
 The circular claimed that dalit women’s experiences were not 
being represented by the mainstream feminist movement.  Dalit women, it argued, are 
“triple-alienated” and their condition in society could only be understood by analyzing 
the intersections of caste, class, and gender inequality in their lives.
438
 This 
announcement initiated the movement for identifying dalit women as a distinct social 
category, a process that would lead to the founding of the National Federation of Dalit 
Women in 1995. 
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The 1987 meeting was sponsored by Women’s Voice and the Christian Dalit 
Liberation Movement, a national organization based in Vellore, Tamil Nadu.
439
 The 
meeting brought together dalit women from across the country and provided a space to 
discuss issues specific to their lives. Ruth recalled that the women at the meeting shared a 
loss of faith in the institutions and ideologies that were supposed to deliver justice and a 
better quality of life: the state, they lamented, had failed to fulfill its Constitutional 
obligations; the Indian women’s movement had neglected issues affecting dalit women 
and did not give dalits leadership roles; and dalit and other leftist movements exhibited a 
clear masculinist bias and did not properly address issues affecting women.  Dalit 
feminism emerged from this crisis in received models for change and offered a new 
ideology for the restructuring of social relations. According to official accounts, 
participants at the conference recognized both the “need to organize themselves in order 
to address their special needs and problems” and the urgency of making ‘dalit women’ 
into a visible social constituency. 
440
 Following the preliminary meeting in 1987, a 
national taskforce of seventeen women from different regions was created and dalit 
women’s groups began convening at both the state and regional levels.    
In the early 1990s, mainstream women’s organizations in India were preparing for 
the Fourth World Conference on Women, to be held in Beijing, China in 1995 (“Beijing 
Conference”). Given their experience of exclusion from the mainstream Indian feminist 
movement, Dalit activists felt a need for separate representation at the Conference and 
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also believed that it held a “golden opportunity to mobilize, educate and disseminate 
information.”  In preparation for the Conference, Women’s Voice and the Asian 
Women’s Human Rights Council held a public hearing in Bangalore on crimes against 
dalits and particularly against dalit women. The forum heard testimonies from hundreds 
of victims/survivors and provided a public space for sharing experiences of caste-based 
violence and injustice for the first time in India.
441
  With the Beijing Conference 
approaching, dalit feminists from the Women’s Voice helped assemble a delegation for 
the Conference and officially established the National Federation of Dalit Women as a 
“secular, autonomous and democratic” organization on August 11, 1995. At the time of 
my fieldwork, the organization was housed in a small three-room office in Bangalore. 
Despite the seeming shortage of space, staff, technology (the organization seemed to have 
only one computer, printer, and copier), and repair-work to the aging building, the office 
managed to generate a significant national and transnational presence through this office. 
The office included a library and archive of the NFDW’s activities, to which I was 
generously given full and free access.   
The organization was created for the dual purpose of concretizing the category of 
“dalit women” and representing the community nationally and internationally.
442
 Early 
goals of the organization included the development of a national human rights 
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commission to monitor crimes against dalits, the establishment of state-level committees, 
and the creation resources, such as scholarships, for dalit women’s education.  From its 
founding, the NFDW listed “building international solidarity and linkages with other 
oppressed groups” one of its central goals and argued that a transnational approach was 
indispensable to solving the problems facing dalit women.  
The Beijing Conference provided the NFDW a fortuitous opening into the 
international arena of women’s rights; it increased the visibility of caste-based issues and 
enabled dalit feminists to network with other activists.
443
 The NFDW helped over eighty 
dalit women participate in Beijing and organized a seminar on the conditions of dalits in 
India. Ruth Manorama, as key spokesperson for the NFDW, delivered the main 
presentation, entitled “Dalit Women in Struggle: Transforming Pain into Power.”
 444
 The 
presentation described the caste system and untouchability in terms that could resonate 
globally. Manorama constructed equivalences and made analogies between caste-based 
discrimination and more internationally visible forms of discrimination, arguing, for 
example, that “racial discrimination on the basis of the caste system is probably the 
longest surviving hierarchal system in existence in the world today.”
445
 Manorama also 
evoked the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and provided 
examples of how the rights of “life, liberty and security of person and property rights” 
were consistently denied or violently violated, often with state complicity.  By framing 
“life, struggles, and aspirations” of dalit women in terms of the struggle for human rights 
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and against racial discrimination, Manorama’s presentation was able to counter the 
assumed “uniqueness” of caste and placed the annihilation of the caste system and the 
protection of dalits within the scope of global social justice movements. 
In her presentation at the Beijing Conference, Manorama argued that dalits, 
despite being a “heterogeneous people” with regional, linguistic, religious, and class 
differences, constituted a discrete social unit and “still preserve[d] distinct ethnic and 
religious cultural heritage.” She claimed that dalits were the “indigenous people of 
India,” but today, were “politically voiceless,” “a lost humanity, a dispossessed 
community…living in segregated condition[s].” Dalits, she explained, were subject to 
degrading and humiliating violence that was designed to enforce a low status in society. 
Although dalit women suffered the brunt of this violence, she added, the women’s 
movement in India had not “seriously” taken up this issue. Manorama deemed dalit 
women the most marginalized in society: a group “thrice alienated on the basis of their 
class (poor), caste (outcaste), and gender” and forced to live in a “culture of silence” 
about their experiences. In Ruth’s assessment, this position made the perspective and 
aspirations of dalit women all the more important for the dalit movement:  
The role of Dalit women is crucial and it is [the] center of Dalit liberation and 
Dalit identity, in the larger movement and struggle of the Dalits. The place of 
women in the Dalit vision is more than an equal partner with men and this must 
form the main path of alternative consciousness. In essence, the Dalit vision and 
alternative consciousness is primarily feminist, non-patriarchal, non hierarchal 
and positively ecological.  
 
Manorama called for the reevaluation and re-centering of the dominant social justice 
philosophies in India and claimed that dalit feminism was crucial to this reassessment. 
“To this end,” Ruth stated, “the Dalit women in India look towards international women 
for solidarity and support.”  
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 At the Beijing Conference, Ruth also drew attention to the “growing 
fundamentalist, communalist and castist forces in India.” The NFDW’s alternative social 
vision, she argued, worked to counteract these forces and subvert their impact on the 
political and social climate in India.  The idea that dalit feminism provided a necessary 
and urgent corrective to discriminatory ideologies in India and abroad was a recurring 
theme in NFDW’s international work. The organization stated that dalit feminism, as 
both a political and cultural movement, “will serve as a medium to counter ideas of 
globalization and Hindutva, which devalue women, homogenize diversity and erode the 
egalitarian practice that are part of dalit women’s lives.”
446
 The NFDW reiterated this 
idea in 2001 at the NGO forum of the World Conference Against Racism.
447
 The 
organization’s statement cited the evisceration of the values of the Indian Constitution 
and the “systematic undermining of the right to life, livelihood and dignity” by Hindutva 
forces. It also implicitly connected the plight of dalits to the plights of many in countries 
compelled to liberalize their economies. The “globalization of the economy,” it argued, 
“has led to a crisis of survival.” The NFDW maintained that a dalit feminist perspective – 
one that insists on equity in opportunity, the economic empowerment of the marginalized, 
and the environmental protection of natural resources – served as a timely intervention 
into ongoing and destructive global processes. 
 On the national level, the NFDW periodically holds conventions, conferences and 
workshops.  These conventions gather dalit women from across the country and provide a 
                                                 
446
 NFDW, “National Federation of Dalit Women.”  
447
 Here too, the statement situates the issues in terms of the “universality of the Universal Declaration of 




space to cultivate new forms of leadership and coordination.
448
 The national conventions 
also foster alliances across states and regions and enable discussion of key issues and 
concerns. Conferences reach beyond the dalit community to raise awareness in the Indian 
public and thus also serve as advocacy for dalit women. For example, in 2006, the 
NFDW and National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR) joined efforts to 
convene the first national conference on violence against dalit women. Held in New 
Delhi, the conference served as a forum for survivors, activists, politicians, and scholars 
to come together, exchange knowledge, and strategize on ways to protect and support 
dalit women. While hoping to direct the country’s attention to the conditions many dalit 
women face, the NFDW and NCDHR also used the opportunity to publically censure the 
state for its “failure…to protect and promote Dalit women’s rights.”
449
  
The conference statement (“Delhi Declaration”) was symbolically passed on 
International Women’s Day, March 8, 2006. It discussed both the contributions of dalit 
women to the country, and the consequences of the exploitation of their labor: “the 
surplus capital created by them [dalit women] by not accessing statutory minimum and 
equal wages for her labour…run into millions of rupees, contributing to the wealth and 
comfort of families and communities at the cost of her self-development, health and 
family.”
450
 The conference declaration also detailed disparities in the prevalence of 
violence, poverty, and sickness between dalit women and other populations and identified 
the caste and gender ideologies that underlie these disparities. For example, the 
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“‘worldview’ of the dominant caste” was shown to endanger dalit women; by marking 
them as “inferior, impure, low character, easily available and accessible,” this view 
exposed dalit women to greater vulnerability to violence. The Delhi Declaration noted 
that this view was prevalent among “dominant caste women” who “have in some 
instances been found to support and encourage their men to commit crimes against Dalit 
women.” Here, the statement reiterated one of the central arguments of the dalit feminist 
critique: “Indian women” do not constitute one coherent category; some women have 
more access to power than others and hold power over other women.
 451
  This argument 
provided the primary reasoning for the NFDW’s insistence that dalit women constituted a 
distinct and separate social category, a demand restated in the Delhi Declaration. 
The Delhi conference identified two primary forms of violence against dalit 
women: violence within the family and violence that is embedded in the functioning of 
the larger society. Violence in the home was related to the prevalence of “patriarchal 
values” in dalit communities; the conference statement explained that demands for 
money and often, abuse of alcohol by men resulted in violence towards mothers, wives, 
sisters, and daughters. 
452
 Alternatively, violence that was “rooted in the caste ethos” 
served to enforce social hierarchy; it became a “weapon for the continued caste-class-
gender subjugation and exploitation of dalit women and the community as a whole.” The 
conference statement argued that this category of violence, a particularly “gruesome” 
form, “seems to be reserved for dalit women.” This was violence designed to reinforce 
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traditional obligations and duties and was often retribution for the exercise of legitimate, 
state-endowed powers and rights.
453
  It was violence that not only assaulted the body, but 
also shamed and humiliated; it functioned to strip an individual and community of dignity 
and was “often a tool to perpetuate a culture of silence and crush the spirit.”
454
 Although 
staged as a national conference, the declaration concluded with a plea to the international 
community, in particular to women’s rights and development organizations, to recognize 
caste-based discrimination as a human rights violation, integrate an assessment of caste 
into development programs, and “extend solidarity to Dalit women’s causes and 
concerns.”  
At the conclusion of the Delhi Conference, activists called for an international 
conference on violence against dalit women. A conference at a global venue held the 
possibility of generating more international interest in dalit rights and building stronger 
transnational relationships for the dalit movement.  In November 2006, just a few months 
after the National Conference on Violence Against Dalit Women, the NFDW and 
NCDHR joined with the Feminist Dalit Organisation of Nepal, the International Dalit 
Solidarity Network (IDSN), Dalit Network Netherlands (DNN), and Justicia et Pax 
Netherlands to hold the International Conference on the Human Rights of Dalit Women 
in the Hague, Netherlands. Thematically, the conference continued the focus of the New 
Delhi conference, namely, on how “caste, class and gender discrimination prevents Dalit 
women from enjoying their basic human rights” and how violence sustains “systemic 
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 The Hague Conference also categorized violence against dalit women 
in terms of violence within the family and violence committed by more dominant castes. 
Instead of merely pointing out the state’s failure to protect dalit women, however, the 
declaration at the Hague Conference went one step further than the Delhi Declaration: it 
identified a “collusion between the state and dominant castes” and cited this relationship 
as explanation for why perpetrators can violate the rights and freedoms of dalit women 
with impunity. It argued that two parallel systems of authority, one deriving power from 
the Constitution and the other from caste ideology, operate in society and that the 
protections, rights and freedoms guaranteed by the state are meaningless when confronted 
by the latter. As the declaration stated, “the modern rule of law has no place in the 
hierarchal order of socioeconomic and political power relationships, as caste-based power 
supersedes state-derived executive authority.”  The Hague Declaration called on the 
governments of Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka to “take seriously the 
voices of Dalit women” and implored the international community for assistance. It asked 
the international community to “express its outrage” at the situation of dalits in South 
Asia and “undertake and support every possible measure to fight the widespread 
discrimination, violence and impunity committed against Dalit women.”  
The NFDW was one among multiple organizations that sponsored the Hague 
Conference. Although the Hague Declaration is consistent with its platform, materials 
circulated at the conference seem to diverge from the politics of the NFDW. For example, 
a portfolio distributed by the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights, entitled 3,000 
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Years…How Much Longer, put forth an analysis of violence that deviates from, and at 
times contradicts, that of the NFDW.  A factsheet in the portfolio states that “the Dalit 
woman faces violence at home from Dalit men, who compensate for their humiliation and 
lack of power by venting their frustration on their wives, daughters and mothers.”
456
 
While the NFDW views “patriarchal values” as underlying family violence, the NCDHR 
factsheet suggests that the disempowered condition of dalit men is one of the root causes 
of family violence. According to this logic, it is not the dismantling of patriarchy and the 
empowerment of women that would reduce violence against women, but rather, the 
empowerment of men.
457
  In the NCDHR’s assessment, “patriarchal values” are not 
addressed and caste hierarchy explains the problem of family violence.  
A similar privileging of the male dalit experience pervades the NCDHR’s analysis 
of upper caste violence against dalit women. The same factsheet in the portfolio stated 
that the dalit woman is  
routinely molested, offensively groped and gangraped by upper caste men to teach 
her community a lesson. To remind them of their position in society. Cases have 
been recorded of feudal landlords bursting into a dalit marriage to claim ‘the first 
night privilege with the bride.’   
 
Here, “community” seems to stand in for “men.” Whereas NFDW literature explained 
that the prevalence of “patriarchal notions of community honour residing in women” 
created a context in which “dominant caste violence against dalit women…punish[es] the 
entire Dalit community,” the NCDHR’s factsheet assumed the perspective of an 
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 Also, if disempowerment is a causal factor, it would manifests itself as violence against women because 
of an underlying patriarchal structure in society. 
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emasculated man and failed to explain the context in which violating a dalit woman 
would teach “her community” a lesson.  
The NCDHR portfolio used representations of dalit women’s suffering that 
subtly, yet significantly, diverged from those of the NFDW. While descriptions of 
suffering and humiliation help translate untouchability and make its experiences 
accessible to a global audience, some descriptions in the NCDHR portfolio were so 
replete with lurid and gruesome detail that they bordered on the sensationalistic. For 
example, the back cover of the conference portfolio prepared by the NCDHR for the 
Hague Conference listed terms that provided a sketch of the experiences endured by dalit 
women. Printed in a light gray ink against a dark gray background, the terms – 
“molestation, sexual abuse, discrimination, oppression, exclusion, outcaste, untouchable, 
spat upon, rape, murder, beaten, humiliated, stripped, disrobed, paraded naked, forced to 
eat shit and urine, kicked, tortured, burnt to death, blinded, scalded, hot oil poured” – are 
listed in English in a vertical column and followed by five columns of translations into  
Dutch, French, German, Spanish and Italian. The cover enumerated many of the 
spectacular dimensions of violence against dalit women, but in the absence of an analysis 
of everyday structural conditions or connection to an individual’s account, it seemed to 
work against the political project of dalit feminism.  Instead of portraying the “strength,” 
“resistance,” and “contributions” of dalit women, descriptions like the ones used by the 
NCDHR at the Hague Conference,  objectify the survivor/victim of caste and gender 
based crimes and exploit tropes of third-world women’s victimhood.
458
 The NCDHR also 
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207 
 
described the experience of dalit women in the superlative. For example, a factsheet 
stated that “Women the world over suffer discrimination. But never in the history of the 
universe has any group faced over 4000 years of persistent and continued oppression.”
459
 
The NCDHR campaign implied that dalit women suffer the most and experience the 
worst forms of oppression. This placed them at the top of an economy of suffering that 
seems to inform the international market in women’s issues, thereby rendering them the 
most in need of international assistance. 
The use of such representations suggests a continued insensitivity to gender issues 
in the dominant dalit movement. Sapna, a dalit activist, spoke to me about the frustration 
she’s felt with the images and rhetoric that have been used to advertise the dalit cause.
460
 
While international campaigns sometimes hinged on depictions of dalit women’s 
suffering and humiliation, the insensitivity of male activists to the interests of dalit 
women were apparent in how they framed the problems of caste and untouchability. For 
example, Sapna told me about an incident in which an international dalit organization 
posted a photograph of a woman who had been stripped and gang-raped. Taken soon 
after the assault, the photograph showed the woman prostrate, bruised and nearly naked.  
The photograph was posted to the NGO’s website without consulting the woman or 
getting her consent.  
Sapna explained how publication of the photograph worked against the interests 
of the woman and actually produced more harm to her. By exposing the woman’s nearly 
naked and vulnerable body to countless viewers, the organization, which was supposed to 
work for dalit empowerment and rights, further violated the woman’s dignity, privacy 
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and modesty, perhaps amplifying the trauma of the primary assault.  In an attempt to 
galvanize an international public and increase awareness of the condition of dalits in 
India, the NGO failed to consider the actual concerns of the woman by publicizing her 
assault. Sapna argued that the organization’s disregard for the actual concerns and well-
being of the woman shown in the picture, and more generally, dalit women, revealed an 
extreme insensitivity to gender among some dalit leaders. When Sapna posted her 
criticism of the publication of the photograph on an activist list serve and demanded that 
the photograph be removed from the website, she found that she was the lone voice of 
opposition.  Not only were her criticisms not supported by other activists, but Sapna was 
reproached by several activists for her comments. 
 
Difference as Critique and Possibility 
The intellectual project of dalit feminism, as imagined by the NFDW, is premised 
on two principles: one, that “women” or “Indian women” do not constitute a unitary 
social category and two, that gender inequality cannot be assessed in isolation, but rather, 
must be analyzed alongside other social variables such as class and caste status.  As 
Manorama explained, “today, in an Indian context, when you look at women as a whole, 
you don’t have the same or homogenous issues to relate to. We have different 
issues.…because we are at the lowest in the hierarchy of society.”  Dalit women, in 
Manorama’s words, “share very specific discrimination”; they share a difference in 
position, perspective, and experience from other communities of women.
 
“Therefore,” 
Manorama argues, “we need to look at ourselves as a very specific category of women.”   
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The assertion of difference has also facilitated dalit feminist transnationalism. As alluded 
to in the conversation with Manorama detailed  at the beginning of this chapter, the 
recognition of “difference” – difference in structural position and epistemological 
standpoint – from both Indian women and dalit men has also enabled affective and 
political bonds across nation-state borders. In this section, I examine how the 
conceptualization of ‘dalit women’s difference’ has served as a critique of identity-based 
social movements in India as well as a basis for building solidarity and alliances with 
communities of women outside of India.   
The mainstream women’s movement in India, explained Seema, a dalit rights 
activist, is run by “middle class and upper caste women”; they, she added, “are only 
talking about the problems of women of their castes.”
 461
  “Dalits are also patriarchal and 
dalit women have realized this,” she continued. According to Seema, the organizations of 
the mainstream movement have not addressed practices such as manual scavenging or the 
devadasi system as feminist issues and have ignored the caste-dimensions of the violence 
and poverty that afflict dalit women. Moreover, the predominant theoretical orientation 
guiding the mainstream movement seems to dismiss the relevance of caste to the analysis 
of patriarchy and to feminist activism. As Seema pointed out, while gender and class are 
analyzed as variables affecting power and opportunity in society, “the caste perspective is 
not there [among feminists]…they will think that a dalit woman suffers inequality 
because she is a woman and is poor…Mainstream feminism will say that its class, not 
caste.”
462
 Seema claimed that the “mainstream women’s movement doesn’t want to see 
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caste [emphasis mine],” thereby implying that the neglect of caste is not only rooted in 
ignorance, but also in the interest of caste privilege.  
According to Ruth, for dalit feminists, caste was “the central thing,” without 
which patriarchy, constructions of gender, and class inequality could not be understood. 
Ruth recounted that she “told them [mainstream feminists], the women in India, leave 
alone dalit women, any women will not be liberated…unless they bring in an analysis of 
caste to the analysis of oppression in India.” Without examining the primacy of caste in 
practices of privilege and discrimination, Ruth declared, even dominant caste women’s 
“liberation is not full; their liberation is not possible.” “I think the general feminist 
movement did not understand this,” she added, “because they are not in a position to 
understand it.” Feminists who inhabited a position of caste privilege, failed to create an 
ideological platform wide enough to advocate for and represent those, who are, as Seema 
said, “at the bottom of the bottom.” 
The description of the Indian women’s movement provided in Nandita Gandhi 
and Nandita Shah’s Issues at Stake: Theory and Practice in the Contemporary Women’s 
Movement in India illustrates the gaps and shortcomings of the mainstream feminist 
activism in India.
463
 The authors, two prominent activists, visited over a score of 
women’s organizations across the country.
464
 The resulting exposition includes accounts 
                                                                                                                                                 
she was “not clear on the concepts” underpinning feminism. While made to feel embarrassed and ill-
prepared, Seema insisted that a documentary on caste in India, India Untouched, be shown in the seminar 
to ‘sensitize people who don’t think caste is there.” After the viewing, her fellow “students were stunned” 
and, according to Seema, they apologized for their earlier dismissal of her comments and questions.  
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 See Nandita Gandhi and Nandita Shah. The Issues at Stake: Theory and Practice in the Contemporary 
Women’s Movement (New Delhi: Kali for Women, 1991). While this text may seem dated, I use it because 
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of their own experiences as activists and serves as an archive of “experiences, ideas and 
issues” of the women’s movement.
465
 In their account, Gandhi and Shah assume a shared 
essence to the struggles women across India face and suggest that the Indian women’s 
movement represents the interests of all Indian women.
 466
  They posit an undifferentiated 
category of “the oppressed” and dismiss the significance of difference in organizing 
critique and struggle, consistently ignoring the intersectionality of gender, caste, and class 
in their discussions of sexism.
 467  
For example, in Gandhi and Shah’s recounting of their 
train travels across India, they describe their confrontations with “two types of 
chauvinism: the ‘shall I fill up your water bottle’ type of patronage and the cruder ‘ye hai 
aaj ki ladkiyan’ (these are the women of today) ridicule.” The authors do not recognize 
that the constructions of gender underlying both types of chauvinism are specific to caste. 
A dalit woman would not receive the “patronage” afforded to the middle-class and upper 
caste authors because she deviates from the ideal of femininity; only women fitting this 
ideal are protected and assisted by men. Similarly, while the authors highlight the 
“ridicule” they receive for traveling without a male companion, there is no mention that 




                                                                                                                                                 
note that she writes that sense of  “altruism” motivating her work on women’s issues. Compared to a 
principled approach to social justice, altruism seems lacking as a mode of engagement in activism.  
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 Shah and Gandhi write that “the woman’s movement in India has…put forward a hope and future which 
every woman can claim and gain strength from so she may work out, in her own way, her struggle for a 
better life and society.” See Shah and Gandhi, 14.    
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Gandhi and Shah fail to recognize caste as a significant social structure and do not 
incorporate it into their analysis of gender relations and patriarchy.
469
 For instance, while 
many of the victim/survivors of rape they discuss are from SC/ST communities, Gandhi 
and Shah do not address how caste status can make some women more vulnerable to 
sexual violence than others.  Although the authors concede that the “leadership of the 
women’s movement has remained predominantly middle-class,” they describe the 
movement as “multiclass”; they make no mention, however, of the caste backgrounds of 
either the leadership or participants in the movement.
470
  In their discussion of the 
“discriminatory practices” and “social taboos” that restrict “choice in livelihood,” Gandhi 
and Shah only account for the sexual division of labor and make no mention of caste, 
despite its continued impact on occupation.  Manual scavenging or other work 
traditionally performed by dalit women is overlooked and caste is not analyzed as a force 
that structures life options and opportunities. In Gandhi and Shah’s narrative, “Indian 
women” emerge as a largely undifferentiated and natural category.  The only reference to 
power relations among women is found in the explanation of the role of mothers-in-law 
in dowry-related violence; family structure, not a broader social structure, provides the 
only context for women acting as “agents” of patriarchy. Gandhi and Shah’s assumption 
of a shared oppression and unity among women not only undervalues differences among 
women, but also proves exclusionary.
471
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Gandhi and Shah’s account of the contemporary Indian feminist movement 
substantiates the feelings of exclusion and marginalization communicated to me by dalit 
women in their discussions of the mainstream women’s movement. The NFDW was 
created as a corrective to the mainstream movement. The organization provided the 
theoretical and ideological groundwork for the articulation of difference and for the 
construction of “dalit women” as a separate social category. Ruth argued that the 
assertion of dalit women’s difference was “a scholarly intervention into feminism.”
472
  
She recounts that the NFDW “did not start because we wanted to be an NGO. We wanted 
to do something…it’s a movement for the dalit women.” The NFDW primary goal was to 
create a foundation for the identity of dalit women and for advocacy on their behalf; 
exposing and publicizing the “specific issues” and “specific human rights violations” 
affecting dalit women was a central part of this work.  The NFDW not only challenged 
the dominant analysis guiding the Indian women’s movement, but also worked to 
dislodge the upper caste and middle class women’s movement as the sole voice of 
“Indian feminism” in international forums.  
The NFDW conceptualized dalit women’s difference not only in terms of a 
difference in social position and the differential burdens of gender, class and caste, but 
also as a cultural difference.  For example, the claim that dalits are the “indigenous 
people” of India anchors the idea of difference in a past that is imagined as historically 
distinct from that of other groups in India.
473
  As the original inhabitants of India, the 
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marginalized communities in India and helped them argue their interests: “Today, Muslim women are 
saying that ‘our category is much different’…So, we have paved the way for other women’s movement to 
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NFDW contended, the “Brahmanic caste system is alien to our history”; dalits therefore 
refused to be “co-opted…by any other history or culture.”
474
 The NFDW argued the 
“dalit cultural heritage” was an “egalitarian” one that consequently 
 
provided a template 
for being and acting in modernity
 475  
This heritage, it claims,  was a resource for 
confronting contemporary threats - primarily from Hindutva and globalization - to the 
“sovereign, socialist, secular and democratic” foundation of the nation-state. The NFDW 
suggests that a return to dalit values would facilitate the development of humanistic 
principles and the trajectory of modernity, at least as it is imagined by the Indian 
Constitution.
 476
 Furthermore, the NFDW argued that “dalit cultural heritage” enabled an 
urgent and necessary critique not offered by even progressive lines of reasoning. It 
contended that while Gandhian, Nehruvian, and Marxist ideologies were unable to 
analyze the effects of Hindutva and liberalization on “traditional oppressive structures,” 
the traditions of dalit reasoning could; these traditions also served as a corrective to these 
ideologies.
477
 The NFDW argues that there is need to “bring to the forefront the traditions 
of Jotirao Phule, Ayyankali, Periyar and Babasaheb Ambedkar.”  The organization 
suggests that revering these heroes and revitalizing their worldviews would counter the 
impact of Hindutva and globalization on both pre-existing and relatively new structures 
of inequality and provide a path to a more egalitarian and humanistic modernity. 
The claim of dalit women’s difference also has immediate and practical 
implications. It makes dalit women visible to the state and demands that the state not 
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“subsume them [dalit women] under the general category of women”; it therefore, serves 
as an intervention into the state’s governing practices. If dalit women constitute a 
separate population, governmental and non-governmental institutions would have to 
produce specific knowledge about their conditions. The NFDW has called for 
disaggregated information on the mortality, morbidity, literacy, and education of dalit 
women because this data would have direct implications for policies and funding for 
development, social services, and reservations.  
The assertion of difference and the specificity of dalit women’s interests were 
initially criticized by prominent feminists. Ruth recalled being accused of “dividing the 
women’s movement” when she started working to establish the NFDW in the late 1980s. 
She, however, strongly rejected such characterizations:  
I said we are not dividing. In fact, we live in divided cherries in India. We live in 
divided slums…Why we live in cherries? Cherries are full of filth, full of dirt. 
Why are we living in this, living in divided cherries, busthies.  In India, the 
woman’s movement did not talk about this [and] did not raise these issues. Now, 
when we want to organize…[they] are saying that you are dividing the women. 
We live in a divided world. In our country, the dalits are the fourth world.   
 
At a time when “third-world feminists” were arguing against the dominance of Western 
feminism and its claims of representing all women, Ruth employed the same critique to 
counter the assumptions of prominent Indian feminists. She called attention to the 
mainstream movement’s neglect of relations of power among Indian women: some 
Indian women were in positions of power due to their caste and class position, while 
other women lived in the “fourth world,” oppressed by the social forces that afforded 
privilege to other women.  Caste divides women and alters the effects of patriarchy, 
resulting in women’s divergent experiences of gender subordination.    
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Dalit feminism, Ruth contended, emerged from the particularities of dalit 
women’s experiences of subordination; it put the experiences of dalit women at the center 
of analysis and developed its critiques and prescriptions based on these experiences.  
Ruth explained to me that “dalit feminism talks from our own experiences and pain 
and…our suffering.”  Disparities in class, gender, and caste inequality engender a 
difference in “consciousness.” Ruth regards this “consciousness” as a “subaltern 
consciousness,” one that is not only non-elite, but also radically different and 
independent.
 478  
She employed this distinction in consciousness not only to reinforce dalit 
women’s difference, but also to assert that dalit women contest ideologies of caste 
inequality and that their worldviews and aspirations diverge from those in more dominant 
social positions.
479
  As stated by many dalit feminists, dalit women’s worldviews and 
aspirations embody a universalist and humanist spirit which enable them to be more 
promising visionaries of social change. As one activist said to me,  
I am from a dalit community and I am a woman. Dalit among dalits. I am at a 
place where I can see the society…No one can see from the upper top….I have 
faced all these hurdles…only a dalit woman can see society from caste, class and 
patriarchy perspective…Feminism is equality, equity, justice and peace for all. 
Dalit women are the ones who…have the ability to analyze [how society works]. 
 
The idea that those who are the most oppressed, those who have experienced life at the 
“bottom of the bottom,” are endowed with a unique perspective on the whole was echoed 
by other dalit activists.  Ruth suggested that dalit women’s position in society enables a 
critique that allows for the imagining of a more complete egalitarianism. “If feminism is 
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non-hierarchal, if feminism is ecological, if feminism is non-patriarchal,” she said, “then 
dalit women know much better than anybody else.”  Dalit women’s experiences rouse a 
vision and desire for social justice that may elude those more privileged.  Ruth seemed to 
claim that dalit women are the true possessors of the humanist values of modernity and 
can be more effective architects of change and progress than the “forward classes” and 
the elite of NGOs.   As Ruth succinctly stated, “those who are very comfortable…they 




The assertion of ‘difference’ by dalit feminists also provides a basis for imagined 
and actualized alliances across nation-state borders. Activists have found that dalit 
women’s difference in structural position is a social phenomenon shared by other 
communities of women; the attendant exclusion and marginalization – in both society at 
large and in social justice movements – that accompanies this difference has also been 
deemed similar to that experienced by other women outside of India. For example, Ruth 
spoke to me about the similarity in structural position between dalit women in India and 
black women in the U.S. and the exclusion of both groups from their home country’s 
women’s movements.  “Black women are much poorer [than white women], living [in] 
the ghettos…[they have] similar lifestyles as the dalits,” she said.  “The white feminists 
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don’t address racism. It is central, crucial to the issue,” she added, “It is the same [in 
India]…We [dalit feminists] go very much along with black feminism.” In a published 
interview, Ruth spoke more about similarities between dalit feminists and black 
feminists:  
I was influenced by the Black women’s movement in America. I was looking at 
why these Black women were organizing themselves differently. Why were they 
separate? Then, I understood the racist notions of purity and pollution that 
operates there. Just like our situation, the Black women don’t have leadership in 
the mainstream women’s movement. The White women were not going to solve 
the problems of Black women…They not only wrote about the racist inequality, 
but they spoke about the class struggle, they outlined the economic oppression, 
the absence of land and resources. There are so many connections between the 
Dalits and the Blacks.
481
     
 
I suggest that the “connections” that Ruth identified constitute what Mohanty 
conceptualizes as “‘imagined communities’ of Third World oppositional struggles.”
482
  
Mohanty proposes this term to advance her ideal of transnational feminism. The alliances 
that Mohanty envisions are not based on essentialist notions of identity, biological or 
social, but rather, are constructed through a shared politics.  As she writes, “It is not color 
or sex that constructs the grounds for these struggles. Rather, it is the way we think about 
race, class and gender.”
483
 Ruth implies that dalit feminists and black feminists are, in 
Mohanty’s terms, “imagined communities of women with divergent histories and social 
locations, woven together by the political threads of opposition to forms of domination 
that are not only pervasive but also systemic.”
484
 While the particulars of the histories and 
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relations that affect both groups diverge, Ruth discerned a similar configuration of 
structural inequality shaping the lives of both black and dalit women. She and other dalit 
activists also find that their understanding of social justice is shared with black 
feminists.
485
 For Ruth and other dalit feminists, cross-border solidarity with groups 
similarly marginalized in their home societies serves as a source of support and a 
resource with which to project a vision of social justice and rights, a vision that is distinct 
from that of the mainstream Indian women’s movement.  
This kind of transnationalism – one rooted in shared convictions and solidarity in 
struggle – can be found in earlier dalit women’s associations. For example, Mahila Samta 
Sainik Dal (League for Women’s Soldiers for Equality), a dalit feminist group active in 
the 1970s, saw their struggle for equality and liberation as part of the same struggle 
pursued oceans away by Angela Davis.
486
 The MSSD Manifesto declared a “fight for 
equality” and announced that its members have “become soldiers in this fight” to 
“destroy [the caste system]” and liberate women “enslaved by the social structure.”
487
 
The Manifesto suggested a cultural basis for both gender and caste oppression. It located 
gender subordination in constructions of male sexuality and desire, arguing that “men 
have kept women deprived of freedom and apart from knowledge and have made them 
slaves only for sexual pleasure.”
488
 In the MSSD analysis, religion, and its “ideology of 
natural inequality,” legitimized exploitation based on both caste and gender. The 
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Manifesto urged women to renounce the model of “Rama, who made his pregnant wife 
leave the house” as an “ideal” and instead follow the models of the Buddha, Mahatma 
Phule, Savitribai Phule, and Babasaheb Ambedkar.
489
  Despite the specificity in 
constructs and ideologies subordinating women and the lower castes in India, the MSSD 
saw themselves in solidarity with Angela Davis and as part of the same historical 
struggle:  
Those who rebel against slavery, the Dalits who aim for freedom, the adivasis and 
toilers are our brothers. We are battling for equality along with men in the 
liberation war for human liberation called for by Dr. Ambedkar. This is history. 
And so we wish every success to the workers in the American women’s liberation 




In the MSSD manifesto “history” advances towards social equality; it is marked by the 
dissolution of structures of oppression and the inclusion of an ever widening group of 
people into an egalitarian order and freedom from structures of oppression.
 
 Dr. 
Ambedkar, the MSSD, and Angela Davis are visionaries and leaders in this historical 
struggle for radical and revolutionary change.
491
 Despite the differences in context, they 
are united by their rejection of reform and their shared goal of “human liberation.” The 
MSSD projects a clear internationalist vision for the empowerment and emancipation of 
all marginalized communities. By imagining solidarity with Angela Davis and the 
“workers in the American women’s liberation movement,” the MSSD connected those 
most excluded in India to a global community and incorporated their cause into a global 
and historical struggle.  
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The imagining of a struggle shared with women fighting from the margins of their 
home societies, namely African American feminists, recurs in the recent history of dalit 
feminist activism.  In 2002, the Alisamma Women’s Collective circulated a statement 
about dalit women’s difference from other Indian women that evoked the history of black 
women’s struggle in the American feminist movement.
492
 The statement was directed to 
the mainstream Indian women’s movement and was delivered on International Women’s 
Day at the University of Hyderabad and circulated electronically soon after. It singled out 
“Hindu women and non-dalit women” and demanded that they “recognize [that the] 
Indian female community is stratified by [a] castist patriarchal system.” It argued that it 
was “not just male domination,” but also a “castist patriarchy” that was at play in India 
and that the caste system made the unity of Indian women an impossibility.  It stated: 
We ask you to rethink. We want you to acknowledge the political importance of 
‘difference,’ i.e., heterogeneity, that exists among Indian female community. That 
you are made as we are mutilated. You are put on a pedestal, whereas we are 





In my reading, the italized section part of the statement follows a pattern of constructing 
comparisons and relations found in the most publicized version of Sojourner Truth’s 
famous speech, “Ain’t I A Woman.” The section of Truth’s speech that can be found 
reverberating in the Collective’s statement illustrates how the privileges that come with 
white womanhood are not extended to black women. Truth shows how the work of 
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racism and sexism positions black and white women differently and precludes a singular 
agenda for social justice. For example, in her speech, she says 
That man over there says that women need to be helped into carriages, and lifted 
over ditches, and to have the best place everywhere. Nobody ever helps me into 
carriages, or over mud-puddles, or gives me any best place! And ain't I a woman? 
Look at me! Look at my arm! I have ploughed and planted, and gathered into 
barns, and no man could head me! And ain't I a woman? I could work as much 
and eat as much as a man - when I could get it - and bear the lash as well! And 
ain't I a woman? I have borne thirteen children, and seen most all sold off to 
slavery, and when I cried out with my mother's grief, none but Jesus heard me! 
And ain't I a woman?  
 
An intertextual reading of the Collective’s statement – an intertextual reading that focuses 
on the structure of the argument – can reveal how the meanings attributed to a dalit 
feminist subjectivity are derived through an analogy to Sojourner Truth’s description of 
the predicaments of black womanhood.  The Collective’s statement contains Sojourner’s 
Truth’s critique of how racism stratifies women in society. Truth shows the complexities 
of a feminist politics in a situation where, on one hand, white women struggled against 
assumptions of frailty and fought for rights in the public sphere, and on the other, black 
women struggled against the exploitation of their labor, never receiving the comforts that 
come with being considered frail.   
This provides a subtext to the Collective’s assertion that caste inequality thwarts a 
singular Indian feminist perspective. While caste-Hindu women are made socially 
respectable, dalit women are exploited, denied respectability, and rendered sexually 
available. This subtext also evokes the centrality of violence in the constitution of dalit 
women’s subjectivity.  Through an analogy to the predicaments and structural position of 
black women in the United States, the Alisamma Women’s Collective then exposes the 
entanglements of caste and patriarchy in the subordination of dalit women and highlights 
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how racism and castism produce different forms of subordination and disparities in 
privileges.  This then aligns the Alisamma Women’s Collective with a broader 
community of women – a community that shares a similar form of “difference” and 
marginalization – and also indicts the mainstream Indian women’s movement for its 
failure to recognize difference and critically evaluate its emancipatory project. 
 
“Will You Be Our Sisters?” 
The “prostitute” has historically been a central figure in dalit and non-brahmin 
movements for rights and respect.
494
 In this section, I discuss how dalit feminists have 
approached the issue of one particular form of caste-based “prostitution” – that of the 
devadasi system – and how it has been represented to international audiences.
 495
 I 
analyze the translation of the devadasi system in contemporary human rights campaigns 
and argue that it is interpreted to fall within recognizable categories of women’s 
exploitation and human rights violations. This translation aids both the international 
visibility of caste-based oppression and the development of transnational alliances for 
dalit feminists.  The devadasi system appears in human rights campaigns through the 
dialectic of traditional oppression and modern violations: it is written about in either the 
language of ritual and timeless tradition or the modern-day crisis of the sexual trafficking 
of women. These campaigns often include survivor testimonies from former devadasis; 
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the testimonies, however, seem to exceed the descriptors used to translate the practice. 
Former devadasis do not provide instrumentalist renderings of suffering nor are their 
narratives geared towards specific political projects; rather, they illustrate a world of 
limited opportunities for education and advancement, of rural poverty, and of loss and 
isolation that do not easily map onto the picture of ritual or sexual slavery drawn by 
activists.  I will conclude my discussion by suggesting that a dalit feminist perspective on 
the devadasi system reveals the gaps of both dominant Indian and global feminist 
activism around prostitution. 
Priyadarshini Vijaisri examines different forms of “sacred prostitution” during the 
colonial period and charts reformist interventions and changes in the perception and 
occurrence of the custom.
496
 She notes that prior to the colonial period, the term 
“devadasi,” though frequently used in ancient sources, was not in wide currency. Rather, 
multiple local terms, such as Sule, Sani, Matangi, Jogatis, and Basavai, were more 
commonly used. Each term indexed a particular caste identity and position in the temple 
structure but these differences were collapsed as the “sanskritized term Devadasi gained 
popular currency and was deployed by the intelligentsia in their conscious reformist 
endeavor at recasting the temple prostitute.”
497
  While the colonial state did not initiate 
legislative changes to the practice, colonial interpretations of the system shaped Hindu 
socio-religious reformist discourse on the practice. Cast as a custom that, in ancient 
times, was related to rituals of piety and performed by virgins, the devadasi system was 
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assumed to have undergone a “process of moral degeneration” following the rise of 
Muslim political dominance in India.  The colonial interpretation assumed that with 
“foreign conquest and eventually decadent standards of morality, the religiosity of the 
temple disappeared and temple women became ordinary prostitutes.”
498
 
Reformist condemnation of the devadasi system rested on this interpretation. The Brahmo 
Samaj, Arya Samaj, and Ramkrishna Mission were among the groups spearheading the 
reformist movement and as Vijaisri shows, were driven by the goal of resuscitating 
Hinduism and restoring purity and morality to its customs. The devadasi was to be 
domesticated, purified and metamorphosed into the ‘new woman.’
499
 These reform 
efforts, however, did not explicitly incorporate the caste-based dimensions of the 
practice.   
Jotirao Phule, however, argued to the police commissioner of the Bombay 
Presidency that most of the girls dedicated into the system were dalit girls and that the 
state should thus legally intervene to stop the practice. In non-brahman and dalit 
movements, as in Hindu socio-religious reform endeavors, the temple prostitute was also 
to be domesticated. In these movements, however, reform of the devadasi system was not 
part of an attempt to revitalize religious tradition, but rather, was part of the project to 
uplift low caste women and consequently, their communities, to proper standards of 
respectability. For example, in the early twentieth century, Shivaram Janaba Kamble 
preached against the dedication of girls and also asked members of the community to 
marry devadasis. His advocacy of marriage to devadasis can be seen as an attempt to both 
remove the social stigma attached to these women and achieve respectability in 
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accordance with upper caste standards.
500
 The Victorian ideology of social purity, evident 
in Hindu socio-religious reform discourse, can be discerned here as well. As mentioned 
in the last chapter, Ambedkar refused to allow Murlis, a community of devadasis, to 
convert to Buddhism. He admonished the Murlis for their shameful work, viewed them as 
a stain on the respectability of the community, and demanded that they give up their only 
source of livelihood.  From the 1920s and 1930s onwards, the devadasis were seen as a 
shameful impediment to the empowerment of the community; as Vijaisri writes, the 
devadasi was cast as a “deviant female whose very survival was lethal for the pride and 
vitality of the community.”
501
  
In contemporary human rights campaigns, the devadasi system appears as a 
traditional oppression that results in modern human rights violations. In statements 
circulated internationally by dalit activists, local terms such as jogini are glossed as the 
devadasi system, suggesting that it is a closed, static, and clearly structured cultural 
mechanism that subordinates women. The practice is represented as the 
“infamous…temple prostitution system” in which “little prepubescent girls are dedicated 
to the goddess” and then “raped by temple priests and then any man who wishes to do 
so.”
502
 An aura of timeless tradition and mysterious ritual exudes from this description.  
Ruth has argued at an international conference that the devadasi system is a “cult which 
is sanctioned by the Hindu religion.”
503
 Another statement circulated internationally 
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states that the practice takes place “secretly” and sexually exploits dalit women under the 
“guise of religious custom.”
504
 The practice is also often referred to as “ritualized 
prostitution in temples.” The key terms and their associations describing the devadasi 
system frame the practice for global audiences in a manner reminiscent of first-world 
feminist critiques of “barbaric” cultural practices such as female circumcision/ 
infibulation and foot-binding. For example, terms such as “secretly,” “cult,” and “guise” 
link to ideas of irrational and perverse customs driven by a primitive cultural logic. The 
meanings ascribed to the devadasi system in international campaigns draw from the 
genres of representation that have historically been successful in gaining attention from 
the West, especially from feminists in the West.  
In addition to the condemnation of the devadasi system as a barbaric tradition 
used to uphold pre-modern relations of power and entitlement, human rights campaigns 
also draw from the discourse around the modern problem of the sexual trafficking of 
women.  In these discussions, “temple prostitution” links up with commercial 
prostitution. “The Devadasi system,” the NFDW argued at 2001 World Conference 
Against Racism, “forces 5000 to 15,000 girls to be secretly auctioned every year in the 
commercial sex market into a distinct form of ritually sanctioned prostitution that is 
centuries old.”  The girls are also “eventually auctioned secretly into urban brothels for 
prostitution.” The use of the verb “auction” conjures associations with both the 
transatlantic slave trade and other forms of human trafficking. Interestingly, Anti-Slavery 
International, a London-based international NGO that traces its history to the late 
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eighteenth and nineteenth century Anti-Slavery Society which campaigned for the 
abolition of slavery in the British Empire, campaigns today for the eradication of the 
devadasi system, which it describes as “ritualized slavery.” Moreover, activists have 
explicitly stated that the devadasi system is a form of “trafficking in women” and 
constitutes “forced prostitution.”
505
 Borrowing from the international discourse on anti-
trafficking, this conceptualization of the devadasi system also employs a crude concept of 
agency which erases the impact of structural inequality on the choices and opportunities 
for survival available to dalit women. As Jo Doezema argues, the denial of agency to the 
“third-world prostitute” is critical to first-world feminist anti-trafficking campaigns; the 
“‘third world’ sex worker is presented as backward, innocent and above all helpless – in 
need of rescue.”
506
  First-world recognition and funding is critical for dalit activists; the 
translation of the devadasi system as a form of sexual trafficking helps gain international 
visibility for the situation of dalit women in India.   
The translation of the devadasi system into terms that are recognizable to global 
audiences has also enabled solidarity with a larger, global community of activists and 
survivors of violence and has brought support to women who have endured the 
exploitation and exclusion of devadasi work. A critical analytical intervention in the 
translation of “devadasi” by Ruth Manorama has facilitated this solidarity and support. 
Manorama had argued that the devadasi system could not be seen as equivalent to 
prostitution and that the devadasi system could only be properly analyzed as part of a 
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social hierarchy where sexual exploitation is a mechanism of caste inequality.  Manorama 
deemed the devadasi system functionally equivalent to the rape of dalit women by upper 
caste men: both were a manifestation of caste-based subordination that “results in the 
violent appropriation of and sexual control over Dalit women by men of the dominant 
castes” and both maintained “the patriarchal caste complex,” in part by rendering the dalit 
male powerless to protect the sexual respectability of dalit women.
507
   
By calling attention to how caste is inscribed in sexual relations, whether paid or 
unpaid, Manorama showed how the devadasi system is both a product of caste hierarchy 
and a cultural mechanism for its perpetuation. Therefore, the sexual labor provided by 
devadasis, Manorama argued, is not comparable to prostitution. As she stated, there is a 
clear “nexus between being an untouchable and prostitution” and this precludes an 
analysis of prostitution that ignores caste.
508
 Mainstream feminist organizations in India 
have neglected this dimension and therefore, as Manorama claimed, they cannot 
competently advocate for dalit women. Manorama recounted a study she conducted of a 
rehabilitation program run by Catholic nuns for devadasis in rural areas of Karnataka.  
While Manorama found that the “sisters” were both empowering the devadasis and 
making their lives “a little better,” other feminists condemned the rehabilitation program 
on “moralistic grounds.” As Manorama recalled, “the upper caste women said, ‘all these 
sisters are converting them, changing their lives.’” These women took issue not only with 
the religious background of the individuals running the rehabilitation scheme, but also the 
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ideology underlying the project.  They called for viewing the devadasi’s labor as 
legitimate work, asking, as Manorama recounted, “‘What is wrong with selling their 
bodies? .... If we are able to sell our minds, why shouldn’t they be able to sell their 
bodies?’”  
Manorama explained her response: “So I said ‘everybody, everyone can sell their 
body very easily. Why we don’t sell our bodies? Why they have to sell their bodies?” By 
highlighting the internal stratifications among women, Manorama underscored the 
significance of caste-based power relations to any assessment of prostitution in India. 
While the dominant discussion of prostitution framed it as either legitimate work or a 
form of violence, Manorama illustrated the need to incorporate other social categories 
into the assessment of prostitution: who does the prostituting, she argued, was as critical 
in the evaluation as any theoretical perspective on women’s bodies and their work.  
According to Manorama, the devadasi system must be analytically separated from other 
forms of sex work. She argued that women working in prostitution can “make money”; 
they can “make two rupees or…thirty lakhs… [depending on] class background, where 
you are put in, what kind of skin you have, what kind of features you have.” Devadasis, 
however, are mandated to provide sexual services and are not paid. According to 
Manorama, “even though they sell their bodies every day, they are not even given a 
penny because the village landlords, village upper caste people think that these women 
are meant only for us. They have to do a free service.” 
Manorama argued that although the devadasi system is legitimized through 
“religious symbols and paradigms,” it can only be understood in terms of both the 
subordination of women in society and a system of social hierarchy that encourages the 
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sexual appropriation of dalit women by upper caste men. The power and entitlement of 
the upper castes over others in society is inscribed in the functioning of the system. This 
form of sex work does not fall within the understandings of prostitution offered in the 
mainstream women’s movement.  Manorama’s conceptualization of it as “free sexual 
labor,” however, has enabled the use of different categories of analysis to make sense of 
the practice.  The emphasis on a caste-inflected difference transforms the sex work of the 
devadasi system into an obligatory “free service” that was located within a social 
hierarchy where sexual exploitation is a mechanism of social inequality.  Manorama used 
this conceptualization of the devadasi system to forge an equivalence between the sexual 
labor performed by devadasis and that by comfort women, women from occupied 
territories that were forced to provide sexual services to the Japanese military during 
World War II:    
devadasis provide free sexual labor. I equated this with free military sexual labor 
in the case of Korean women, Korean women for the Japanese…Comfort 
women…I took one of the devadasi women to a tribunal conducted in Japan in 
1994….Tribunal was on sexual slavery. Women being enslaved by Japanese men. 
The Korean, Filipino, wherever the Japanese military went. Comfort women. I 
then saw [that devadasis are like] comfort women in the name of religion for the 
upper caste.  
 
The tribunal that Manorama refers to is the Asia Tribunal on Women’s Human Rights 
held in Tokyo in March, 1994. Sponsored by the Asian Women’s Human Rights Council, 
the tribunal focused on “traffic in women, military sexual slavery and other war crimes 
on Asian women,” and sought to both provide “new spaces for women to speak, to 
challenge, and to be heard”; it aimed to publicize “crimes against women which have 





 The tribunal included testimonies from survivors/victims of these 
“crimes” as well as statements from activists, lawyers and scholars. Kim Bok-Dong and 
Victoria Canlas Lopez, former “comfort women” from Korea and the Philippines, and 
Babamma Basappa, a former devadasi from Manvi, Karnataka, testified about their 
experiences at the tribunal. Kim Bok-Dong and Victoria Canlas Lopez were both 
imprisoned and forced to provide sexual services for the Japanese military in the early 
1940s.
 
Babamma Basappa, who accompanied Ruth to Tokyo, became a devadasi while 
she was still a child. Her father died when she was seven years old and her mother 
dedicated her into the system soon after. Babamma provided sexual services for men of 
her community until she joined a rehabilitative program for devadasis run by Catholic 
nuns. The three women, Kim Bok-Dong, Victoria Canlas Lopez, and Babamma Basappa, 
provided testimony on the physical and emotional traumas incurred as sexual service 
providers. Despite differences in age, context and geographical location, the grouping of 
the three women suggested an implicit parallel between dalit women and colonized 
women. 
The tribunal brought together the two issues of trafficking in women and war 
crimes against women under one conceptual frame, one which highlighted the loss of 
bodily integrity and agency in both experiences.  The tribunal served as a space from 
which activists from fifteen countries along with the former devadasi and comfort women 
could broadcast their vision of feminism and human rights. The participants at the 
tribunal announced that this vision was from a distinctly “South perspective,” one that put 
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the experiences of marginalized women at the center of analysis and activism.
510
  As 
stated by one of the activists at the conference, “it is from the edges that the women are 
speaking, knowing that from the margins of power, we see the world differently. We 
need to find a new terrain, walking with other people on the edges– the indigenous, the 
dalits, the disabled and the dispossessed.”
511
  This “new terrain” is supported through the 
transnational alliances created by the gathering of women in Tokyo.
 512
  The alliances 
traversed “edges” and margins and generated, as the activist stated, a “new political 
imagination” and “new historical possibilities.” The Tokyo Tribunal can thus be viewed 
as laying a foundation for a global feminist project that is constructed through alliances 
based on shared forms of violence and inequality.  
By identifying the devadasi system as “free sexual labor” and a form of sexual 
“slavery,” Manorama was able to get the caste-based practice on the agenda at the Tokyo 
Tribunal.
513
 This not only increased the international visibility of the practice, but also 
created a new space for activism around issues affecting dalit women. At the Tribunal, 
Ruth circulated a petition on behalf of forty-one devadasis which asked for “solidarity” in 
the “struggle against the trafficking and prostitution of young girls and women in the 
name of religion.”
514
  As the spokesperson for devadasis back in India, Manorama asked 
the audience of activists and survivors gathered at the tribunal, “will you be our sisters?”  
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Left without representation and advocacy by the mainstream Indian women’s movement, 
Manorama looked abroad for ‘sisterhood” and solidarity.  Here, sisterhood is not based 
on a shared essence or identity, but rather on a shared structural position, shared human 
rights violations, and a shared political vision. 
One of the stated goals of the tribunal was “to generate support from the national 
and international public for the victims and survivors”; towards this end, the Tribunal 
provided a space for Babamma, Kim Bok-Dong and Victoria Canlas Lopez, to speak 
about their experiences and aspirations.
515
 As many scholars have pointed out, survivor 
testimonies also play a role in authenticating the claims of activists at events such as the 
Tokyo Tribunal. Meg McLagan argues that survivor testimonies have become an 
essential part of human rights practice; testimony “has become a transnational cultural 
form, one that plays a crucial role in almost every human rights campaign.”
516
  Expressed 
“through the idiom of suffering,” testimony establishes “claims for recognition and 
redress on the basis of one’s humanity.”
517
  
Babamma told her life story, replete with accounts of the adversity, pain, and 
suffering she had endured. Her story, however, was contextualized by Ruth’s statement 
and that of other activists/experts.  This contextualization helped fit Babamma’s narration 
of suffering into the frame of the conference. It seemed that in order for Babamma’s 
narrative to authenticate and confirm the arguments of activists/experts, it had to be 
translated from the category of experience into the category of testimony. This seems to 
have been done not only through the mediation provided by context, but also through the 
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use of descriptors such as “ritual” and “forced prostitution.” These terms activate 
meanings which map onto pre-established arenas of human rights violations and global 
feminist interventions and thus mediate the comprehension of survivor/victims’ 
narratives.  
Although scholars have found that testimonies in human rights campaigns often 
offer instrumentalist renderings of violence and suffering, I found that Babamma’s 
testimony actually exceeded the terms framing it. Babamma’s story imparted more than 
what activists/experts ascribed to it; her testimony provided a surplus of meaning which 
spilled beyond the parameters used to contextualize and produce meaning from her 
experiences. For example, in Babamma’s testimony, work as a devadasi is not part of 
closed cultural system, but rather is very much affected by external factors such as 
poverty and opportunities for advancement. Babamma illustrated how poverty, more than 
“ritual,” was the predominant causal factor in her entrance into the devadasi system.  
Babamma was her parents’ only child and after her father died, her mother dedicated her 
because she did not want her to marry and join another family. Here, poverty and the 
more general structure of gender relations in India where a girl’s marriage is deemed a 
loss of labor and financial burden to her family provide a critical context for 
understanding Babamma’s work as a devadasi.  As Babamma explained to the tribunal, 
“The devadasi system is forced on poor girls who have to accept it precisely because of 
poverty….Some educated girls do not follow the devadasi practice instead they prefer to 
work in the fields and the mills.” Although poverty and limited opportunities for 
education are central foci of dalit feminist activities, locally and nationally, they are 
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largely omitted in the context for the devadasi system in international human rights 
campaigns and replaced by “ritual,” “trafficking,” and/or “forced prostitution.”    
Babamma’s testimony in Tokyo included a description of how the devadasi 
system functioned and an account of critical experiences and events in her life.  Her 
account significantly departs from the description of the devadasi system as forced 
prostitution directed by upper caste men in temples.  Babamma explained that life as a 
devadasi is initiated with a “ceremonial puja,” after which upper caste men negotiate 
payments with the parents of the girl. Once it is decided “whether payment would be in 
full or installment,” the men “would start having regular sexual intercourse with the 
girls.” Babamma worked as both a laborer and a devadasi. Describing the violence and 
anguish she experienced, she stated that  
At night we have to share our bodies with the men who work with us as coolies 
during the day. We are treated like animals and sometimes beaten up. We are like 
wives imprisoned within four walls. Even if the men see the children born out of 
our relationship with them, they don’t show any care or love for them. Our 
children do not have the right to use their father’s name.  
 
The analogy to the “wives” in terms of the denial of mobility is striking in 
Babamma’s testimony.  Babamma also explained that “the men who had relations with us 
did not always keep their promises.” Babamma had three children – two girls and one 
boy – with a “Muslim driver” who gave her money regularly. When his wife found out 
about their relationship, however, the payments ceased. The driver soon after died in a 
car accident, leaving Babamma without any support.   
After the death of the driver, Babamma began having sexual relations with her 
maternal uncle who, as she describes, “was a drunkard.” Babamma’s discussion of her 
uncle and the events related to him provide the climax in her testimony.  When Babamma 
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received a bank loan to buy cattle, her uncle made claims to half of the money. One 
evening, he came to her house with a friend and demanded the money, but then suddenly 
collapsed and died. Babamma and her mother were blamed for his death and arrested and 
detained by the police. “We were beaten up by the police,” Babamma said, “who have no 
respect for devadasis.” A catholic priest and nun who had been working with devadasis in 
Manvi posted bail for Babamma and her mother. Although an autopsy later found that 
Babamma was not to blame for her uncle’s death and that he had died of a heart attack, 
the incident was emotionally, socially, physically, and financially damaging: “After the 
incident, no man ever came to my house. We were completely isolated. I used to cry a lot 
after the incident which also resulted in a lot of psychological problems for me. I was 
sent to a doctor for treatment and then to a convent in Poona.” 
The story about her uncle and his death is the central episode in Babamma’s 
testimony. Although Babamma’s status as a devadasi is at play in the sexual exploitation 
she experiences and the harassment she received from the police, her narrative does not 
bear close resemblance to activists/experts’ representations of the devadasi system as 
“ritual” or “trafficking”/”forced prostitution.” 
Babamma’s crisis finds resolution through the intervention of the Catholic nuns 
working in Manvi. They help send Babamma to Poona and then, move her to a convent in 
Andhra Pradesh where her children can go to school. After hearing that her mother was 
ill, Babamma returned to Manvi, where she found work as a helper in the convent and 
enrolled her children in boarding school.  
After narrating this life story, Babamma discusses her own change in perspective 
and empowerment:   
238 
 
I now realize what a devadasi is. It is a heinous crime that robs a woman of her 
dignity as a human being. A woman’s group organized by the sisters had given 
me an orientation [on women’s rights] and advised me to give up being an 
devadasi. Other devadasis say that if they can earn 300 rupees (US $10) a month 
in a factory or anywhere, they would give up being a devadasi. Government, 
however, has not provided any help in rehabilitating these women. I ceased being 
a devadasi after I was made awareness [of what the practice was doing to me as a 
woman]….My dream is to help other devadasis change their lives so they may 
have a better future. Corrupt religious practices have made them victims. 
 
The reference to “corrupt religious practices” overlaps with some activists’ 
representations and may also show the influence of activist discourse on Babamma’s 
narrative. Babamma, however, seems to focus on the structural constraints on women’s 
agency.
 
She calls attention to the lack of government rehabilitation schemes and the 
inability of the government to offer women other ways to provide for themselves. Her 
discussion illustrates a world of few options for basic survival.   
 
******** 
In this chapter, I have tried to show how transnational alliances have offered dalit 
feminists a sense of solidarity and support and have also enabled activists to transcend the 
ideological limitations of mainstream social justice movements in India. Faced with 
inadequate representation by both the dalit movement and the mainstream women’s 
movement in India, dalit feminist activists have turned abroad for partnership in protest 
and advocacy as well as for sources of inspiration and hope. In these efforts, activists 
have strategically used the identity of dalit women to show how identity-based 
movements are inherently exclusive. Transnationalism makes these critiques more 
powerful and exposes the social injustice that recurs in social justice movements.  
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As an intellectual practice, transnationalism in this context has depended on the 
construction of analogies – on the discernment of similarity in both structural location 
and subjectivity – and on the imagining of a shared struggle and political vision.  These 
analogies have offered a means out of exclusion and isolation by fostering the imagining 
of empathy and solidarity.  These analogies also have pedagogical force. Analogies to 
African American women, South African women, or former comfort women make the 
injustice suffered by dalit women legible to a global audience. These analogies are not 
only instructive for the international human rights community, but perhaps also for dalit 





Ambedkar on the Women’s Question 
 
In all of my interviews with dalit activists, including dalit feminists, B.R. 
Ambedkar was consistently held up as the visionary responsible for illuminating the path 
to equality and liberation in political modernity. As one dalit feminist said, “Dr. 
Ambedkar has shown the way [for the liberation for dalit women].” Another activist said 
that “Ambedkar is kind of a demigod”; he “is a superhero for me.”  B.R. Ambedkar, born 
an untouchable from the Mahar community, dedicated his life to the political and social 
struggle against untouchability and caste.
 518
 Today he is esteemed by both men and 
women, feminist and anti-caste activists across India. While the feminist historian 
working on Ambedkar faces an intellectual responsibility to assess Ambedkar’s thoughts 
on women and gender relations through his own words, he or she must also contend with 
popular imaginings of Ambedkar as well as the continued marginalization of dalits in 
India.  Despite the attitudes espoused by the dalit feminists above, in my reading of 
Ambedkar’s writings and speeches, I have discerned an ambivalence towards dalit 
women. Furthermore, his prescriptions for dalit women seem surprisingly consistent with 
those of the dominant Hindu socio-religious reform movements of the time.
519
 While 
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Ambedkar denounces the most conspicuous and infamous patriarchal practices of the 
colonial era, namely sati, child marriage, and enforced widowhood, his critique of 
patriarchy is restricted to upper caste customs and is tangential to his critique of 
Brahmanism and caste.  
In this chapter, I offer a gendered reading of Ambedkar’s social and political 
thought, in part to explore the intellectual history inherited by contemporary dalit 
feminists. The sources I interpret, from an anthropology seminar paper presented at 
Columbia University in 1916 to the formulation of oaths for conversion to Buddhism in 
1956, span a period of forty years.
520
  Inconsistencies in thought surely surface in this 
corpus of writings and speeches. Nonetheless, what emerges consistently is that 
Ambedkar’s critique of patriarchy is both limited and strategic and his prescriptions for 
dalit women remain within the paradigm of nationalist-reformist ideals of respectability. I 
discern a tension between Ambedkar’s critique of social hierarchy and his desire for a 
strong and respectable dalit community, a tension which seemed to be resolved through 
the marginalization of dalit women. With Indian independence and the promulgation of 
the Indian Constitution, however, a subtle but meaningful change in thought about gender 
relations can be discerned in Ambedkar’s writings.  This change can be linked to the 
establishment of democracy and a legal and political framework that reflected 
Ambedkar’s commitment to the universalist ideals of equality and liberty.  As opposed to 
Ambedkar’s discussions of gender relations before 1950, his thoughts on the issue after 
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1950 can be categorized as feminist in that they represent the ideals of a particular kind of 
political modernity, one rooted in respect for the individual as social agent and equality 
before the law.  
 
Historiography 
Since the publication of the first biography of Ambedkar in 1954, Dhananjay 
Kheer’s Dr. Ambedkar: Life and Mission, Ambedkar’s life and thought has been a focus 
of study for historians, political scientists, scholars of religion, and others.
 521
  
Researchers, however, have only recently begun to analyze Ambedkar’s ideas on 
gender.
522
 Nearly all accounts of Ambedkar’s work begin by recounting his early 
experiences of caste-based discrimination. D.C. Ahir narrates the humiliating experiences 
Ambedkar endured from his early days in primary school, where he was forced to sit 
outside the classroom and denied water, to his days working as a lawyer, when he was 
harassed by his colleagues and prohibited from drinking common water.
523
 Ambedkar’s 
time abroad in New York and London has been described as a crucial experience that 
imparted a critical perspective on conditions in India. As Ambedkar himself recalled, 
“my five years of study in Europe and America had completely wiped out of my mind 
any consciousness that I was an untouchable and that an untouchable wherever he went in 
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India was a problem to himself and others.”
524
 While these experiences are recounted as 
formative moments in the development of Ambedkar’s cultural and political critique of 
caste, most accounts of his life do not discuss his relations with his family. At most, one 
finds brief mention of Ambedkar’s long friendship with Fanny Fitzgerald, a British 
woman he first met during his stay in London; Ambedkar’s second marriage to Sharda 
Kabir, a brahmin nurse, has begun to surface in biographical sketches.
525
  The influence 
of the significant dalit women in his life, such as his mother, who suffered an early death 
after giving birth to fourteen children, of whom only seven survived, his paternal aunt, or 
his first wife, Ramabai, however, has yet to be considered.
526
  
Gail Omvedt and Eleanor Zelliot have provided remarkable historical studies of 
the nineteenth century non-Brahman movements that influenced Ambedkar’s anti-caste 
and social reform work.
527
 These works demonstrate how the critique of Brahmanism 
formulated by Jotirao Phule and the Satyashodak Samaj provided an influential template 
for struggles against caste. Phule, along with his contemporaries and associate Tarabai 
Shinde, put forth powerful critiques of Brahmanism as patriarchy and advocated for the 
welfare of all women, those of upper and lower castes. Interestingly, while Ambedkar’s 
understanding of the intersection of caste and gender inequality seems to be influenced 
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by Phule, his ideas on women are less radical and contain patriarchal elements that Phule 
himself challenged during his life.
528
 
In the historiography on Ambedkar’s efforts to eradicate untouchability and caste, 
scholars often focus on Ambedkar’s divergence from M. K. Gandhi in the means and 
ends of social change.
529
  While Gandhi believed in the annihilation of untouchability, he 
saw virtue in the caste system as an ideal type – in the Weberian sense – of social 
organization.  He also conceptualized untouchability as a problem for the Hindu 
community that could only be resolved through the repentance of upper-caste Hindus.
530
 
Ambedkar, however, viewed the empowerment of dalits as a crucial element in creating 
social change and called for the immediate removal of caste-based encumbrances to their 
livelihood and dignity.   Towards this end, he organized a series of protests around 
specific practices of untouchability.  For example, the object of the 1927 Mahad 
Satayagraha was to secure dalits’ access to public water.  Omvedt sees it as “the 
foundation for the liberation struggle of Mahrastrian Dalits,” which also transformed into 
a “cultural challenge” to Hindu society.
531
  Protesters burned copies of the Manusmriti, 
which attracted the ire of the Hindu press, and demanded their rights to access public 
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  From 1930-1935, Ambedkar organized the Nasik Satyagraha for 
entry rights the Kalaram temple.  Ambedkar also worked to abolish the traditional 
responsibilities of the Mahar caste and organized a march of 25,000 Kunbi and Mahar 
peasant tenants against their Brahmin landlords in 1938. In her evaluation of these 
movements, Omvedt argues that Ambedkar targeted issues of civil rights and thus 
diverged from the “focus on personal virtue,” such as hygiene and vegetarianism, in 
Gandhi’s Harijan Sevak Sangh [Society for the Service of Harijans].
533
  A “focus on 
personal virtue,” however, can be discerned in Ambedkar’s prescriptions for dalit 
women.  While Ambedkar advocated for their participation in politics and public 
demonstrations, he was equally concerned with their habits, dress, and appearance. 
Scholarship on Ambedkar’s political work has focused on his dispute with 
Gandhi.
 534
  Ambedkar’s role as spokesperson for the Depressed Classes and his 
emergence into politics followed his successful mobilization of a group of educated 
Mahar men and upper caste reformers.
 535
 In 1920, he held the first Depressed Class 
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Conference and in 1926 he was nominated to the Legislative Council, where he 
sponsored a bill for access to a water tank in Mahad and supported for a bill for women’s 
maternity leave. Ambedkar’s efforts to secure separate electorates for the Depressed 
Classes and subsequent conflict with Gandhi, however, have been at the center of 
scholarship on Ambedkar’s political work during the colonial period. For Ambedkar, 
separate electorates were a key step in the development of the Depressed Classes into a 
formidable political force. Gandhi was resolutely opposed to this demand and after the 
colonial government granted separate electorates, he went on a fast till death to protest 
the decision, arguing that it would divide and devastate the Hindu community.  
Ambedkar was compelled to compromise. The Poona Pact, which overturned the 
Communal Award and replaced separate electorates with reserved seats in the general 
electorate, was a disappointment for Ambedkar and resulted in his lasting distrust of 
Gandhi.
536
   
In 1936, after the obstacles encountered during the Nasik Satyagraha and the 
disappointments of the Poona Pact, Ambedkar announced that while he may have been 
“born a Hindu,” he would “not die a Hindu.” Confrontations with caste Hindus and the 
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persistence of Brahmanic ideology and power led him to the realization that Hinduism 
itself had to be abandoned in order to restore dignity and rights to the Depressed Classes 
as well as to generate nationalist solidarity.  As Valarian Rodrigues writes, “one of 
Ambedkar’s most important arguments against Hinduism was that caste and 
untouchability did not let Hindus act as a community.”
537
 In 1956, just a few months 
before his death, Ambedkar officially renounced Hinduism and converted to Buddhism. 
Gauri Viswanathan argues that his conversion should not be read as a reaction to political 
obstacles, but rather as an attempt to formulate “alternative conceptions of nation and 
community” and “restore dalits an agency that untouchability had eroded.”
538
  Ambedkar 
searched for a religion that embraced the ideals of equality, liberty, and fraternity. He 
critiqued aspects of Buddhism that contradicted these ethical commitments and according 
to Omvedt, gave Buddhism a “‘liberation theology interpretation”
539
  This interpretation 
of Buddhism also embodies a feminist ethic. 
While historians and political scientists of India have analyzed Ambedkar’s ideas 
of caste, Jaffrelot argues that the “founding figures” of Indian anthropology, such as 
M.N. Srinivas and Louis Dumont have largely neglected Ambedkar’s understandings of 
the origin, regulation, and maintenance of caste.  Ambedkar’s analysis of the practice and 
ideology of caste emerges in various sources, including his histories of India.  His 
histories, Omvedt notes, demonstrate that caste has a historical social origin and thus also 
can have an end. Moreover, these histories impart the critical idea that “the action of the 
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oppressed and exploited could be effective” in accomplishing this end.
540
 As Rodrigues 
writes, Ambedkar employs the “resources that history and culture offered for an 




In addition to Ambedkar’s cultural challenge to Hindu society, his work on the 
Constitution and the Hindu Code Bill speak to his ultimate objective of the radical 
restructuring of social relations in India.  Anupama Rao argues that “the political 
language of rights and representation that had come to dominate dalit struggles at this 
point rendered the language of law and constitutionalism an important site for advocating 
changes within the structures of caste and gender.”
542
  Scholars have argued that 
Ambedkar’s legal work reveals his feminist commitments.
543
  Ambedkar was dedicated 
to the equality of all citizens and struggled, albeit unsuccessfully, to provide women with 
equal rights in matters of divorce and inheritance. Ambedkar’s legal work illustrates his 
commitment to universalist ideals and democracy in both government and social 
relations. 
While anthropological and historical work has examined the intersection of caste 
and gender social systems, these works focus mainly on the constraints of caste 
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regulation on upper caste women and largely neglect the conditions facing lower caste 
women.
544
  M.N. Srinivas suggests that the cultures of the lower castes embodied a 
matriarchal principle that afforded women more liberty and only with processes of 
“sanskritization” did lower caste women become victim to patriarchal oppression.
545
 
Scholarship on the non-Brahman movement in Maharashtra, most notably by Rosalind 
O’Hanlon, Uma Chakravarti, and Gail Omvedt, analyzes the incorporation of gender and 
caste critiques into Jotirao Phule, Tarabai Shinde, and Pandita Ramabai’s writings and 
work; these accounts, however, also focus on the plight of upper caste women.
546
  Andre 
Beteille, in a comparison of race and caste through gender, demonstrates that both 
systems of race and caste are marked by sexual violence towards women positioned on 
the lowest social strata by men on the highest as well as a preoccupation with the “purity” 
of women on the upper echelons of the social hierarchy.
547
 The essays in Caste and 
Gender, a collection of essays on issues related to dalit women published by the feminist 
press Kali for Women, has continued to challenge the analytic separation of caste and 
gender inequality. These essays contest both feminist and anti-caste social understandings 
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for marginalizing dalit women and have mounted a powerful critique of mainstream 
Indian feminism.  Rao, Pardeshi, Moon and Pawar, and Zelliot’s essays in this volume 
suggest that Ambedkar’s encouragement of dalit women’s political participation and 
advocacy for women’s legal rights reveals his opposition to patriarchal ideologies and 
practices.
548
 In the discussion that follows, I challenge this view. I examine how 
Ambedkar contests the patriarchal privilege of male caste-Hindu leaders such as Gandhi 
and how he strategically deploys patriarchal conceptions of women to advance his social 
and political goals.  I argue that Ambedkar’s critique of patriarchy is instrumentally 
applied to his larger project of the critique of caste and Hinduism and that Ambedkar 
prescribes patriarchal norms of domesticity and respectability for dalit women.   
 
 An Instrumentalist Critique of Patriarchy 
Ambedkar’s challenge to patriarchal relations is limited to those social relations 
that either hinder the development of an autonomous dalit political community or 
reinforce his critique of caste and untouchability.  I use “patriarchy” to mean not only 
male power over women but also to encompass a wide range of relations among men that 
emerge around the authority of older men. Patriarchal privilege underlies not only the 
marginalization of women by men, but also the authority that older men command over 
younger men. In this section, I analyze how Ambedkar confronts patriarchal authority in 
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his attempt to become spokesperson for the Depressed Classes. I then discuss his critique 
of patriarchy and argue that it is limited and tangential to his critique of caste. 
Ambedkar confronts and challenges patriarchal relations in his discussions with 
Gandhi and specifically, in his attempt to wrestle the authority to represent the Depressed 
Classes from Gandhi. In a speech at the Minorities Committee on November 13, 1931, 
Gandhi, after reasoning that separate electorates for the Depressed Classes was the most 
“unkindest cut of all,” argues that if there were an election, he rather than Ambedkar 
would receive the majority of Depressed Class votes.
549
  Gandhi had by this time already 
assumed the appellation “Bapu” and his repeated references to the “child-like faith” in 
him by the masses of India further identify him as a father figure. “I claim myself, in my 
own person,” he asserted, “to represent the vast majority of Untouchables.” He dismissed 
Ambedkar’s claim to represent the Depressed Classes, insulting him as someone whose 
“bitter experiences” have distorted his judgment and reason. “It is not a proper claim,” 
Gandhi stated, “which is registered by Dr. Ambedkar when he seeks to speak to for the 
whole of the Untouchables of India.”
550
 
In speeches and letters to Ambedkar, Gandhi repeatedly highlighted his years of 
experience contemplating and working on dalit issues. In one letter to Ambedkar, Gandhi 
wrote, “I understand that you have got some grievances against me and the Congress.  I 
may tell you that I have been thinking over the problem of Untouchables ever since my 
school days – when you were not even born.”
551
  Here, Gandhi seemed to be evoking the 
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reverence and submission older men mandate from younger men in a patriarchal system.  
He utilized his seniority to establish his authority over Ambedkar and consequently, his 
authority on issues affecting the Depressed Classes.  Ambedkar, however, had identified 
and challenged the premise of Gandhi’s authority.  “It is true, Mahatmaji,” Ambedkar 
conceded, “that you started to think about the problem of Untouchables before I was 
born.  All older and elderly persons always like to emphasize the point of age.”
552
 
Ambedkar then proceeded to question Congress’ commitment to the abolition of 
Untouchability and asserted that Untouchables “believe in self-help and self-respect. We 
are not prepared to have faith in great leaders or Mahatmas.”  With this, Ambedkar 
argued for the agency and capacity of dalits to change their conditions and 
simultaneously invalidated the patriarchal foundations of Gandhi’s authority. Gandhi 
later claimed that Ambedkar’s plan for achieving equality for Untouchables “arrest[s] the 
marvelous work of the Hindu reformers.”
553
  Ambedkar, he noted, failed to recognize 
“how dependent they [‘the Depressed Classes’] are on them [‘the so-called caste 
Hindus’].”
554
 To gain recognition as the spokesperson of the Depressed Classes by both 
the colonial state and Indians, Ambedkar had to invalidate Gandhi’s authority to 
represent the interests of the Untouchables.  Ambedkar did this in part by countering 
Gandhi’s patriarchal privilege and paternalistic approach with a declaration of the 
importance of experience to the ability to represent. The experience of untouchability, 
Ambedkar suggested, qualified and empowered him to represent the Depressed Classes 
of India.  He urged dalits to reject Gandhi’s paternalistic reform efforts and called upon 
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them to employ their agency in the pursuit of their betterment and in the annihilation of 
caste. 
Ambedkar’s challenge to patriarchal relations extended beyond the arena of elite 
male politics and can also be found in his analysis of sati, child marriage, and enforced 
widowhood, three of the most fervently debated practices in nineteenth and early 
twentieth century Hindu socio-religious reform movements. These practices, however, 
were largely confined to the upper-caste.  Ambedkar’s critique of patriarchy ignored 
patriarchal relations in lower caste communities and instead only targeted the practices 
and ideologies that affect the lives of upper caste women. Ambedkar argued that the 
practices of sati, child marriage, and enforced widowhood were created to maintain the 
caste system. Caste was perpetuated through endogamy and endogamy required, he 
explained, “equality in numbers of men and women” in the community population.
 555
  
“Surplus” women, he wrote, “become a problem because they can marry out and thus 
threaten the caste”; the caste system must, therefore, have some mechanisms for the 
regulation of female population, or at least female sexuality.
556
 Ambedkar astutely noted 
that while sati and enforced widowhood solved the problem of “surplus” women, the 
problem of “surplus” men could not be solved by either killing them or forcing them into 
celibacy. Ambedkar argued that the spiritual and economic well-being of the caste 
precluded this and that “surplus” men were afforded protection through the operation of 
patriarchy: 
557
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man as compared with woman has had the upper hand…With this traditional 
superiority of man over woman his wishes have always been consulted. Woman, 
on the other hand, had been an easy prey to all kinds of iniquitous injunctions, 





The position of men within the caste allowed them to remarry, but the structure of the 
caste system required that the bride come from “the ranks of those not yet marriageable 
in order to tie him down to the group.” Child marriage thus resolved the problem of 
“surplus” men. 
Ambedkar theorized that sati, enforced widowhood, and child marriage were the 
“means” of caste regulation and in order to make these seemingly cruel practices 
acceptable, a wide range of “ideals” centering on a wife’s devotion to her husband – the 
ideology of pativrata – had to be created.  As he wrote, “the very fact that these customs 
were so highly eulogized proves that they needed eulogy for their prevalence”; a belief in 
pativrata enabled practices which “must have been so abominable and shocking to the 
moral sense of the unsophisticated that they needed a great deal of sweetening.”
559
 
Pativrata, in Ambedkar’s analysis, was thus also a central ideology of the caste system.   
The colonial state in India had targeted cultural practices that related to women. In 
particular, sati, enforced widowhood, and child marriage were deemed evidence of the 
backwardness of Hindu society. The civilizing mission, a crucial legitimating ideology 
for colonial rule, was built upon the view of Indian women as degraded, disempowered, 
and ignorant. This simultaneously condemned Indian society and positioned the colonial 
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government as the bestower of “civilization” and modernity.
560
 For Indian socio-religious 
reformers, the revamping of tradition and the modernization of women became linked 
with the regeneration of community and the fitness of the nation.
561
  Sati, enforced 
widowhood, and child marriage were equally a concern for them and became the focus of 
both legislative intervention and Hindu socio-religious reform.  
Ambedkar’s analysis of pativrata as a derivative of caste ideology rendered the 
caste system responsible for generating the customs that signified Hindu society’s 
inferiority. His analysis was able to explain three of the most derided and notorious 
Hindu practices during colonialism as practices that functioned for the regulation and 
perpetuation of the caste system. Ambedkar’s critique of these customs seems largely 
strategic: by linking caste with the practices that were associated in both the colonial and 
reformist imagination with the backwardness of Indian civilization, Ambedkar was able 
to identify the caste system as both the (historical) point of origin of India’s civilizational 
decline and the most significant obstacle to India’s modernization.  Ambedkar did not 
offer a comprehensive analysis of how caste and patriarchy intersected in the lives of 
dalits; nor did he make gender inequality a concern in and of itself.  For Ambedkar, the 
relationship of gender inequality to caste was functional; the caste system was the 
primary unit for analysis and patriarchy was subsumed within it.  As Gabrielle Dietrich 
argues, “while he [Ambedkar] sees a connection between social evils like sati, child 
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marriage, ban on widow remarriage, caste and untouchability, his occupation is clearly 
with untouchability and caste.”
562
   
Ambedkar’s analysis of sati, child marriage, and enforced widowhood challenged 
and critiqued the dominant socio-religious reform movements of the time.  In the 
Annihilation of Caste, Ambedkar distinguished between social reform “in the sense of the 
reform of the Hindu Family and social reform in the sense of the reorganization and 
reconstruction of the Hindu Society.”
563
  While the former related to “widow remarriage, 
child marriage etc.,” the latter “relates to the abolition of the Caste system.” The social 
reform movements in India, he argued, only targeted the former. Ambedkar’s work 
demonstrated the connection between the two arenas of reform and showed that 
comprehensive social reform could occur without the abolition of caste.
564
  Nicholas 
Dirks argues that nineteenth century reform movements, with their focus on “Brahmanic 
practices,” simultaneously “worked to assert the primary importance of Brahmin customs 
for the definition of the Hindu Community.”
565
 Ambedkar seemed aware of this and its 
influence on the lower castes. In “Caste in India,” Ambedkar wrote that “the status of 
caste in the Hindu society varies directly with the extent of the observances of the 
customs of sati, enforced widowhood and girl marriage.”
566
 At a time when, as Zelliot 
notes, “other castes were ‘sanskritizing’ and adopting such older Brahmanical practices 
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as child marriage and prohibition of widow remarriage,” Ambedkar vehemently opposed 
the mimicry of upper caste customs.
567
 While a critique of patriarchy, albeit focused on 
the upper caste, can be discerned in this, Ambedkar’s opposition to these practices 
emerges from his critique of the caste system and his opposition to the creation of a 
majoritarian community based on Brahmanic practices. 
In The Annihilation of Caste, Ambedkar identified intermarriage – the “fusion of 
blood” – as that which “can alone create the feeling of being kith and kin” which would 
“serve as the solvent of caste.”
 568
 Scholars have viewed this advocacy of intermarriage as 
also a critique of the patriarchal control – via caste ideology – of women’s sexuality.
569
 
While Ambedkar was arguing for the liberalization of traditional sexual economies, his 
primary concern was not the restrictions on women’s sexuality.  Ambedkar seems to have 
two primary reasons for intermarriage: to disable the caste system and to rectify the 
inequality between lower caste men and upper caste men in their access to women.  He 
wrote that Manu mandated “each class to marry within his class” and was “particularly 
careful not to allow intermarriage to do harm to his principle of inequality among the 
masses”; intermarriage was allowed only when a man married “a woman from any class 
below him.”
570
 A lower caste man could not marry a woman from a higher caste and, as 
Ambedkar pointed out, a Shudra could be charged with adultery and put to death for 
marrying a higher caste woman.
571
 The rules of caste gave upper caste men unregulated 
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sexual access to lower caste women, while limiting a lower caste man’s sexual access to a 
much smaller pool of women.  Ambedkar’s writings on intermarriage thus did not 
endorse women’s choice in marriage or support giving women control over their 
sexuality; rather, Ambedkar’s objective seemed to be equality among men by giving 
lower caste men the same sexual privileges as upper caste men. 
 
A Strategic Patriarchy  
Ambedkar’s contestation of patriarchal ideologies and practices did not extend to 
the situation of dalit women and was limited to those practices that maintained inequality 
among men.  Furthermore, Ambedkar’s prescriptions for dalit women betray a view of 
gender relations that contradicts the principles of self-assertion, liberty, and 
empowerment found in his ideological approach to other social issues. Ambedkar was, 
however, an advocate for women’s literacy and political participation.  He professed at 
the All-India Depressed Class Women’s Conference: “I am a great believer in Women’s 
organization.  I know what they can do to improve the condition of society if they are 
convinced…Ever since I began to work among the Depressed Classes, I made it a point 
to carry women along with men. ”
572
 Ambedkar had organized conferences for women 
and encouraged their empowerment as reformers. Despite this, a patriarchal and 
paternalistic approach to gender issues pervades Ambedkar’s discussion of dalit women.  
While Ambedkar challenged upper caste patriarchy, he reproduces early twentieth-
century ideals for the upper caste woman in his prescriptions for dalit women. 
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Furthermore, Ambedkar suggested that the assertions and empowerment of dalit women 
could potentially threaten the strength of the dalit community.  
A correlation between the empowerment of women and the emasculation of men 
can be discerned not only in Ambedkar’s thoughts on dalit women, but also in his 
critiques of Hinduism.  In his discussion of Hindu goddesses, he claimed that whereas 
Vedic goddesses “were worshipped only because they were the wives of Gods,” Puranic 
goddesses are worshipped “in their own right” because they “went to the battlefield and 
performed great heroic deeds.”
573
  This, he maintained, made the Gods “a set of 
miserable cowards.” In this rendering, the strength of the goddesses emasculated the gods 
and diluted their power.  As Ambedkar argued, “it seems that the Gods could not defend 
themselves against the Asuras and had to beg of their wives to come to the rescue…How 
can such cowardly Gods have any prowess?”
574
  The “doctrine of Sakti,” Ambedkar 
continued, is an “absurdity.” Ambedkar not only dismisses the liberating possibilities of a 
principle of female power, but also suggested that the perversion of strong goddesses and 
emasculated gods had deluded and weakened their worshippers.    
The disparagement of women’s empowerment can also be found in Ambedkar’s 
assessment of the educational needs of the dalit community. In a speech delivered in 
1956, Ambedkar recalled that after noticing the large sum of money the colonial 
government invested in Hindu and Muslim education at Banaras Hindu University and 
Aligarh University, he asked the Viceroy to support education for the Depressed Classes. 
“The Europeans,” he recollected, “were very sympathetic.  They accepted my proposal. 
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The problem was on which item the money should be spent.”
575
  The government had 
allocated funds for the education, including boarding, of Depressed Class girls. 
Ambedkar regarded this allocation as contrary to his goals: “If our girls are provided 
education and made educated, where at home, is the material to cook various types of 
dishes? What is the end result of their education? The government spent the money on 
their heads and withheld the amount of education.”  Ambedkar approached the Viceroy 
again and explained that he had envisioned funding on education to produce men like 
himself, men whose “learning is so great” that they could “sit on the pinnacle of the 
palace.”  Ambedkar claimed that from such a position, “one can make overall 
surveillance” and if the Depressed classes were “to be protected, then sharp eyed men are 
to be created.”  The Viceroy agreed and “sixteen men were sent to England for higher 
education.” Ambedkar added, however, that “just as some earthen pots are half-baked 
and some baked, of those sixteen, some are half-baked and some are baked.” The funds 
lost on the “half-baked” men were brushed aside as “a different matter,” but funds lost to 
the education of girls were controversial enough to be included in his speech. Ambedkar 
suggested that women’s education would disrupt their performance of domestic labor and 
would interfere with their roles as caregivers. He envisioned a community led by men 
and women’s roles were limited to those as wives and mothers; empowerment that would 
detract from these primary roles was deemed a potential harm to the community.  
Ambedkar suggested that a significant way women could assist in the 
construction of a politically and socially formidable dalit community was by conforming 
to dominant standards of domesticity and respectability.  He remained vigilant against 
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women subverting his vision of dalit empowerment and in speeches to or about 
Depressed Class women, he utilized the language of community rather than that of the 
individual. Women’s behavior and gender relations within the community indexed the 
respectability of the community as a whole. Thus, while he endorsed certain types of 
reform, he also marginalized and ostracized sectors of the dalit community. 
“Self-respect,” Ambedkar declared, “is a most vital factor in life.”
576
  Two distinct 
concepts can be discerned in this concept: One aspect relates to personal dignity, a self-
assertion of equality as a counterpoint to feelings of inferiority. The other relates to 
honor, or the embodiment of qualities that confer a sense of equality and respect through 
their social signification. Ambedkar’s conceptualized self-respect as a transformative 
affect that could generate a new social and political identity. The concept of self-respect, 
however, also seemed to include a coercive directive to women to assume the practices 
deemed respectable by more socially and politically powerful communities.  
For example, although Ambedkar opposed the adoption of upper-caste customs 
such as sati and enforced widowhood, he instructed dalit women to imitate the self-
presentation of upper-caste women.  Ambedkar viewed the silver jewelry and short saris 
commonly adorned by Mahar women as marks of their subjugation and advised them to 
dress like their upper-caste counterparts.  Pratima Pardeshi argues that this does not 
convey Ambedkar’s endorsement of the “brahmanisation of dalit women,” but rather 
indicates that “Dr. Ambedkar saw the question of the dalit woman’s identity of self-
respect as crucial to social reform and to the revolutionary struggle.”
577
  Pardeshi 
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suggests that the rejection of dress codes enforced by caste was pivotal to the 
empowerment of the community.  However, while Ambedkar maintained dalit women’s 
equality with upper-caste women and encouraged dalit women, through their dress, to 
defy caste inequality, “self-respect” was earned by embodying an upper-caste habitus. 
Self-respect and social change thus also depended on recasting dalit women’s identities to 
fit upper caste notions of respectability. 
Ambedkar marginalized dalit women whose activities challenged his vision of a 
self-respecting and respectable community.  For example, he found the work of 
prostitutes in Bombay so shameful that he refused to integrate them into his movement.
578
  
In an act that revealed his privileging of honor above rights, Ambedkar demanded that 
the prostitutes abandon their “disgraceful life.”
579
  In a meeting in 1936, he declared that 
“the Mahar women of Kamathipura are a shame to the community.”  “Unless you are 
prepared to change your ways,” he instructed, “we shall have no use for you.  There are 
only two ways open to you: either you remain where you are and continue to be 
depressed and shunned, or you give up your disgraceful profession and come with us.”  
In Gail Omvedt’s recounting of this incident, she notes that the prostitutes had hoped that 
Ambedkar would use his stature to protect them from police harassment. Ambedkar’s 
refusal conveys his willingness to disregard for the safety of these dalit women in order 
to strengthen the reputation of the community. Ambedkar – despite his commitment to 
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equality, individualism, liberty, and fraternity – privileged the honor of the community 
over the rights to equality and fraternity of some of its members.  He ignored the 
structural and material conditions facing these women as well as their potential 
exploitation by the police. Omvedt points out that Ambedkar received criticism from 
other “caste reformers…for ignoring the severe economic constraints that drove women 
to this profession.”
580
 She argues that Ambedkar’s position indicates his advocacy of 
“self-respect over economic constraints”; by asserting the prostitutes “ability to choose 
and act,” Ambedkar, “refused to see the women simply as victims.”
581
  Ambedkar, 
however, did not take into consideration material limitations on their agency.  He also 
represented the prostitutes as a source of “shame” and a blight on the honor of the 
community. Furthermore, Ambedkar repeatedly used the figure of the prostitute in a 
derogatory sense in metaphors and analogies in his writings and speeches.
582
  The 
prostitute symbolized a woman who lacked virtue and self-respect and possessed an 
“immoral character.”  Given the large number of dalit prostitutes in Bombay, his choice 
of language suggests not only their marginalization in Ambedkar’s movement, but also 
the degree to which Ambedkar distances himself from them in public representations of 
the community.  
Interestingly, dalit women, unlike upper caste women, were rarely represented as 
victims in Ambedkar’s accounts; more often than not, they were cast as the objects of 
reform. When they were represented as victims, it was usually to bring attention to the 
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social and political marginalization of dalits in India. For example, Ambedkar discussed 
the release of a man who raped a fourteen year old dalit girl.  Noting the lack of “fair play 
and justice” in the parole of her attacker, Ambedkar commented on the impotence of the 
community in Times of India: “We [the dalits] are destined to be a minority.  We can only 
criticize.  We can never hope to control.”
583
  
In his speech to the Bombay prostitutes, Ambedkar directed them to “marry and 
settle down to normal domestic life as women of other classes do.”
584
  Marriage would 
restore both the prostitutes and the community’s honor.  In his speech to the Second 
Session of the All-India Depressed Classes Women’s Conference in 1942, Ambedkar 
reiterated his advocacy of patriarchal gender norms.  He spoke to the conference 
attendees as mothers – as the custodians of the community – and instructs them on how to 
perform their domestic life: 
Learn to be clean; keep free from all vices.  Give education to your children.  
Instill ambition in them.  Inculcate on their minds that they are destined to be 
great.  Remove from them all inferiority complex.  Don’t be in a hurry to marry: 
marriage is a liability.  You should not impose it on your children unless 
financially they are able to meet the liabilities arising from marriage.  Those who 
will marry will bear in mind that to have too many children is a crime.  That 
Parental duty lies in giving each child a better start than its parents had.  Above 
all, let each girl who marries stand up to her husband, claim to be her husband’s 
friend and equal and refuse to be his slave.  I am sure if you follow this advice 




In this and other statements, Ambedkar espoused the model of domesticity and 
respectability associated with the ‘new woman.’  The ‘new woman,’ the model of proper 
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femininity formulated by late nineteenth-century nationalist and socio-religious reform 
movements, was educated, financially prudent, modest, and hygienic; she indexed both 
the respectability and modernity of the community. 
586
  The companionate model of 
marital relations, a Victorian ideal which positioned the wife as both the partner and 
helpmate of her husband, formed the paradigm for the new woman’s relations with her 
husband. The “‘new woman,’” as Partha Chatterjee writes, “was subjected to a new 
patriarchy”
587
  It is this ‘new’ vision of gender relations, a paradigm of both modernity 
and respectability created by elite sectors in colonial society, that Ambedkar prescribed 
for dalit women. 
Chatterjee argues that the new woman is identified not only through her 
difference from the westernized woman but also from the lower class and lower caste 
woman. “Maidservants, washer women, barbers, peddlers, procuresses, prostitutes” were 
among the figures popularly represented as these women. “It was precisely this 
degenerate condition of women,” Chatterjee adds, “that nationalism claimed it would 
reform, and it was through these contrasts that the new woman of nationalist ideology 
was accorded a status of cultural superiority to the Westernized woman…as well as to the 
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common woman of the lower classes.”
588
The denigration of lower class and caste women 
in nationalist ideology seems to have become particularly problematic for Ambedkar in 
his attempt to construct a respectable and honorable social and political community.  
Ambedkar seems to have accepted the nationalist rendering of the ‘modern’ woman and 
urged the Depressed Classes to assume the gender roles and relations of the new, 
‘modern’ patriarchy. He did not challenge the nationalist and reformist paradigms of 
respectability and domesticity; rather, he demanded that dalit women embody them.  For 
Ambedkar, a dalit community socially and politically equal to the upper caste sectors of 
society would require the lower caste woman to refashion herself as the ‘new woman.’ 
 
A New Template for a Humanistic Universalism 
Ambedkar’s discussions of gender after Indian independence reveal a shift in 
focus from respectability to rights.  While his earlier discussions contain instrumental 
critiques of upper-caste patriarchy and paternalistic directives for the domestic reform of 
dalit women lives, Ambedkar’s work on the Constitution of India and the Hindu Code 
Bill exemplified his  commitment to women’s legal and political equality as citizens of 
India. Ambedkar’s respect for the individual and commitment to the principles of 
equality, liberty, and fraternity are evident in the laws he drafted.  As Pratima Pardeshi 
writes, Ambedkar undid Manu’s “caste-based and patriarchal law” and provided India 
with a new template for social relations.
589
 This template was based on “fraternity,” 
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which, Ambedkar argued, “is only another name for democracy.”
590
   Ambedkar, 
however, feared that the legal principle of equality would not be sufficient to combat the 
deeply ingrained sexism and castism in Indian society.  He feared, as Gauri Viswanathan 
argues, that “secular differentiation” in India could be “consistent with rather than an 
alternative to a social philosophy based on hierarchy.”
591
  Ambedkar reasoned that this 
alternative would have to come in the form of community identity and would have to 
counter the limitations of liberal democracy in generating social change. 
592
  He found 
this alternative in the renunciation of Hinduism and conversion to Buddhism. 
Ambedkar’s frustrations with the liberal democratic state peaked when the Hindu 
Code Bill could not be passed as he had envisioned. After years of championing the Bill 
and participating in its debate, Ambedkar resigned from Nehru’s Cabinet on September 
25, 1951, noting that he had only stayed on in Nehru’s government despite his differences 
with the administration in the hopes of getting the Bill passed.  Ambedkar argued that the 
Bill was intended to give “the widow, the daughter, the widow of the pre-deceased 
son…the same rank as the son in the matter of inheritance.  In addition to that, the 
daughter also is given a share of her father’s property; her share is prescribed as half of 
that of his son.”
593
 In this way, the Bill countered the ideology of son preference that 
undergird gender inequity in Hindu culture. Moreover, by affording widows and 
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daughters equal status in inheritance, Ambedkar encouraged the financial independence 
of women and placed an obstacle to the exploitation of their labor, especially the widow’s 
labor.  He conceded that although the “large majority of our countrymen do not accept” 
the bill, it passed the “test of one’s conscience”; in order to remove the “obstruction of 




In his resignation letter, Ambedkar wrote that the Hindu Code Bill “was the 
greatest social reform measure ever undertaken by the Legislature of this country,” but 
that Nehru “although sincere, had not the earnestness and determination required to get 
the Hindu Code Bill through.”
595
  Ambedkar’s resignation letter also expressed extreme 
disappointment and frustration with the administration’s neglect of issues affecting the 
Scheduled Castes.   He concluded that “to leave inequality between class and class, 
between sex and sex which is the soul of Hindu society untouched and to go on passing 
legislation relating to economic problems is to make a farce of our Constitution and to 
build a palace on a heap of dung.”
596
 
Disenchanted with the efficacy of the liberal democratic ‘secular’ state to overturn 
Hindu social relations, Ambedkar turned to Buddhism to provide the foundation for the 
community and ethics that could replace the inequality and differentiation in Indian 
society.  Conversion to Buddhism was an explicit critique of the inequality and 
segmentation that characterized Hindu society and provided, as Omvedt argues, an 
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opportunity to “redefine and reconstitute…relations with the whole of Indian society, 
with its various groups, its historical and cultural traditions.”
597
 The social vision 
Ambedkar found in Buddhism was one of egalitarianism, rights, and social camaraderie 
and in this way can broadly be characterized as feminist.  While many of the oaths 
required for conversion, such as vegetarianism, marital fidelity, and teetotalism, 
embodied the practices of upper-caste Hindu reformist respectability, these practices no 
longer conferred a notion of ritual purity, but rather related to a social ethic based on 
community.
598
  For example, as Pardeshi notes, the prohibition against alcohol was 
intended to help hinder marital violence against women.
599
  Ambedkar reformulated 
Buddhism to supplement “a modern liberal philosophy”; his Buddhism was a “religion 
with a social mission” that “answered the needs of India’s depressed millions.”
600
  The 
transcendental components of religion were understated in favor of the ideological, which 
provided the principles for the restructuring of social relations. 
Ambedkar’s histories of ancient India recounted a past for the nation that diverged 
from that imagined by both the socio-religious reform movements and other nationalist 
leaders. The age of Buddhism, which constituted the golden age of Indian civilization in 
Ambedkar’s narrative, provided the historical antecedent for the repudiation of Hindu 
beliefs and its corresponding social relations. Ambedkar, like other reformers, employed 
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a “trope of decline” and drew parallels between the civilizational status of each period 
and the status of women.
601
 However, while Ambedkar’s histories remained within the 
nationalist and reformist genre in terms of structure and metaphors, his narrative imparted 
a very different representation of the past and consequently, different aspirations for the 
future. 
Uma Chakravarti discusses the prominence of idealizations of a supposed ancient 
Aryan Age as the golden age of India in the socio-religious reformist and nationalist 
imagination.  The civilizational merits of this golden age was indexed by the figure of 
“the Aryan woman,” who “came to occupy the center of the stage in the recounting of 
‘the wonder that was India’” and personified “an amalgamation of Brahmanical and 
Kshatriya values.”
602
 Ambedkar’s vision of the past departed from this representation and 
illustrated the Aryan Age as an oppressive and morally-bankrupt time. The Aryan Age 
was marked by gambling, intoxication, and perverse sexual and gender relations.  
Ambedkar used the examples of Draupadi and Sita and to argue against the celebration of 
Aryan women as models for contemporary today. “We wonder why Draupadi never had 
been given a chance to gamble away her five husbands,” he wrote, “or Sita an 
opportunity to send her calumniators and doubters on the pyre onto the woods.”
603
   
In Ambedkar’s histories of ancient India, Buddhism incited a social revolution 
that both denounced the caste system and its bars on intermarriage and inter-dining and 
liberated women and advanced their status in society. Buddhism gave women “the right 
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to knowledge and the right to realize their spiritual potentialities along with man.”
604
  
Ambedkar claimed that “the Buddha did not place any premium on virginity as such.  He 
kept his way open to all classes of women – married, unmarried, widows, and even 
prostitutes.”
605
 The inclusion of “prostitutes” is noteworthy considering Ambedkar’s 
rejection of them earlier in his life. Perhaps recognizing the limitations of his earlier 
judgments on respectability, Ambedkar extolled the Buddha’s inclusive and egalitarian 
project. “Under the Buddhist regime,” Ambedkar argued, women enjoyed equality with 
men in all matters, including property and marriage; she “became a free person.”
606
 
Following the Aryan Age and the era of Buddha’s revolution, the third period in 
Ambedkar’s history of India was ushered in with the revolution of Pushyamitra. 
Buddhism was overthrown and in a counter-revolution and Brahmanism was re-
established as the prevailing social system.  Manu provided the legal institutionalization 
of Brahmanism.  Caste, in its most severe forms was legitimated, and practices like 
endogamy, sati, child marriage and enforced widowhood were enacted to regulate caste.  
Manu, Ambedkar argued, was responsible for the downfall of the Indian woman; he 
“wanted to deprive women of the freedom they had under the Buddhistic regime.”
607
  
Ambedkar explained that women were not permitted to divorce and were denied access 
                                                 
604
 Ambedkar argues that “Buddhism was a revolution.  It was as great as the French Revolution.” It began 
as a religious movement, but resulted in both the social and political restructuring of Indian society.  
605
 Ambedkar, “The Rise and Fall of the ‘Hindu Woman’: Who was Responsible for it?,” Dr. Babasaheb 
Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Vol. 17, Part 2, eds. Hare Narake, Dr. M. L. Kasare, et al. (Mumbai: 
Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Source Materials Publication Committee, Government of Maharashtra, 2003), 
121.  
606
 Ambedkar, “Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Ancient India,” 310. Ambedkar also notes that the 
status of women in Buddhist countries is higher than that in India.  He argues that this is in part because 
“the Buddhist wife does not look up to her husband as a god, she is not expected to eat after her husband 
has finished his meal or immolate herself after her husband’s death as an alternative to life of utter 
dejection.” See Ambedkar “The Rise and Fall of the ‘Hindu Woman’: Who was Responsible for it?,” 496.     
607
 Ambedkar, “Rise and Fall,” 125.  
272 
 




Ambedkar’s movement for conversion to Buddhism was thus an appeal to return 
to the social relations that marked the Buddhist regime in India. Buddhism provided an 
ethical framework that, in conjunction with the legal guarantees of the Constitution, could 
transform Indian society.  Conversion would allow women to escape the patriarchy 
created by both Hinduism and the Indian state’s legislation and enter a more egalitarian 
social system. For Ambedkar, it was the Buddhist woman, an educated, empowered and 




Ambedkar concluded his discussion on the status of women in the different 
periods of Indian history by noting that those in the past prescribed roles for women 
based on the needs of their day and that critiquing them would not be help achieve the 
empowerment of women today.  Perhaps this also applies to a gendered reading of 
Ambedkar’s writings and speeches. Ambedkar’s social and political thought remains a 
testament to his ideological independence and his commitment to the empowerment of all 
individuals.  His radical critiques of both the principle of hierarchy and majoritarianism 
maintain their salience today.  Many of his views on women and gender relations, 
however, stand in contradiction with the values espoused in his work.  They reveal a 
blindness to women’s subjectivities and the structural and material constraints affecting 
their lives. His views on women, however, also point to the predicament of a colonized 
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and minority group attempting to forge a strong and respectable social and political 
community.  Not only was Ambedkar constrained by the politics of the colonial state and 
the play of “communities” for power, he was also not impervious to the prevailing 
discourses on gender that linked particular modes of respectability with modernity.  
Ambedkar also had to contend with the denigration of the dalit community by the 
majority of other Indians; his conflicting and at points, patriarchal views on gender 
indicate the elusiveness of a truly feminist politics in a context in which the men of a 
community are rendered socially and politically impotent.  While the very notion of 
untouchability – a notion premised on the logic of defilement and the psychology of 
aversion – may have presented an additional burden that shaped his views on gender 
relations, it is clear that Ambedkar’s endorsement of norms of domesticity and 
respectability for dalit women contradicted his ideology of rights, self-help, and self-
respect.  Ambedkar’s endorsement of patriarchal relations for dalits during colonialism 
represents a limit to his universalist ideology; his legislative work and movement for 
conversion to Buddhism, however, may reveal his hope for the establishment of a 
feminist universalism in post-independent India. 
Today Ambedkar remains a hero for all dalits, both men and women.  Despite the 
contradictions in his ideas on women and gender, it could be argued that the very idea of 
Ambedkar functions to deliver a message of the universal right to dignity and social and 
political equality.  For this, it seems that feminists as well pay tribute to Ambedkar as a 
champion of gender equality.  The contradictions in his message, however, are still part 
of the intellectual tradition inherited by the dalit movement.  Dalit feminists, as discussed 
in the last chapter, contend with the patriarchal tendencies in the dalit movement and find 
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one, if partial, resolution to these contradictions by reaching abroad for solidarity with 
women who are in a similar structural position in their societies. It seems that 
transnational alliances and the internationalization of the caste, class, and gender 
structured discrimination and violence have enabled dalit feminists to both transcend 





Scholarship and popular opinions on Ambedkar seem to fall into two camps: 
either Ambedkar is unreflectively extolled as a defender of equality and social justice in 
modern India or he is denigrated as disloyal to the nation, an outsider who colluded with 
the British and contributed little to the nation. This division precludes nuanced critiques 
that engage with his work and legacy from multiple perspectives – critiques that carry the 
potential to elucidate the shortcomings of Ambedkar’s liberation philosophy for dalits. In 
the previous chapter, I strived to open up one such critique. By elaborating on the sexist 
and exclusionary aspects of Ambedkar’s work and philosophy, I suggest that a feminist 
critique of Ambedkar could elucidate some of the tensions and contradictions present in 
contemporary dalit activism. In a context where statues of Ambedkar are frequently 
desecrated and dalits across India continue to face the threat of violence for asserting 
their right to dignity, this elucidation, however, is fraught; any critique of Ambedkar then 
runs the risk of manipulation by factions against the political empowerment of dalits. 
This may explain why dalit feminists seem to venerate Ambedkar as a champion of 
women’s rights and empowerment, even as they rework his political philosophy and 
prescriptions for dalit women.   
This dissertation – although focused on transnational dalit activism – includes 
such a lengthy discussion of Ambedkar not only because his theories of and strategies for 
liberation have provided a foundation and guide for contemporary activists, but also 
because his search for a resolution to caste inequality has certain uncanny parallels with 
276 
 
transnational dalit activists.  For both Ambedkar and the dalit activists discussed in this 
dissertation, disillusionment with the workings of the state propelled a search for new 
resources for dalit liberation. Both felt that the state had failed to live up to the promises 
of the Constitution.  Ambedkar then turned to Buddhism for a new cultural identity for 
dalits and for a code of ethics to supplement the laws and policies of the newly 
independent Indian state. The transnational turn in dalit activism similarly sought new 
resources to shed identities defined by caste and the state and to create a new notion of 
dalit identity. Transnationalism, like Buddhism, provided membership in another form of 
community and it is this community that held the possibility of emancipation from caste.  
Historical consciousness of Buddhism as an ancestral religion – a consciousness 
imparted from histories of ancient India authored by Ambedkar – supported conversion 
and in this way, for Ambedkar, the past was intertwined with a vision of a caste-less 
future. Transnational dalit activism presents a similar blurring of temporalities: the 
emancipatory project of dalit activism seems premised on the calibration of an 
aspirational politics with a politics oriented towards the past. Human rights by definition 
in liberal theory are intrinsic, transcendent, and hence, outside of time. To appeal to rights 
is thus to harness their atemporal and transcendent power to restore that which should be 
immanent.  In transnational dalit activism, however, rights are not immanent, but rather 
emerge from social relations, and crucially, from social relations that run across time. 
Dalit activism, supplements an appeal to human rights with a historical argument for 
rights. This historical argument is in time, emerges from social relationships, past and 
present, and is grounded in a right to justice.  While activism for rights is always already 
future-oriented, activism for justice is by necessity retrospective in nature; the former 
277 
 
works on the present to bring about change for a better future, while the latter is 
configured as a compensatory action for a past wrong. Although justice is conventionally 
approached in utilitarian terms – i.e., acts for the greater social good – or in terms of 
fairness, reciprocity, and mutual advantage, justice as it emerges in the work of dalit 
activists can be better categorized as historical. Here, justice is not an abstract principle, 
but rather an action against past injustice.  Just as Ambedkar’s genealogy of 
untouchability and histories of ancient India provided a template for action in the present 
and aspirations for the future, memory and historical consciousness similarly give form to 
contemporary dalit activism. 
For dalit activists, duties towards the dead seem to have an important function in 
setting the agenda for social justice.  This perhaps helps explain why the Indian 
Constitution – a document created under Ambedkar’s leadership – emerges as a more 
liberating doctrine than the discourse of human rights. The Indian Constitution allows for 
the recognition of the past and its legacy in the present for the calibration of rights and 
duties. Liberal rights, however, are neither directed towards the “atoning of injustice” nor 
the pursuit of justice. The theory of human rights also does not leave room for the 
recognition of histories of exploitation, degradation, and injustice.  Dalit memory and 
historical consciousness preclude a strictly future-oriented or aspirational politics for dalit 
activism; the past is deemed an imposition on the present and thus demands resolution. 
  Transnational dalit activism, however, utilizes the political logic of universal 
human rights in creative ways and here, also significantly departs from Ambedkar’s anti-
caste movement. Transnational activism seeks support from groups and institutions 
outside of the nation-state.  It internationalizes issues of caste to forge alliances with 
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other social justice movements and to generate international pressure on the Indian state 
to act in the interests of dalits.  By articulating the problems of dalits in India in the 
language of human rights, dalit activists counter the assumed national or regional 
specificity of caste inequality and render this inequality just like that of the racism and 
exploitation of the Jim Crow South or South African Apartheid; the deracination of 
indigenous groups in the Americas; or the calculated genocide of the Holocaust.  These 
analogies have both political and pedagogical significance and offer a conceptualization 
of human rights as a citationary practice.  In this way, dalit identity is also constructed 
through the citation of other groups – groups outside of India that are perceived as having 
comparable histories of oppression and as sharing comparable structural positions in their 
home societies. “Caste” in these arguments becomes a generalizable category.  It is not a 
phenomenon specific to India or Hinduism, but rather, is described as a form of 
discrimination based on descent that is found across the world. Caste is a global 
phenomenon and a global problem in transnational dalit activism.   
Several of the activists discussed in this dissertation spent time abroad before they 
became involved in transnational activism. Both Martin Macwan and Ruth Manorama, 
for example, cited time abroad, in which they learned about other minority communities 
and met activists working on their behalf, as formative experiences. These experiences 
influenced their analysis of the problems of dalits at home and generated new ideas about 
their potential solutions.  While firmly rooted in the local experiences and histories of the 
dalits they represent and advocate for, both activists and the organizations they have 
founded – the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights, Navsarjan Trust, and the 
National Federation for Dalit Women – have also forged ties with groups outside of 
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India. By perceiving parallels in historical experiences and structural positions in society, 
they and other dalit activists have worked against the “isolation” of dalits, a predicament 
that disturbed Ambedkar decades earlier.  
Transnational dalit activism, as exemplified by the work of Macwan and 
Manorama, thus challenges commonly held assumptions about the circulation of 
knowledge. Here, knowledge does not follow routes between the global North and South, 
or center and periphery. Rather, knowledge travels between and among marginalized 
groups of people and transnationalism takes the form of South-South linkages. The study 
of transnational dalit activism offers an opening for writing new histories and genealogies 
of ideas of equality, justice, and rights for it reveals how knowledge about these ideals is 
developed through dialogue between marginalized groups. As Manjula Pradeep, current 
director of Navsarjan, commented as she explained the transnational orientation of dalit 
activism to me, dalits are “shar[ing] our problems and issues and strategies” and 
“get[ting] exposed” to the conditions faced by marginalized groups in other countries. 
“We have to exchange across countries,” she insisted; doing this “gets us away from this 
isolation and… [from] segregating ourselves and ghettoizing ourselves.”  Instead of 
viewing oneself as “an untouchable,” Manjula said, “looking at a broader level and 
saying that whoever is discriminated, whether based on caste, gender, religion, ethnicity, 
is part of this larger global movement” is both inspiring and empowering for dalits.  “So, 
that’s what we’re trying to inculcate,” she said; “we’re trying to bring more and more 
people together.” She added that social justice movements such as the civil rights 
movement in the U.S. and the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa had provided 
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models that helped support commitments to protest and optimism in the possibilities for 
change.   
Transnational dalit activism thus offers a glimpse into the historical consciousness 
and aspirations that motivate the political life of a group doubly and triply marginalized 
in a postcolonial country as they struggle for dignity, safety, and well-being. It projects 
new possibilities and models of global activism. The political imaginings generated 
through this have also, as Pradeep stated, motivated and sustained struggles for social 
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